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ABSTRACT
“ON NEPTUNES WATRY REALMES”:
MARITIME LAW AND ENGLISH RENAISSANCE LITERATURE
MAY 2021
HAYLEY COTTER, B.A., OHIO DOMINICAN UNIVERSITY
M.A., NEW MEXICO STATE UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Joseph Black
This dissertation stages an unprecedented dialogue between the maritime, the
literary, and the legal within the context of the English Renaissance. It positions the
ocean as an essentially legal space and argues that law mediates all human-ocean
interactions. Additionally, it contends that an understanding of legal conceptions of the
sea is essential to developing a cultural awareness of maritime space. Therefore, my
project resituates early modern literary engagements with the ocean within a complex
body of legal and political discourses and argues that in an island nation such as England,
knowledge of the sea was widespread. Consequently, the ubiquitous maritime references
in the period’s literature were founded on real legal knowledge that literary scholars can
consider in their readings of these texts. Through its synthesis of canonical literary works
such as Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene (1590, 1596) and Michael Drayton’s PolyOlbion (1612, 1622) and legal texts such as William Welwood’s An Abridgement of all
Sea-Lawes (1613), Alberico Gentili’s Hispanicae advocationis libri duo (1613), and John
Selden’s Mare clausum (1635), this dissertation offers four case studies that illuminate
the rich possibilities when maritime law inhabits the same scholarly space as English
Renaissance literature.
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INTRODUCTION

A novel scholarly topic—a matter of first impression, as referred to in law—
grants the scholar who sets down its path both considerable freedom and scholarly
responsibility. If executed effectively, then the topic unfurls for others in the field who,
too, may find themselves surveying its attendant trails. Its incipiency proves its greatest
asset, and its conclusions represent the starting point of additional investigations. A poor
execution, however, can dissuade future prospectors by convincing them the path too
serpentine, and the journey too arduous, for rewarding scholarly payoff. Any merits of
the topic become entangled in weeds, and the path itself grows overcovered and
forgotten. As a result of this inherent risk, a pioneering intellectual inquiry requires the
employment of the full range of tools in one’s scholarly arsenal.
This dissertation investigates such an issue. It stages an unprecedented dialogue
between the maritime, the legal, and the literary within the context of the English
Renaissance. Because of this project’s unpathed waters and undreamed shores, its central
argument, one that informs each chapter, is that the link between maritime law and
English Renaissance literature is indeed a productive one, that it lends itself to a variety
of questions, methods, approaches, and texts, and that it provides myriad opportunities
for others to investigate its major themes. My project positions the ocean as an essentially
legal space. It argues that all human-ocean interactions are necessarily mediated by some
form of law. Additionally, it contends that a nuanced understanding of these legal
conceptions of the ocean is essential to developing a cultural understanding of maritime
spaces, one that extends to different historical periods and geographical locations, and
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one that applies to different types of law. While my own research engages with
Renaissance literature within an early modern legal and cultural framework, it more
broadly demonstrates the scholarly payoff of applying a legal lens to the sea. This legal
lens, I posit, transcends the needs of the legal scholar or the naval historian. It touches
many branches of scholarship: the ocean has played a central role in much of human
history and has touched colonialism and imperialism; the rise of capitalism; the exchange
of ideas and cultures; global migration; technologies of science and navigation; political
discord; and questions of territorial claims. Because the early modern period witnessed
many of these paradigmatic shifts, it presents a useful site at which to begin this type of
inquiry. Therefore, my research resituates early modern literary engagements with the
ocean within a complex body of legal and political discourses and argues that in an island
nation such as England, knowledge of the sea was widespread. Consequently, the
ubiquitous maritime references in the period’s literature were founded on real legal
knowledge that literary scholars can consider in their readings of these works.
In the early modern period, the maritime, the legal, and the literary were each
marked by an inherent tension: on the one hand, pulled forward by navigational,
jurisprudential, and aesthetic innovations; on the other, pulled backward, beholden to
maritime custom, legal conservatism, and literary antiquarianism. While this tension
manifested itself differently in each case, the core unease remained, and this core forms
the foundation of my dissertation.
During the sixteenth century, maritime expansion and advances in naval
technology rendered the surface of the globe an increasingly small space. Perhaps the
most striking example of these advances comes not from England, but from Spain and
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Portugal. When Christopher Columbus crossed the Atlantic during the autumn of 1492,
his crew commanded a carrack and caravels that had not been built for transoceanic
voyages. As recently as the early fifteenth century, most piloting depended on always
being within view of the coast, and the concept of sailing on the high seas for extended
periods befuddled the period’s mariners.1 His initial voyage had earned Columbus the
title of Admiral of the Ocean Sea. Less than thirty years later, when Ferdinand Magellan
crossed the Pacific during his circumnavigation of the globe, he did not see land for over
three months. Ravaged with scurvy and near death—nineteen men perished during the
voyage—the desperate crew finally landed on the Mariana Islands of present-day Guam
on March 6, 1521. In his account of the transpacific passage, Antonio Pigafetta wrote:
We sailed about four thousand leagues during those three months and twenty days
through an open stretch in that Pacific Sea. In truth it is very pacific, for during
that time we did not suffer any storm, and we saw no land except two desert islets,
where we found nothing but birds and trees … Daily we made runs of fifty, sixty,
or seventy leagues with the wind at the windward side or at the stern, and had not
God and His blessed mother given us such good weather we would have all died
of hunger in that exceedingly vast sea. In truth I believe no such voyage will ever
be repeated.2
Between 1492 and 1521, the seas of the world had shrunk, and European navigation had
moved from pilotage beholden largely to a view of the shore to the crossing of Earth’s
largest ocean. This shift represents a fundamental reorientation of the European
worldview, one whose effects still reverberate.

1

See G.V. Scammell, The First Imperial Age: European Overseas Expansion c.1400-1715
(London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 54-55; N.A.M. Rodger, The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval
History of Britain, 660-1649 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1998), 161-62.
Antonio Pigafetta, The First Voyage Around the World, 1519-1522: An Account of Magellan’s
Expedition, trans. Theodore J. Cachey, Jr. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 25.
2
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Although England arrived rather late on the scene, the English Navy became
permanent during the reign of Henry VIII and advances throughout the century led to the
emergence of England as a major presence on the global ocean.3 Yet with these advances
came an attendant nostalgia for a nautical past. Richard Hakluyt’s The Principall
Navigations, Voiages and Discoveries of the English Nation (1589) instills in its reader
the impression that England’s naval prowess had existed since time immemorial.
Although largely apocryphal and at times falling into the fantastic, Hakluyt’s work
celebrates an English maritime history that stretches back to Arthur himself. But The
Principall Navigations did not radically reconfigure the English orientation to the sea.
Long before the defeat of the Spanish Armada, the English recognized the naval
advantage enjoyed by an island nation. In the mid-1430s, an anonymous poem
(erroneously attributed to Adam Moleyns in the early twentieth century), The Libelle of
Englyshe Polycye, urged the English to “cherish merchandise, keep the Admiralty / That
we be masters of the Narrow Sea,” and one manuscript copy is titled “An exhortation to
continue the strength of the Navy of England in the Narrow Sea.”4 Hakluyt, accordingly,
included a copy of the Libelle in The Principall Navigations. But one need not look back
to the fifteenth century to locate such maritime nostalgia in early modern England. In the
second book of William Browne’s Britannia’s Pastorals (1616), for example, the poet
recalls the defeat of the Spanish Armada twenty-eight years earlier. Browne reminisces:
So by our heroes were we led of yore,
And by our drums that thunder’d on each shore,
Struck with amazement countries far and near;
Whist their inhabitants, like herds of deer
3

See Rodger, 164-346.

4

See Rodger, 152; The Libelle of Englyshe Polycye: A Poem on the Use of Sea-power, ed.
George Frederic Warner (Oxford: Clarendon, 1926), xiv.
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By kingly lions chas’d, fled from our arms.
If any did oppose instructed swarms
Of men immail’d Fate drew them on to be
A greater fame to our got victory. (2.4.73-80)
But this earlier period of glory could not sustain itself, Browne opines:
But now our leaders want; those vessels lie
Rotting, like houses through ill husbandry;
And on their masts, where oft the ship-boy stood,
Or silver trumpets charm’d the brackish flood,
Some wearied crow is set, and daily seen
Their sides instead of pitch caulk’d o’er with green. (2.4.81-86) 5
Within a generation, the golden age of Elizabethan sound government had faded, leaving
abandoned ships moored mournfully at Devon’s ports, sad specters of a former glory. For
Browne, maritime deterioration served as a powerful surrogate for political decay.
Legal contours in the early modern period underwent paradigm-shifting changes
as well. The scholarly question of English law and the Renaissance was first addressed
seriously by legal historian Frederic Maitland in his famous Rede Lecture of 1901.
Indeed, so influential were his opinions that all legal historians writing in their wake have
had to contend with them. Maitland’s main question involved the endurance of the
English common law during the early modern period. How was the national law of
England able to resist the reception of Roman law?6 Why did the English councilor courts

5

The Poems of William Browne, vol. 1, ed. Gordon Goodwin (London, 1894).

6

The Reception refers to the process by which Roman law was introduced to Europe during the
medieval and early modern periods. See C.C. Turpin, “The Reception of Roman Law,” Irish
Juris, 3.1 (1968), 162-74; O.F. Robinson, et al., An Introduction to European Legal History
(Abingdon: Professional Books Ltd, 1985), 318-21.

5

fail to Romanize as the Reichskammergericht had done in Germany?7 As legal historian
John Baker notes, Maitland framed the situation thus: “On the Continent the old Canonlaw books were being burned, and Roman law was driving German law out of Germany.
Intellectuals such as Erasmus and Starkey were attacking the language and content of
English law as barbarous, and raising the Civil law as refined and humane.”8 The answer,
concluded Maitland, to the riddle of English juristic resistance, lay in the Inns of Court,
England’s law schools, and their manner of teaching municipal law. Centers of European
legal learning could claim no equivalent, and so were susceptible to humanistic ideas
sweeping through the universities.
Maitland later admitted that his conclusions were purposely broad because his
knowledge and access to original materials precluded more precise assessments. He was
also embarrassed by his paucity of knowledge regarding Scots law. In addition, he
compared England mainly to Germany, which itself represented the true European
outlier. But Maitland’s conclusions were also hindered by his general premise that during
the first half of the sixteenth century Roman law threatened English law in any genuine
way. Baker and others have shown this simply was not the case, that those English
intellectuals who had studied on the Continent and returned to England inflamed by the
new learning were few, insufficiently influential, and too deficient in requisite legal

7

Founded in 1495 during a period of imperial reform, the Reichskammergericht was the supreme
court of the Holy Roman Empire. See Ralf-Peter Fuchs, “The Supreme Court of the Holy Roman
Empire,” Sixteenth Century Journal 34.1 (2003): 9-27; Eva Ortlieb and Siegrid Westphal, “Die
Höchstgerichtsbarkeit im Alten Reich: Bedeutung, Forschungsentwicklung und neue
Perspektiven,” Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte 123.1 (2006), 291-304.
8

Baker, The Reports of Sir John Spelman, Vol. II (London: Selden Society, 1978), 24.
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knowledge to instigate real change.9 Locating the changes that did occur in law during
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries remains difficult for another reason, Baker notes
“since there is a deep conservative element in the common law which often conspires to
deny or conceal any sense of movement.”10 Early modern lawyers embraced a nascent
historicism about their laws and strove to prove their changeless qualities. Around 1470,
John Fortescue had argued that English law was the oldest, and the best, in the world.11
By the early sixteenth century, credulity of this degree began to dissipate. Vergil
Polydore, for example, provided a more probable account of early English law in his
History of England (c.1511).12 In the early seventeenth century, lawyer Edward Coke—
an indefatigable champion of the common law—felt pressure to demonstrate the
constancy of English law for another reason: the ascension of James I.13 By proving that

9

See Baker, The Oxford History of the Laws of England Volume VI: 1483-1558 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003), 3-18.
10

Baker, The Oxford History of the Law of England, 17.

“And touchynge the antyquitie of the same neither are the Romaine Ciuile lawes by so longe
contynuaunce of aucient times confirmed nor yet the lawes of the venetians, whiche aboue al
other are reported to be of most antiquity: forsomuch as their Ilande in the beginninge of the
Britones was not then inhabited, as Roome then also vnbuilded: neyther the lawes of any patnime
nation of the world are of so olde and auncyent yeares. Wherefore the contrarye is not to be sayde
nor thoughte, but that the Englyshe customes are verye good, yea of all other the verye best” (fol.
39r): Fortescue, A learned commendation of the politique lawes of Englande (1567).
11

Polydore Vergil’s English History: From an Early Translation, ed. Henry Ellis (London,
1846), 292.
12

“For Englishmen who wished to defend their law, it was not sufficient to assert that the king
was bound by it, as Coke did to James’ face in 1608. … It had also to be shown that James'
succession had not in any sense been a conquest, which would have vested him with a conqueror
s power to impose new laws on the conquered. … Further, the existing law to which alone James
owed the English throne could not be the creation of any king. Not only had his succession been
no conquest, the continuous existence of English law had never been interrupted by any conquest.
No king of England had ever exercised the powers of a conqueror. English law was not made by
kings, English kings were made by the law”: George Garnett, “‘The ould fields’: Law and History
in the Prefaces to Sir Edward Coke’s Reports,” The Journal of Legal History 34.3 (2013), 245-83
(249).
13
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the national law of England had existed since before the Norman conquest, indeed, since
time immemorial, then by extension, James remained bound to it. Later in the century,
antiquary William Dugdale’s Origines juridiciales, or, Historical memorials of the
English laws (1666) demonstrated the continued interest in locating the origins of the
common law. In Chapter 3, “The Antiquity of Our Laws in England,” Dugdale wrote,
“That which we call the Common Law is, out of question, no less antient than the
beginning of differences betwixt man and man, after the first peopling of this land.”14 The
authority of English law, for the early modern lawyer, swept in as a wind from the past.
Despite this seemingly ineradicable conservativism, law in England did change
during the early modern period. The technology of the printing press did for English law
what the technology of the Portuguese caravel had done for European sea travel: it
ushered in changes that transformed the landscape. Most scholars agree that during the
period the printing press pushed English law from an oral to a textual endeavor. In the
Middle Ages, the common law depended on oral tradition, rather than textual references,
as its main source of authority; the lawyers frequently invoked “our law” in their
arguments, a phenomenon that persisted until the reign of Henry VIII.15 In the early
modern period, this dynamic shifted, and common lawyers began to rely increasingly on
printed texts rather than memory: the technology that allowed the production and
circulation of law books gradually changed the way the law itself was practiced. English

14

Dugdale, Origines juridiciales, or, Historical memorials of the English laws (1666), 3.

Ian Williams, “‘He Creditted More the Printed Booke’: Common Lawyers’ Receptivity to
Print, c.1550-1640,” Law and History Review 28.1 (2010), 39-70 (42).
15
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law moved from an oral to a textual enterprise. A clear preference for print was
discernable by the 1590s as evidenced in lawyers’ citations.16
English Renaissance literature demonstrates paradigmatic shifts as well, and if
one juxtaposes a poem of Thomas Wyatt with a poem by John Donne, it stretches
credulity that their authors belong to the same broad literary epoch. The early modern
period witnessed a proliferation of poetry and drama, and English literature came into its
own as it looked to earlier models: Wyatt and Sidney to Petrarch, Spenser to Ariosto and
Tasso, and Drayton to Spenser. As the world both within and beyond English shores
transformed, the literature reflected these social, political, philosophical, and religious
developments, sometimes deliberately—as in Redcrosse Knight’s rejection of thinlyviewed Catholicism in Book I of Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene—and sometimes
more circuitously—as in Shakespeare’s characters, whose mutability beautifully reflects
Pico della Mirandola’s observations on human capacity for change in his Oration on the
Dignity of Man.17 Although the period failed to produce an English maritime epic
equivalent to Portugal’s Os Lusíadas, the sea informs The Faerie Queene more than has
been recognized by previous scholars. Beyond Spenser’s framing of his poem as an
allegorical ship, the ocean plays a major role in several of the work’s key plot
developments and, as I demonstrate in Chapter 3, develops along a discernable trajectory.
Similarly, Michael Drayton’s Poly-Olbion, published in 1612 and 1622 with the mission
to provide a “A Chorographicall Description of Tracts, Rivers, Mountaines, Forests, and

16

Williams, 48.
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other Parts of this Renowned Isle of Great Britaine,” abounds with references to the sea,
and Neptune permeates Drayton’s verse. The poetic indebtedness to the sea that defines
both works reflects, in part, England’s increasing presence on the world’s oceans.
The period’s literature glances backward, however, even as it gazes into the
future, and the antiquarianism of the English Renaissance has been well-documented.18
Turning again to Drayton and Spenser, this extension becomes clear. While in the House
of Alma, for example, Guyon “chaunst eke on another booke, / That hight, Antiquitee of
Faery lond. / In which whenas he greedily did looke, / The’ofspring of Elves and Faryes
there he fond” (II.ix.60). The proceeding canto provides a chronicle of British kings. This
episode, along with the visit to Merlin in III.iii, in which he prophesizes the progeny of
Britomart and Artegall, demonstrates Spenser’s preoccupation with Faery Land’s past,
and how that past has shaped its present, and how, in turn, its present will shape its
future. As Judith H. Anderson observes, “While a number of times in The Faerie Queene
the words antique and antiquity are neutral in meaning, designating ‘ancient’ or ‘olden
time,’ and at least once are touched distinctively by ambiguity, in this poem they
generally carry a more positive weight.”19 Even the poem’s “old” spelling impels the
reader to look back, always, to envisage an earlier time; indeed, through his antiquated
orthography, Spenser makes other directions of temporal textual engagement
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impossible.20 In an analogous homage to the past, Drayton’s Poly-Olbion pulsates with a
nostalgia for Elizabeth’s reign. Drayton urges the reader to engage with the history and
legend embedded in his verse: those who ignore it do so at their own peril. In a stern
rebuke of those who may set his poem aside, he chides, “Then, whosoever thou be,
possest with such stupidity and dulnesse, that, rather then thou wilt take paines to search
into ancient and noble things, choosest to remaine in the thicke fogges and mists of
ignorance … the fault proceeds from thy idlenesse, not from any want in my industrie”
(v). It is not without significance that John Selden, the greatest English antiquarian of the
seventeenth century, provided the first part of Poly-Olbion with its prose illustrations. In
his study of Michael Drayton, Oliver Elton commented on the tension that preoccupied,
indeed obsessed, the poet: on the one hand, he was taken by the Renaissance idea of
Time’s decay of beauty; on the other, he, like many of his generation, was compelled to
attempt a recapture of the antiquity that had fallen away.21

II. ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION AND FREE SEAS
Maritime law in early modern England found itself involved in two disputes, one
domestic, the other international, that inform a large part of this dissertation. A brief
overview of their major contours follows. Like the maritime, the legal, and the literary,
these debates found their participants both pulled into the past and thrust into the future.
The increase in sea traffic across the globe increased business at the High Court of

For an alternate interpretation of Spenser’s spelling, see Catherine Nicholson, “Old Spelling
and the Forging of Spenser’s Readers,” Modern Language Quarterly 78.2 (2017), 173-204.
20
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Elton, Michael Drayton: A Critical Study (New York: Russell & Russell, 1966), 110. See also
John E. Curren, “The History Never Written: Bards, Druids, and the Problem of Antiquarianism
in Poly Olbion,” Renaissance Quarterly 51.2 (1998), 498-525.
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Admiralty and brought renewed urgency to the question of the freedom of the seas. But
each of these debates had earlier origins.
The question of English admiralty jurisdiction spans several centuries.22 The
earliest applications of maritime law occurred, most likely, at port courts (such as the
Cinque Ports), which proceeded according to the customary law of the sea, or else at
common law. Dating the establishment of the English admiralty court proves difficult,
largely because the contemporary evidence does not survive, but the court was apparently
operational by the mid-fourteenth century. Edward III’s reign witnessed diplomatically
ruinous piracy within the Channel; foreign merchants became dissatisfied with the
procedurally slow-moving common law courts, and the High Court of Admiralty, which
proceeded according to the civil law, was formed. Before the end of the century, the
tension between common lawyers and this new admiralty court arose, and the Crown
believed the Admiral was overflowing his jurisdictional boundaries by meddling in
matters that belonged, rightly, to the common law. An oft-cited statute of 1389, 15
Richard 2 c. 3 (Jurisdiction of the Admiral), for example, sought to pinch the admiral’s
purview. It stipulated, in part, that “of the death of a man, and of mayhem, done in great
ships, being and hovering in the main stream of great rivers, only beneath the bridges of
the same rivers nigh to the sea, and in none other places of the same rivers, the Admiral
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shall have cognizance.”23 The admiral did not take apparent heed, and similar statutes
were issued before the close of the century.
While the tensions between common law and admiralty appear to have quieted
during the otherwise tumultuous fifteenth century, the ascent of the Tudors witnessed an
increase in naval activity and a subsequent increase in admiralty business. Henry VIII
issued a statute, 32 Hen. 8 c. 14 (1540, On the Maintenance of the Navy), which granted
greater power to the Lord Admiral in civil matters. Common lawyers were not pleased.
During the second half of the sixteenth century, they developed sophisticated ways to
wrest maritime cases away from the High Court of Admiralty and adjudicate them
instead in the common law courts, while pointing to 15 Richard 2 c. 3 to justify these
actions. The conflict peaked in 1575, when the judges of admiralty and the common law
judges signed an agreement that sharply delimited their respective jurisdictions. But this
armistice did little to end the war, and the common law courts continued to pilfer
admiralty cases in the following decades. Indeed, the battle escalated throughout the early
seventeenth century, spurred in part by the indefatigable remonstrations of common
lawyer Edward Coke.
To the common lawyers, one main problem with the High Court of Admiralty was
that it proceeded according to the civil law of the Continent. This meant that the further
into English legal business the Lord Admiral extended his jurisdictional arm, the greater
the threat of the unwelcome influence of imported law. But for a court awash in foreign
suitors, the application of civil law made sense: during the early modern period, this law
acted as a universalizing force across Europe. By the sixteenth century, civil law in

23

Statutes of the Realm, vol. 3 (1817; rpt. London: Dawsons, 1963), 79.

13

England was already viewed as suspect: its procedural usage in Chancery allowed for an
“inquisitorial trial procedure which by-passed the sheriff and the jury.”24 In the
seventeenth century, when Coke took up his pen to explicate English jurisdictions in The
Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (1644), he wrote scathingly of
foreign law. History, however, would prove the common lawyers’ anxiety unwarranted,
as the common law courts eventually won the war over admiralty jurisdiction.25
The period’s second major debate touched international law and concerned the
question of freedom of the seas. Like the admiralty jurisdiction debate, this issue did not
originate during the early modern period, but increased sea traffic added urgency to the
question. The concept of mare liberum has its roots in antiquity. Under Roman law, at
least in theory, the sea remained open to all: it was considered res communis omnium, a
thing belonging to no one.26 And yet, for the Romans, the international law of the sea
remained limited mostly to the Mediterranean. It would be over a millennium before
Magellan and Drake launched their global circumnavigations, and the seventeenthcentury debates reflected the law catching up with the political, navigational, and
geographic realities of the early modern period. In the Middle Ages, the general attitude
of jurists had tended toward mare liberum, in both theory and practice. During the
sixteenth century, a number of jurists, most notably Alphonso de Castro and Fernando
Vasquez of Spain, returned to the question in light of expanding navigational and

24

John Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 2nd ed. (London: Butterworths, 1979),
36-37.
25

See Yale, “View of the Admiral Jurisdiction.”

26

For a discussion of the concept of mare liberum in Roman law and its impact on the early
modern debate, see W. Paul Gormley, “The Development and Subsequent Influence of the
Roman Legal Norm of Freedom of the Seas,” University of Detroit Law Journal 40.5 (1963),
561-96.

14

technological advances, but although they argued for free seas, they did so via an appeal
to earlier Roman sources: their writings did not advance the nature of the debate.
This turn occurred when Grotius published his Mare liberum anonymously in
1609.27 The work was most likely written between 1604 and 1605, a period during which
Grotius had been retained as legal counsel for the Dutch East India Company. Grotius’
treatise was short and originally intended as a chapter in a longer work that was not
published during Grotius’ lifetime. Much of Mare liberum remained political and
explicitly addressed the conflict with the Portuguese, who were attempting to monopolize
trade routes to the East Indies, rather than arguing for mare liberum in a more general
sense. Although he does not offer credit, Grotius borrowed a considerable portion of
Mare liberum from Italian-born lawyer Alberico Gentili.28 Gentili, who argued for open
seas in his De iure belli libri tres (1598), resolved a common problem with the concept.29
The high seas, even if free, required a certain degree of policing: the crime of piracy
represented a major diplomatic threat during the sixteenth century, and it behooved
governments to deal with the infraction as expeditiously as possible. Gentili’s solution
was to separate the concept of possession of the high seas from its jurisdiction, so that
states could still punish pirates without claiming ownership of the sea. In 1625, Grotius
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published a more mature work, De jure belli ac pacis, which fully developed his theory
of mare liberum.
In 1613, lawyer William Welwood provided an unofficial English response to
Grotius, which appeared as a chapter in his longer work An Abridgement of All SeaLawes, entitled “Of the Community and Propriety of the Seas.” Welwood’s rebuttal
adopted a theological tenor: he averred that God had granted man dominion over the
world, and that thus the sea was indeed capable of possession. Welwood also observed
the precariousness of fishing reserves, noting that during the preceding twenty years the
herring population off the eastern coast of Scotland had diminished dramatically. In 1615,
Welwood translated and expanded this chapter in his De dominio maris in order to reach
a wider Continental audience that included Grotius, who could not read English.
Grotius’ treatise, although expressly directed toward the Portuguese, alarmed
James I, who issued “A Proclamation touching Fishing” in 1609 in response.30 By 1619,
James had grown increasingly vexed by international maritime affairs and sought legal
guidance from lawyer John Selden, who offered the king a draft of Mare clausum by
summer of that year. However, this draft remained unpublished, most likely because
James did not wish to spur a dispute with Denmark, whose claims to the North Sea
conflicted with Selden’s drawing of English territorial waters. When Charles I assumed
the throne in 1625, he was initially consumed by war with Spain and France, but the next
decade aroused his maritime concerns and in 1635 he asked Selden to rewrite Mare

In 1911, Thomas Wemyss Fulton argued that a single phrase in the proclamation, “questioning
of our Right,” alluded to Mare liberum: in other words, James believed that Grotius had
questioned the English right to police its territorial waters: Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Seas
(1911; Millwood: Kraus Reprint, 1976), 148.
30
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clausum to assert English sovereignty over the North Sea, a space on which the Dutch,
according to the English, were encroaching.31 The book, divided into two parts—the first
directly rebutted Grotius’ arguments for mare liberum, while the second demarcated
England’s territorial waters—reached the printing press later that year; readers would
have to wait until 1652 to read the work in an English translation.32 Selden’s Mare
clausum remained unparalleled in seventeenth-century English legal literature in its
engagement with earlier writers on the question of free seas, both classical and medieval,
and he frequently used Grotius’ sources to make the opposite argument. He also
displayed extensive knowledge of early English legal history and the history of the
English admiralty. Ultimately—and improbably—Selden argued that English national
waters stretched southward from the western coast of Ireland to the northern coast of
Spain, eastward to the German sea, and northward to the limits of habitable space.33 Of

See Mark Somos, “Selden’s Mare Clausum: the Secularisation of International Law and the
Rise of Soft Imperialism,” Journal of the History of International Law 14 (2012), 287–330.
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“Printing Anglo-Saxon in Holland and John Selden’s Mare Clausum seu de Dominio Maris,”
Quaerendo 31.2 (2001), 120-38. Charles I issued two proclamations prohibiting the import and
sale of these pirated copies in England.
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the three treatises considered, only Selden’s included maps, which demonstrate, visually,
the possibility of containing the sea.

III. CHAPTERS
My first chapter, “Like a Ship Without Ballast”: Maritime Law in Early Modern
England, begins by asking the fundamental questions, “What is maritime law?” and
“What comprised its central texts in early modern England?” Unlike the English common
law, the maritime law practiced in the realm had been imported from other places in
Europe and thus requires a different framing of its central texts. Here I focus on those
elements that might interest the literary scholar and cultural historian rather than the legal
historian. The chapter, in considering these texts, provides an attendant overview of
maritime law in England, one that does not concern itself with unraveling legal minutiae
or explicating esoteric jargon, but rather focuses on placing early modern English
maritime law within its cultural, national, and international contexts. I consider the
European law of the sea in England through a schema that assigns its texts one of four
labels: code, government document, report, or treatise. This categorization reveals, in
part, that despite a universalizing impulse that stretches to the ancient world, the
application of maritime law across Europe remained disparate well into the early modern
period.
This first chapter makes two primary interventions in the current scholarly
landscape. First, it expands the definition of “maritime law” within an English context to
include printed royal proclamations on subjects such as mariner’s wages, the suppression
of piracy, and the jurisdiction of the Lord High Admiral. This argument about

18

proclamations, explored more robustly in my second chapter, provides a crucial link
connecting the legal with the literary. Previous scholarship has assumed—correctly—that
early modern public interest in maritime law remained small, as this interest involved
mainly mariners, merchants, and admiralty lawyers. The law of the sea remained a
specialized topic that lacked wider appeal. However, I argue that proclamations reached a
far greater number of readers than other forms of maritime law and have been unfairly
excluded from scholarly conversations.
My second intervention considers these texts as texts. Certain works, such as the
Book of the Consulate of the Sea, hold perhaps little more than an antiquarian appeal for
the literary scholar.34 Consider this amusing passage on a sailor who violates dress
regulations:
A sailor shall not undress for the night unless the vessel is moored in the port for a
winter layover. Should he violate this rule, he should be punished for each
transgression by being tied and dunked in the ocean three times while held by a
rope. If he should violate this rule three times, he shall lose his wages and all the
possessions he has aboard the vessel.35
Another targets sailors who throw food overboard: “A sailor who maliciously throws
food or wine overboard shall be deprived of his wages and his right to free freight of any
merchandise he may have aboard the vessel, and will be left at the mercy of the patron.”36
In England, however, the works of lawyers John Godolphin, Richard Zouch, and John
Exton, who each wrote treatises on admiralty jurisdiction during the Restoration, have

34

The Book of the Consulate of the Sea (Libre del Consolat de Mar), probably originating in
Barcelona and written in Catalan, sought to coalesce local statutes and customs of the commercial
judges who heard cases in coastal towns of the Mediterranean.
35

Stanley Jados, ed. and trans., Consulate of the Sea and Related Documents (Tuscaloosa:
University of Alabama Press, 1975), 87.
36

Jados, 86.

19

never been read or studied for their literary, rather than legal, merits. Exton’s treatise in
particular exudes the craftsmanship and ear for language of a great prose stylist, and I
close the chapter with a close reading of passages from his The maritime dicæologie, or,
Sea-jurisdiction of England (1664). Ultimately, this contextual chapter works to define
and categorize the “maritime law” of my project’s title in a way that holds interest for the
literary scholar.
My second chapter, “Robbers of the Sea: Piracy in Proclamations, Pamphlets, and
Plays, 1558-1675,” takes up the question of piracy, the maritime crime perhaps most
intriguing to the reading public. It asks, specifically, “How did the early modern public
come to know about the crime?” and answers, “In large part, through proclamations.”
Thus, it takes up the argument left off in Chapter 1 that printed royal proclamations
represent the widest-spread form of printed maritime law circulating in early modern
England. However, unlike the first chapter, this one moves away from the legal texts and
maritime codes that would have occupied a civil lawyer’s shelf and rather approaches the
crime of piracy through the eyes of a disinterested party, that is, a non-merchant, nonmariner, and non-lawyer. It argues that, in addition to proclamations on piracy, this
reading public could have acquired piratical information from pamphlets and broadsides,
works such as A true and certaine report of the beginning, proceedings, overthrowes, and
now present estate of Captaine Ward and Danseker (1609), A true relation of the life and
death of Sir Andrew Barton, a pirate and rover on the seas (1630), and A true relation, of
the lives and deaths of two most famous English pyrats, Purser, and Clinton (1639) that
were written for a non-specialist audience. Ultimately, this section considers how, as a
genre, a proclamation differs from a “popular account” in the way it conveys information

20

about piracy and possible implications of this difference. It considers these popular
accounts as the offspring of the royal proclamation, one that both supplanted and
transformed the government document, and traces this genealogy by analyzing
distribution (from publicly displayed to privately purchased), form (from official
government document to commercial text) and content (from unembellished facts to
sensational narrative). It also ponders how the illustrations in certain popular accounts act
as an additional means of theorizing early modern piracy.
This chapter closes with a reading of two early Stuart pirate plays, Robert
Daborne’s A Christian Turned Turk (1612, performed c.1612) and Thomas Heywood and
William Rowley’s Fortune by Land and Sea (1655, performed c.1609). This section
serves to bridge the legal and literary aspects of this project—drama, as an ostensibly
fictive literary genre, does not bear the burden of purported accuracy implied in the
proclamations and pamphlets. At the same time, these two plays depict real historical
pirates—Ward, Clinton, and Purser—who also appeared in corresponding pamphlets.
These portrayals allow the critic to draw a theoretical line from proclamation to pamphlet
to play. Much recent work has contributed to our understanding of piracy in early modern
English literature and culture, and this recent scholarship offers several useful portals
through which to engage with the pirate plays. To these I offer three more. First, I argue
that drama afforded its playwrights the freedom to depict the human—in addition to the
economic and political—toll of piracy, and that it achieves this end through testimony.
Second, I consider the temporal contexts of A Christian Turned Turk and Fortune by
Land and Sea and demonstrate how these contexts had significant consequences for the
plays’ portrayals of their respective pirates. Finally, I posit that the plays construct
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piratical identity through carefully crafted language and that a closer analysis of these
constructions reveals an increasingly nuanced portrait of the early modern literary pirate.
“Wrecked Upon the Sands: Maritime Law and Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie
Queene,” my third chapter, stages a sustained dialogue between the legal and the literary
by reading Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene against the backdrop of the early
modern English admiralty debates. It begins by considering one of the most puzzling
episodes in the poem, the dispute in Book V, Canto 4 between brothers Amidas and
Bracidas, and asks why the meaning of this brief passage has long eluded critics. I
conclude that while the brothers’ fracas is usually interpreted within the context of
Artegell’s mission for justice in Book V, its most plausible meaning emerges only when
placed against the backdrop of the entire poem, and in particular, the poem’s engagement
with maritime jurisdiction. Previous scholarship has overlooked this interpretative angle,
and although The Faerie Queene is not a strictly maritime poem, its preoccupation with
the law of the sea develops along discernable lines. The first half of this chapter,
therefore, traces this development across Books II, III, and IV within the seas of Acrasia,
Marinell, and Neptune. Each of these oceanic domains witnesses maritime infractions or
jurisdictional disputes, and they provide a crucial alembic for distilling the
Amidas/Bracidas episode in Book V.
The chapter’s second half then analyzes this episode within two contexts: the rest
of The Faerie Queene, as well as the early modern question of admiralty jurisdiction. It
concludes that Spenser inserted the brothers’ seaside conflict as a direct response to this
question, and that it showcases the poet’s advocation of the common law, a surprising
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conclusion, given his other writings.37 My reading of Artegall’s intervention on the strand
rests on three interpretative points. The first posits that Artegall is the allegorical
depiction of the common law of England. The second considers the specific legal issues
that Spenser included—alluvion and accretion, wreck, and marine salvage—and the
relationship between these issues and English common law. Finally, my analysis
considers the episode against the backdrop of the poem’s larger treatment of maritime
jurisdiction. Using these three points in tandem, my reading demonstrates that the
Amidas/Bracidas episode reveals an alternative understanding of Spenser’s attitude
toward the common law, insofar as it relates to admiralty jurisdiction.
In my fourth chapter, “‘Round About The Globe’: Spenser, Drayton, and the
Freedom of the Seas,” considers the international law of the sea as a useful framework for
engaging with early modern poetic texts. I begin the chapter with a brief exposition of the
legal and historical context of the question of freedom of the seas and the debate between
Hugo Grotius (who argued for mare liberum) and William Welwood and John Selden
(who argued for mare clausum). This section does not focus on the strict legal principles
of open seas and closed seas; rather, I show how these writers, through their conceptions
of the ocean, defended these principles. The second part of the chapter uses these oceanic
conceptions as a tool of literary interpretation. I analyze two moments in each poem: in
The Faerie Queene, I consider Guyon’s voyage to the Bower of Bliss (Book II) and the
evolution of the character of Neptune (Books II, III, and IV). In Poly-Olbion, I ponder the
catalog of English voyagers (Song 19) and the nymphs’ song in honor of Neptune (Song
20). Through a close reading of these moments, I extract general principles that reflect
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the authors’ cultural understandings of the ocean. Ultimately, this chapter argues that the
oceans of The Faerie Queene align with the features of the Seldenian sea, while the
oceans of Poly-Olbion replicate the Grotian sea, and I conclude with a brief discussion of
how such an approach can further develop the current literary and cultural understanding
of early modern maritime space.
I do not suggest a one-to-one correspondence between legal arguments about the
freedom of the seas and The Faerie Queene or Poly-Olbion, or that the poets composed
their poems with any deliberate allusions to the legal debate itself. In the first place,
Spenser died ten years before the debate’s inception, and the first part of Poly-Olbion was
published just three years after the appearance of Grotius’ pamphlet; the publication of
the poem’s second part in 1622 preceded Selden’s Mare clausum by thirteen years.
Additionally, even if Drayton were aware of the debate—which is very likely, given both
his acquaintance with John Selden and the political gravity of the matter—he left no
explicit reference to it in his poem.38 Rather, this chapter links the legal with the literary
in a more abstract, and theoretical, fashion, and foregrounds certain cultural assumptions
about the sea in the early modern period.
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CHAPTER 1
LIKE A SHIP WITHOUT BALLAST:
MARITIME LAW IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND

I. INTRODUCTION
In his Direction of preparative to the study of the law (1600), legal scholar
William Fulbecke divided English law books into four categories: historical, explanatory,
miscellaneal, and monological.1 Fulbecke’s method of categorization works well for the
corpora of English common law and the Continental civil law, both of which he was
conversant with.2 Unsurprisingly, however, Fulbecke’s bibliographic schema did not
extend to the texts of maritime law that had governed the European law of the sea for
centuries, and which continued to hold authority in the early modern period. The texts of
maritime law were too specialized, or too small in number, to warrant his attention. This
gap in English legal bibliography has persisted until the present: no comprehensive
categorization of texts related to both the international law of the sea and the English
admiralty has been attempted. This scholarly omission has adversely affected our
understanding of maritime law in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England. Most
“All books written of the Law may be reduced to these fower heads: either they are Historical,
as the year Books of the common law; and Zasius his counsailes in the civill law … or
explanatory, as Mast. Stamford his Treatise of the Prerogative, and the Discourses of divers
Glossographers, & commentators in the Civil Law… or els they be miscellaneall, and insuch they
needeth no Methode … or els they can be monological, being of one certain subject”: Fulbecke,
Direction or preparative to the study of the law (London, 1600), 24-25. See also John H. Baker,
“English law books and legal publishing,” The Cambridge History of the Book in Britain, vol. 3,
ed. Lotte Hellinga and J.B. Trapp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 474. Baker
only considers Fulbecke’s categorization in its common law context.
1
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previous studies of early modern writing on maritime law within an English context have
either focused on the contents of selected works or have neglected entire categories of
printed material. My intervention argues that by considering this branch of law through
its corresponding texts, certain theoretical signposts emerge which inform the rest of this
dissertation.
In this chapter, I begin to remedy this legal bibliographic gap. I consider the range
of printed (and in some cases, manuscript) materials related to maritime law that existed
on the Continent and in England in the early modern period. My schema categorizes
maritime law into four distinct categories: codes, government documents, reports, and
treatises. Each category adds a layer of nuance to our understanding of the position of
maritime law in early modern England. I dedicate the greatest attention to legal treatises,
and in particular treatises addressing English admiralty jurisdiction in England, since
these texts shed the strongest light on the role of maritime law during the period. In some
ways, they do the heavy lifting of synthesizing the three other categories (codes,
government documents, and reports) and in turn offer us the most nuanced portrait of the
subject. I conclude this section with a close reading of John Exton’s The maritime
dicæologie, or, Sea-jurisdiction of England (1664) and argue that it represents an apogee
of early modern English writing on maritime law. Exton not only incorporates the other
categories of maritime law, but in a gesture of literary reflexivity, he also infuses his
treatise with language that calls attention to the sea itself.
In addressing the period’s various texts on maritime law, this chapter also
provides an overview of maritime law in England from the latter Middle Ages until about
1700. As a concept, “maritime law” can be difficult to pinpoint, and its definition
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becomes even more unstable when considered in the context of early modern England: its
presence on English shores presented problems of legal authority since its practice
depended on the civil law of the Continent.3 And unlike most other forms of law, which
sat nestled firmly under the purview of the English common law, maritime law was
paradoxically both English and not English, English because it was practiced in England
within the English High Court of Admiralty, not English because its codes were
transported from other areas of Europe. In addition, the High Court of Admiralty
proceeded according to the civil law, which, for the English common lawyer, rendered it
tainted by foreign roots. These larger themes of authority, jurisdiction, and the role of
maritime law itself construct theoretical frames through which I analyze selections of the
period’s literature throughout this dissertation. Thus, using the complementary tools of
legal history and bibliography, the theoretical goal of this chapter is to provide
historically grounded instruments for a legal engagement with the early modern literary
and cultural sea.

II. THE CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND
In order to understand early modern maritime law in England, as well as its
corresponding texts, a brief overview of the civil law in England is required. This is
because the High Court of Admiralty was administered by the civil lawyers, a distinct
professional body separated from the common lawyers by education and training,
expertise, and even working language. They are also separated by fate: the civil lawyers

For a technical discussion of the distinction between “maritime law” and “admiralty,” see
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(2005), 1127-48.
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did not survive the nineteenth century.4 This trajectory has led to a certain degree of
neglect among later legal historians. “Legal history is winner’s history,” notes Richard
Helmholz, a leading authority on the canon law in England, “[and] Doctors’ Commons is
gone.”5 Indeed, the field of English legal history has tended to focus myopically on the
common law, and as a result the contributions of the civil lawyers (referred to
interchangeably as civilians) have often been overlooked. The sometimes amicable,
sometimes tense relationship between the common lawyers and the civilians helped
produce the great English treatises on maritime law.
The civil layers constituted a relatively small professional body: Brian Levack
estimates that during the period from 1603 to 1641, the common lawyers outnumbered
the civilians at a ratio of about ten-to-one.6 While the common lawyers dealt with a wide
range of civil and criminal matters, the civilians enjoined a more niche-based practice and
focused mainly on ecclesiastical law and admiralty.7 Despite their divergent numbers and
forms of law, the two groups of lawyers paralleled each other in other notable respects.
The common lawyers belonged to the Inns of Court, their professional organization.8
Doctors’ Commons was the corresponding organization of the civil lawyers.9 The
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common lawyers obtained their legal education at the Inns and gained practical
knowledge by observing cases at Westminster. The civilians learned about the civil law at
Oxford or Cambridge (sometimes furthering their education at Continental universities)
and picked up practical skills in the admiralty and ecclesiastical courts in London. Each
type of law practiced also had a separate professional language: the common law was
conducted in Law French, the civil law, in Latin. And finally, the common lawyers and
civilians each engaged with a distinct professional literature.10
Levack’s research reveals that the common lawyers enjoyed greater social
prestige than the civilians: he notes that “the common lawyers of early seventeenthcentury England belonged to a genteel profession,” and most young men who entered the
Inns of Court during this period came from families who belonged to the gentry class or
higher.11 Conversely, the men who studied civil law at the universities were more evenly
distributed across social classes. Levack attributes this difference to the admission
policies at Oxford and Cambridge, and the Inns: the law taught at the Inns was primarily
land law, and even if students did not pursue careers as common lawyers, they would
benefit from this information as members of the landed classes. At the same time, Oxford
and Cambridge offered attractive fellowships to students who sought to study the civil
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law, which most likely appealed to students from lower classes who desired a career in
law but who could not afford to attend one of the Inns.12
The common law had never been taught at Oxford or Cambridge: in fact, civil law
and, prior to 1535, canon law were the only types of legal education offered at the
English universities.13 Here, students would gain a theoretical understanding of the
Corpus Juris Civilis, as well as the medieval glossators and commentators. But it was at
Doctors’ Commons in London where they would gain the necessary practical experience
to be advocates of the civil law. This system of practical learning shared its model with
the common law: although common lawyers lacked a theoretical grounding—the
common law had no Corpus Juris Civilis of its own—their experience mirrored the
civilians in that they learned to practice law by observing the legal proceedings in the
courts of Westminster.14 Daniel Coquillette argues rather convincingly that the civilians
enjoyed a more cosmopolitan education than the common lawyers: after obtaining their
DCL (Doctor of Civil Law) degree from Oxford or Cambridge, many civilians continued
their legal education in Europe, already conversant with the law practiced in those
countries. However, as Alain Wijffels observes, “Despite the success of legal studies at
Oxford and Cambridge [and] the formation of a professional esprit de corps among
academically trained legal professionals, […] the British Isles did not, at the time, count
any civil lawyers who contributed significantly to the corpus of (legist) ius commune
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literature.”15 When the English civilians did begin to write on the philosophy of the civil
law, the focus of their work was not maritime law: they tended, rather, to publish on
ecclesiastical or comparative law. Early examples include Thomas Smith’s De republica
Anglorum (1583), a work that juxtaposed the French and English legal systems, William
Fulbecke’s Parallele or Conference of the Civill Law, the Canon Law, and the Common
Law of England (1601), a work that attempted to synthesize the three types of law
practiced in England, Alberico Gentili’s De iure belli (1588-89), a pioneering work on
international law, and John Cowell’s The Interpreter (1607), a dictionary of legal and
political terms that provided controversial definitions to words such as “Subsidy,”
“Prerogative,” and “Parliament” and which was suppressed by royal proclamation in
1610.16
The professional line that divided the common lawyers from the civilians also
impacted the reception of maritime law. While both groups wrote on the law of the sea in
England, they approached the topic with different professional interests. The common
lawyers wrote either for personal reference (Fleetwood and Hale), or in support of a
particular position (Selden and Coke). The civilians, naturally, had a much more personal
stake in maritime law and the workings of the High Court of Admiralty. Not only were
they invested in the financial windfall of prize cases, but they also spent much of the
early modern period fighting to protect their monopoly on admiralty jurisdiction. These

Alain Wijffels, “The Civil Law,” The Cambridge History of the Book in Britain, vol. 3, ed.
Lotte Hellinga and J.B. Trapp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 401.
15

“A proclamation touching D. Cowels booke called the Interpreter” (1610). Cowell’s Interpreter
does provide several definitions related to maritime law in England. These include Admiral,
[General] Average, Charter Party, Cinque Ports, Creek, Flotsam, Prohibition, Shipper, and
Wreck. However, the dictionary’s focus is not the English admiralty, and Cowell’s nautical
definitions were not heterodox enough to warrant mention in the proclamation.
16

31

professional divisions affect the role played by maritime law and its related texts: the
civil lawyer would have enjoyed a fundamental advantage in his engagement with these
works, while the common lawyer stood a few steps removed. In a limited sense, maritime
law acted as an equalizer and placed the common lawyers and civilians on the same
plane, the former enjoying the role of England’s more powerful legal professional, the
latter a much greater comfort with the law itself. In England, as on the seas, maritime law
rendered the established social order a little askew.

III. LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY AND MARITIME LAW
The field of legal bibliography, notes David Ibbetson, remains “all too commonly
left to historians of printing or seen as the preserve of law librarians rather than ‘proper’
scholars.”17 Despite this historical bias, much recent work on legal bibliography has
emerged. This scholarship is perhaps best represented in the research of Ian Williams and
Richard Ross, and their work represents two distinct approaches to the consequences of
the burgeoning of legal printing in England during the early modern period. Most
scholars agree that during the period the printing press pushed English law from an oral
to a textual endeavor. In the Middle Ages, the common law depended on oral tradition,
rather than textual references, as its main source of authority; the lawyers frequently
invoked “our law” in their arguments, a phenomenon that persisted until the reign of
Henry VIII.18 In the early modern period, this dynamic shifted, and common lawyers
began to rely increasingly on printed texts: the technology that allowed the production
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and circulation of law books gradually changed the way the law itself was practiced.
English law moved from an oral to a textual enterprise. A clear preference for print was
discernable by the 1590s as evidenced in lawyers’ citations.19 I classify Williams’s
scholarship and methods as internal; that is, they focus on how the advent of print
influenced English lawyers and the legal profession itself. The work of Richard Ross,
conversely, looks outward, and applies an external approach. It considers what effects
printed law had on society at large, because, as Ross notes, the “dissemination of law is at
once unavoidable, politically dangerous, and potentially unpalatable to legal
specialists.”20 Print rendered the legal texts of the common law available in a way
unfathomable in the Middle Ages and its effects extended far beyond the legal profession
itself.
No legal historian or bibliographer has considered the introduction of printed
maritime law through either the internal or external approaches. Publishing the texts of
such a narrow branch of law would have had far less societal repercussions than
publishing the texts of the common law. Additionally, given that maritime law in
England remains an understudied subject relative to the common law, it is unsurprising
that the advent of printed maritime law has attracted little scholarly attention. Despite this
neglect, maritime law offers a site at which to combine the internal approaches, and the
treatises addressing admiralty jurisdiction prove particularly useful for understanding the
texts of printed maritime law in England. The common lawyers and civil lawyers did not
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share a professional language (both literally and figuratively) and so they had to write
across a linguistic chasm in order to make their own law accessible to a non-specialist on
the other side. They had to address legal professionals who practiced not only a different
type of law, but a different system of law. The debates also contain aspects of the internal
approach: both the common lawyers and the civil lawyers were practicing legal
professionals, and the circulation of their printed texts had obvious professional
consequences for the English legal landscape. Consequently, while maritime law presents
unique challenges for the legal bibliographer who seeks to collate its texts, it also
provides a rich catalyst for understanding both the labyrinthine legal landscape of early
modern England and the movement of texts dealing with the law of the sea.
Almost a hundred years ago, legal historian William Senior wrote on early English
writers of maritime law.21 He aimed to further probe why Welwood’s Sea-Law of
Scotland (Edinburgh, 1590) and An Abridgement of all Sea-Lawes (London, 1613) were
the treatises printed in Britain on maritime law, even as several Continental jurists had
published works on the subject during the sixteenth century. Although admiralty law had
been practiced in England for centuries, and although jurisdictional disputes between the
High Court of Admiralty and the common law courts had been waged since at least the
fourteenth century, these debates were not set down in print until the seventeenth century.
Senior notes that even as activity burgeoned in the High Court of Admiralty throughout
the sixteenth century, the English presses produced no printed treatises or manuals of
maritime law, and offers two reasons: first, this niche had already been filled by
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Continental works on maritime and civil law printed in Latin, and second, whatever
procedural materials the civilians needed to try maritime cases were readily available in
manuscript form. Senior’s work remains important. But the scholarship in Senior’s wake
has overlooked certain categories of printed law that also addressed maritime law in
England.
As Senior accurately observed, the civilians appear the most likely candidates to
have produced printed material on maritime law during the period, but despite the
increase in business at the admiralty court, they were slow to produce a professional body
of literature that explicated that court’s function, let alone a philosophical or
jurisprudential defense of their claim to admiralty jurisdiction. The functioning of the late
sixteenth-century High Court of Admiralty involved the importation of legal writing from
the Continent, but this method proved inadequate, especially with regards to the
international law of the sea. As one legal historian notes: “A major impediment […] was
the absence of a specialized legal literature on international maritime law. Privateering
and prize-law, probably the most important issues the Admiralty Court had to deal with,
were a subject which no legal work treated systematically.”22 The only printed work in
the first half of the seventeenth century to come out of direct practice in the High Court
of Admiralty, Alberico Gentili’s Hispanicae advocationis libri duo (1613), was
theoretical, not procedural or pragmatic, in nature. It was not until the Restoration that
civilian Francis Clerke wrote his treatise on the practice of the High Court of Admiralty,
Praxis curiæ admiralitatis angliæ (1667). Clerke’s work, however, was meant for the
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advocates practicing the civil law in the High Court of Admiralty, not for common
lawyers, politicians, merchants, or mariners.23 Similarly, while the Restoration treatises
of Godolphin, Zouch, and Exton appear addressed to the common lawyer, they—unlike
the navigational manuals that contained ancillary sea law and customs—would have been
of negligible value to the working seaman. Printed maritime law itself found itself
suspended uneasily between the theoretical and the pragmatic.

IV. EARLY MODERN TEXTS ON MARITIME LAW
The nature of maritime law, like the nature of the sea itself, remains capricious,
and its practice in England represents continual shifts, like the ebb and flow of the sea.
The texts considered here reveal the law’s protean instability. They also reveal something
of the legal landscape of England itself. Legal authority is an unstable concept, but the
maritime law in England challenged it at nearly every turn. That the debates on admiralty
jurisdiction produced a rich corpus of literature attests to this tension. This chapter, thus,
not only asks how maritime law can be categorized, and what previous attempts have
overlooked, and what theoretical payoffs emerge from such a categorization, but it also
considers what the relationship between the laws of England and the laws of the sea
reveals about maritime law’s position in England.
In this section, I attempt to categorize the different genres of printed maritime law
that circulated during the period. This includes the treatises, but also statutes, royal
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proclamations, codes, and reports. Each category constructs a distinct theoretical
framework for understanding the period’s maritime law in both a legal and cultural
context. Each also represents varying degrees of public engagement. The codes of
maritime law were generally only consulted by specialists: mariners who needed a
working understanding of the law of the sea; civil lawyers who practiced in the High
Court of Admiralty; scholars like John Selden who required a nuanced understanding of
the sources of maritime law in order to defend mare clausum, the legal principle of closed
seas; and common lawyers such as Matthew Hale, who wanted to situate the Admiral’s
jurisdiction within its common law strictures. The treatises on admiralty jurisdiction,
although composed by civil lawyers, were intended mainly for common lawyers. The
government documents offer various degrees of engagement: the royal proclamations
enjoyed a wider circulation and readership than the acts of parliament and statutes of the
realm. In fact, the royal proclamations represent the most widespread (but, paradoxically,
the least studied) form of printed maritime law in the period.
Although I attempt a neat classification system, certain texts defy strict
categorization. For example, William Welwood’s An Abridgement of all Sea-Lawes
(1613) could be considered a legal treatise or a conglomeration of codes, and Alberico
Gentili’s Hispanicae advocationis libri duo may be a report or a treatise. Any
categorization, especially one that attempts to collate texts as divergent and unstable as
maritime law, opens itself to quibbles and fissures. Perhaps this is fitting: given that
maritime law attempts the ordering and jurisdictional dividing of a space as tempestuous
as the sea, it only follows that its corresponding texts defy containment, cordoning off,
and subjugation to static, impenetrable boundaries.
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1. Codes
In law, the term “code” is used generally to signify a body or collection of laws.
Ancient codes are numerous, Hammurabi’s Code and the Biblical codes of ancient
Hebrew law being among the most familiar. Roman law, John Baker observes, “began,
and ended, with a code.”24 David Walker notes from “the fifteenth century onwards the
term can be applied to a more or less comprehensive systematic statement in written form
of major bodies of law, such as the civil law or the criminal law of a particular
country.”25 Although the codification of law remained largely the purview of the civil
law, various English humanist scholars set out to codify the common law, a venture that
began in the late fifteenth century. This impulse increased during the reign of Henry VIII,
fueled in part by the broader legal reforms resulting from the English Reformation. Baker
argues, though, that a serious refashioning of English law in the image of Roman
principles of codification did not present a serious threat, and Francis Bacon’s later
attempts at legal reform that proposed organizing the common law into a more codified
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system never materialized (perhaps, in part, because Bacon’s inclinations were toward
legal philosophy rather than legal practice).26
Like the other legal codes, the great codes of maritime law deferred to in the early
modern period—the Rhodian Sea Law, the Tables of Amalfi, the Rolls of Oléron, the
Laws of Wisby, the Black Book of the Admiralty—deal mainly with substantive and, to a
lesser extent, procedural, law. That is, they outline the custom of the sea and maritime
commerce and prescribe appropriate methods for dealing with problems that arise during
human-ocean interactions. The scope of these problems, relative to legal problems arising
on land, proves small. They include piracy, wreck, salvage, marine contracts, mariners’
wages, shipbuilding, and the duties of a captain, among others. The law outlined in the
codes has a strong customary element, as it was born of necessity as legal problems arose
and gathered into uniform systems later.
The most important post-Roman code of maritime law was the Rhodian Sea
Law.27 The collection dealt with a variety of maritime issues including theft of anchors,
capacity and valuation of ships, and punishments for wayward mariners. Perhaps the
most important law contained in the collection, the lex Rhodia de iactu, laid the
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foundation of the modern law of general average.28 Probably compiled on the island of
Rhodes between 600 CE and 800 CE, the laws’ origins were originally believed to be
much older: until the early twentieth century, scholars believed that the laws dated to
almost 1000 BCE and were inserted into the Twelve Tables, the earliest codification of
Roman law, but this opinion has been shown to be erroneous: now most scholars presume
the laws were developed around the second century BCE and recodified during the
seventh or eighth century CE.29 The Rhodian Sea Law’s distant origins imbued them with
an authority not uncommon to the authority similarly ascribed to the common law: they
came from time immemorial, as Coke had claimed of the latter, and their status as
“always existing” granted them a degree of clout in the minds of early modern lawyers.
The English lawyers paid great homage to the Rhodian Sea Law. In his 1663 treatise,
Zouch writes, “All businesse concerning Navigation, and all causes concerning things
done at Sea, are decided by the Rhodian Lawes, for the Lawes of the Rhodians are of all
Sea-Lawes the most antient.”30 John Godolphin’s treatise of 1661 states, “There were
also very Ancient Laws made and published by those of Rhodes, who were most expert at
Sea, as well touching Navigation, as Merchant-affairs, where the use thereof was of no
less Consequence unto, then of Antiquity in that Mediterranean Isle.”31 In chapter 25 of
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his Mare clausum, John Selden devotes several pages to the Rhodian sea law and its
attitude toward the dominion of the seas.32 The English writers on both admiralty
jurisdiction and the international law of the sea exhibited a keen interest in the
historiography of maritime law, and in their writings—as in the writings of Continental
authors—all waterways flowed backward to the Rhodian Sea Law.33
On the Continent, the first post-Rhodian code of law germinated in the coastal
town of Amalfi on the Mediterranean. The so-called Tables of Amalfi were collected
sometime in the eleventh century, although the oldest extant manuscript dates from
1274.34 The analogous Ordinamenta of Trani, dating to the early fourteenth century,
contained the maritime customs of the towns on the Adriatic coast. The great importance
of Amalfi and Trani to European maritime law and commerce notwithstanding, these
codes did not have much influence in England: Edda Frankot points out that during the
Middle Ages, maritime law was divided roughly along a north-south axis, noting
“northwestern maritime law is generally considered to constitute a largely separate
tradition from the law of the sea in the Mediterranean area and both have their own
historiography.”35 This geographic divide is well-known in legal history, but Frankot
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draws an additional conclusion that gives pause: he argues that even within Northern
Europe “a common medieval law of the sea was an impossibility due to the absence of a
supra-territorial jurisdiction which could implement such a law” and that “the law of the
sea was not shared between territories at all, but was divided across many small
jurisdictions.”36 These observations on the north-south divide, as well as north-north
divisions themselves, challenge the idea of maritime law as a universalizing force during
the period. While the impulse to standardize the law of the sea had existed since the
classical world, its realization remained far out of reach during the Middle Ages and early
modern period.37
The most important code of maritime law in Northern Europe were the Rolls of
Oléron, which consisted of forty-seven articles. The Rolls took their name from the island
of Oléron, which was situated off the coast of Aquitaine, but more exact information
about their origins evades historians.38 English tradition held that Richard I had returned
to England from the Crusades with the Rolls in hand, a legend already debunked by
lawyer Matthew Hale in the 1670s: “But the supposition that [Richard] made these
Constitutions called the Laws of Oleron in his return from the Holy Land or in any short
time after seems utterly improbable and indeed almost impossible.”39 Still, despite the
tale’s tenuous relationship to historical reality, it illustrates the anxiety inherent in
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absorbing the foreign Rolls into England’s domestic legal fabric. The laws had been
adopted as the code which governed admiralty courts in England during the reign of
Edward III in the fourteenth century. The first partial English translation appeared in The
Rutter of the Sea, a 1520 French sailing manual, which had been translated by English
poet Robert Copland in 1528 and reprinted a total of five times before the end of the
sixteenth century.40 In addition to practical navigational instructions for the coasts of
Spain, France, and England, the 1536 edition of the Rutter contained an abridged copy of
the Rolls of Oléron, the first translation of the laws into English.41 It should not surprise
us that the first printed copy of the Rolls appeared not as a legal text, but rather in a
sailing manual, which highlights the utilitarian nature of the laws: they were as likely to
be found in a captain’s cabin as in a lawyer’s study. But they also served as an
authoritative touchstone for the seventeenth-century writers on admiralty jurisdiction and
were reprinted in the treatise of Zouch, who included only twenty-seven of the original
forty-seven articles. The Rolls represent the increasing impulse to standardize the law of
the sea in the Northern Atlantic.
The Rolls of Oléron also appeared, untranslated, in the Black Book of the
Admiralty, the most important work on the English Admiralty during the late Middle
Ages. Like most records related to the court, it was not published until the second half of
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the nineteenth century.42 Its origins remain murky, but scholars generally agree it served
as a manual for the Lord High Admiral. Compiled during the fourteenth century, its
contents included rules for the Admiral, instructions for the Admiral during times of war,
articles for a maritime inquest, miscellaneous laws and ordinances, and the Rolls of
Oléron. Various manuscripts of the Black Book circulated; one copy (British Library
Cotton MS Vespasian B. 22) is handsomely illuminated and was probably prepared for
the Lord High Admiral himself.43 John Selden, who owned a manuscript copy of the
Black Book, wrote, “The book itself is rather a monument to antiquity, yet not above
about Henry VI, than of authority, and rather as a purpose of what was in some failing
project, than ever in use and judgement held authentical. Most of it is against both the
now received and former practice.”44 While the Black Book held considerable importance
for the first two hundred years of the English admiralty, it was already perceived as
outdated in the seventeenth century.
Another important and influential text for the history of European maritime law
was birthed in the Mediterranean. The Book of the Consulate of the Sea (Libre del
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Consolat de Mar), probably originating in Barcelona and written in Catalan, sought to
coalesce local statutes and customs of the commercial judges who heard cases in coastal
towns.45 The book contained both substantive and procedural law and in this sense can be
viewed as a southern counterpart to the Black Book of the Admiralty, although the
former enjoyed much wider influence and circulation. As Stanley Jados writes in the
introduction to his translation, “Each commercial city had its own laws and customs, its
own system of justice. Any merchant who was not a resident of the city in which he
carried on his trade was regarded as a foreigner. For protection the merchants needed a
reliable code of general laws and impartial courts.”46 The Consulate contains an
exhaustive compendium of sea law, and nearly every possible circumstance that might
arise on the sea or in ports is addressed: examples include “123 - Obligations of a
Passenger,” “249 - Waterlogged Cargo Carried in an Open Boat,” “271 - Inability of a
Patron to Undertake a Voyage Due to His Indebtedness,” as well as ordinances related to
a number of persons aboard ship, including barbers, the ship’s caulker, and the lookout.47
At times, it is amusing in its specificity:
If any merchandise or cargo is damaged by rats while aboard a vessel, and the
patron has failed to provide a cat to protect it from rats, he shall pay the damage;
however, it was not explained what will happen if there were cats aboard the vessel while
it was being loaded, but during the journey these cats died and the rats damaged the cargo
before the vessel reached a port where the patron could purchase additional cats.48
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Due to its wide-reaching utility, the Consulate was printed twenty-fives times between
1490 and 1700, in both its original Catalan as well as Italian, Spanish, and French, and
remained the authoritative body of maritime law in the region until the appearance of the
Ordenanzas de Bilbao in 1737.49 The Book of the Consulate of the Sea can most usefully
be viewed as the Mediterranean equivalent of the Rolls of Oléron.
These maritime codes contain three elements to note. In the first place, they exude
textual instability. The Rolls of Oléron, for example, shift content from one copy to the
next. These discrepancies reveal that the Rolls exist on a plain of multifarity and that
identifying an authoritative copy proves an elusive goal. The Rhodian Sea Law also, and
unsurprisingly, was subject to much deviation across copies.50 The law of the sea, in its
transmission across times and places, adapted to both the needs of seafarers and the
national law of the countries in which it was practiced. As a result, textual instability can
be read more generously as textual flexibility, and this flexibility imbued it with a nascent
universalizing impulse, as stubborn rigidity would have rendered the codes less effective.
Related to this textual instability is geographic instability. That is, the sea law developed
varying customs in the Mediterranean and in the North Atlantic, and the codes offer
evidence of these differences. In England, William Welwood’s An Abridgement of all
Sea-Lawes attempted to truncate these divergent paths: as the medieval seas gave way to
the early modern oceans, the need for a law that could be applied to ships and mariners
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across the globe grew more urgent. The codes represented specific geographic locations,
emphasized in their very names—Rhodes, Amalfi, Oléron—but despite their initial
provincialism, they stretched out from the north and the south until they met, and in their
conjugal union they conceived what would become modern maritime law. Finally, the
codes share a common interest in the practical. Unlike other forms of English law, they
do not tend toward the esoteric. This reflects the nature of those using the law: mariners,
merchants, men who did not have the time or inclination to pore over labyrinthine legal
texts. The brevity of the codes parallels the reason why early modern merchants, both
English and foreign, generally preferred the High Court of Admiralty to the common law
courts. The nature of their business—swift, transitory, and often involving actors from
different states—made the court an attractive alternative to the procedurally slowermoving common law courts. In fact, this feature comprises a reason for the existence of
maritime law itself.51 Appropriately enough, the codes reflect the nature of the law to
which they are bound.

2. Government Documents
Maritime law must coexist with national law. It must flex and conform to the
legal contours of the countries in which it is practiced. In England, of course, this law is

In “Admiralty’s Adjudicatory Jurisdiction over Alien Defendants: A Functional Analysis,” The
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 11.4 (1980), 395-452, Richard T. Robol offers a
heuristic model of admiralty jurisdiction to help conceptualize the law of the sea. His model
argues that maritime law 1) supposes the actors in maritime transactions are engaged, to a greater
or lesser extent, in interstate and international commerce, and as a result, they come into contact
with a multiplicity of other nations; 2) sees the policing of the sea in matters such as piracy and
the protection of seamen as a goal that serves an international, as opposed to mere national,
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the common law. Government documents related to maritime law and admiralty
jurisdiction remain an overlooked category of printed maritime law in early modern
England. Materials that fall under this categorical umbrella include royal proclamations,
statutes, and acts of parliament. These documents, of course, encompass the entire scope
of royal authority in the period and are not exclusive to matters affecting the English
admiralty. However, they demonstrate the range of maritime issues that the early modern
English government sought to regulate. They complement and at times supplant the
codes, and unlike the codes, they originated on English soil, safely within the confines of
English legal authority. Edward Coke, who in his Fourth Institute of the Laws of England
(considered below as a treatise) sought to define the jurisdictional parameters of the High
Court of Admiralty, was not inclined to conjure the Continental codes of maritime law.
As English judge Sir Francis Buller noted in a report from the eighteenth century, “In
truth my Lord Coke could not bear anything connected with the Civil Law.”52 Maritime
law, procedurally connected to the Continental civil law, offended Coke as well. In the
Fourth Institute, he relies on three authorities in his mission to restrict the admiralty’s
court’s jurisdiction, Acts of Parliament, judgments and judicial proceedings, and book
cases, all material rooted firmly in English soil.53
Coke, as well as the other writers on admiralty jurisdiction in England
(Fleetwood, Godolphin, Zouch, Exton, Hale), sought to delimit the English admiralty in
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part through the invocation of certain statutes.54 Perhaps the three most referenced
statutes were 15 Ric. 2 c. 3 (1391, on the jurisdiction of the admiral), 28 Hen. 8 c. 15
(1536, on offenses at sea), and 5 Eliz. c. 5 (1562, on the maintenance of the navy).55 The
Statutes of the Realm cannot be considered maritime law in the same manner, or to the
same degree, as the codes. But this does not mean that their interpretation did not have
real consequences for the merchants and mariners who had their cases heard before the
judges in the High Court of Admiralty, or who found themselves in the throes of the Lord
High Admiral’s jurisdiction within British waters. They did not seek to define aspects of
maritime law substantively, as did the codes; rather, they mainly impacted the procedural
elements of the English admiralty. In a sense they complement the codes by setting out
the machinery with which to enforce the codes’ directives in an English jurisdiction, and
perhaps their procedural nature is what excluded them from Senior’s discussions of
maritime law.
The second main government document, the printed royal proclamation, offers an
even more overlooked category of printed maritime law. Chapter 2 engages more
robustly with these ubiquitous broadsides of the period, displayed across the realm as an
ever-present visual reminder of royal authority, but a general consideration of their role in
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early modern England will be considered here. Like the statutes, royal proclamations
addressed many issues of maritime law: piracy, of course, but also shipwreck, mariners’
wages, impressment of mariners, sea traffic, ships, the High Court of Admiralty, and even
anchors. I know of no scholar who has investigated the proclamations’ engagement with
maritime law: this omission is unfortunate, as the proclamations represent the most
widespread printed material addressing the law of the sea in early modern England. In
certain ways, the proclamations’ relationship to maritime law mirrors the statutes, but
they also stand apart. For example, the legal authority of royal proclamations in the
period remains contested by modern historians.56 However, on a pragmatic plane, a
person in early modern London who would most likely never have business in the High
Court of Admiralty could read of maritime law and regulations across the city.57
The government documents on maritime law illustrate the precarious positioning
of this law in England in a more straightforward, and clinical, fashion than the treatises.
Their mere existence serves as a reminder of the High Court of Admiralty’s subservience
to English national law. In addition, they challenge two assumptions about early modern
maritime law in England. First, that it was strictly international: while the codes did
develop in other places in Europe, their implementation required administrative and
procedural rules in England, and I would argue that these rules themselves constitute a
form of maritime law. Due to a narrow definition of maritime law, some scholars have
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focused on the substantive at the expense of the procedural in their discussions of the law
of the sea. Second, this omission has unnecessarily shaped the scholarly trajectory of
printed maritime law in early modern England. Beginning with Senior, the topic of
English maritime law has been limited to codes and treatises. Leaving out these
government documents has distorted the scholarly conversation and produced a myopic
vision. In particular, the exclusion of printed royal proclamations, the most frequently
printed and widely distributed form of English maritime law, has unhelpfully skewed
ideas about the early modern English public’s engagement with the English admiralty and
the law of the sea.

3. Reports
In his “Proposition Touching Amendment of Laws,” Francis Bacon set aside his
lifelong animosity toward Edward Coke long enough to shower praise on the latter’s
Reports. He wrote that “had it not been for Sir Edward Coke’s Reports (which though
they may have errors, and some preemptory and extrajudicial resolutions more than are
warranted, yet they contain infinite good decisions and rulings over cases), the law by
this time had been almost like a ship without ballast.”58 The reports of Coke, as well as
Spelman, Dyer, and Plowden, supplanted the long tradition of the year-books in English
legal history.59 The early reports, dating from the fifteenth century, were not much
different from the year-books, but over time, the new medium added depth and
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sophistication to the art of English law reporting. This development reached an apogee in
Coke’s Reports, published in ten volumes between 1600 and 1615. One legal historian
argues that Coke, as legal thinker, embraced a paradoxical farrago of conservatism,
progressivism, and even superstition, but that this very combination granted his Reports
their strength: “The great value of the Reports, in fact, lies in this, that although they
summarise mediaeval authority upon a point, yet in many cases they also lay the
foundations of a modern doctrine.”60 Reports of cases at common law—first in the yearbooks, later in the named reports—provided a crucial resource for the period’s lawyers
and legal thinkers.
Due in part to the limited nature of the High Court of Admiralty’s jurisdiction and
business, the practitioners produced no published texts analogous to the printed reports of
the common lawyers. However, the civilians did keep records and notes of the cases that
came before the court. One famous example is that of Sir Julius Caesar, who served as
judge in the court between 1582 and 1606. Caesar’s papers contain several volumes of
notes related to this role; they include “miscellaneous papers which Caesar either
received or transcribed in the course of the court of Admiralty business: correspondence
with litigants or their representatives, lawyers, councillors, muniments, accounts, etc. …
in addition, five volumes contain Julius Caesar’s personal notes (in his own handwriting)
on the legal arguments presented by counsel.”61 The annotations mainly reference legal
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authorities, and he generally omits factual details of individual cases. Alain Wijffels
speculates that Caesar collected these notes for his own professional activities and adds
as “a judge in the court of Admiralty, Caesar intended to clarify the workings of the
court, whether or not with a view to publishing the results of his research and notes.”62
Ultimately, Wijffels concludes, we cannot be sure of the purpose of Caesar’s notes, and
they remain unpublished.
But Caesar was not the only civilian associated with the court to keep notes on his
activity there. Italian-born civilian Alberico Gentili’s Hispanicae advocationis libri duo
(Hanau, 1613) represents the closest text to a report that exists of the early modern High
Court of Admiralty.63 Gentili himself is perhaps best remembered for several important
contributions to early modern international law. According to Coquillette, Gentili’s main
works “were remarkable for their narrow, objective approach. They focused on factual
data about customary law, not on hypotheticals, ideals, or academic theories.”64 In many
ways, Gentili remained an outlier in early modern England’s legal landscape: he was not
born in England, but rather Italy; he did not obtain his legal education at Oxford,
Cambridge, or the Inns of Court, but rather at the University of Perugia.65 He arrived in
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England in 1579 as a Protestant refugee.66 Gentili held a Regius professorship in Civil
Law at the University of Oxford for twenty-one years, where he was, by all accounts, a
popular and effective teacher. Despite his affiliation with the civil law, he never joined
the Doctors’ Commons. He did, however, hold an honorary membership at Gray’s Inn.67
In 1584, the Spanish ambassador to England, Don Bernardino de Mendoza, was accused
of participation in a plot to liberate Mary, Queen of Scots. His alleged guilt had been
revealed by the plot’s chief conspirator, Francis Throckmorton, who confessed under
torture on the rack. Unsure how to proceed, the Privy Council consulted both Gentili and
French jurist François Hotman on the matter: both lawyers agreed that Mendoza could
not be tried in England, as he enjoyed the criminal immunity of an ambassador.68
Gentili’s decision required a certain degree of moral courage, as it was an extraordinarily
unpopular one; in De iure belli, he defended his decision to exile Mendoza rather than to
have him stand trial.
The Hispanicae advocationis drew on Gentili’s experience as the advocate for
Spain at the High Court of Admiralty from 1605 until his death in 1608. As a result of his
favorable opinion in the Mendoza affair, the Spanish Crown had entrusted Gentili with
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representing Spain at the English admiralty court.69 Lauren Brenton notes the
precariousness of Gentili’s position: he was expected to represent the Spanish Crown
while remaining mindful of the interests of his adopted homeland.70 During his three
years as a Spanish advocate, Gentili took notes on the cases that he witnessed, which he
probably intended to revise prior to publication. Unfortunately, however, Gentili died in
1608, before he had the opportunity to edit his manuscript. He directed his brother,
Scipio, to destroy his other writings, but he wanted his notes on the international law of
the sea to be published. Perhaps this illustrates Gentili’s recognition of the gravity of the
work. Frank Frost Abbot notes the “attitude which Gentili took toward the different
branches of law and the method which he followed in establishing judicial principles are
more clearly shown in the Advocatio than in any of his other writings, and perhaps in that
fact the primary importance of this work lies.”71 The Hispanicae advocationis is notable
also because it is the only printed High Court of Admiralty corollary to the common law
reports; and like the common law reports and Caesar’s annotations, Gentili does not focus
on the facts of cases but rather the broader jurisprudential issues piqued by the cases.
The best example of Gentili’s method can be found in Chapter 11 of the
Hispanicae advocationis, “On Holding to the Civil Law in Appeals from a Judge of the
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Admiralty.” This chapter also gives us a valuable window into the practical issues
associated with the adjudication of maritime causes in common law England. This
chapter comprises a small portion of the entire work—clearly, questions of admiralty
jurisdiction were not the Italian jurist’s focus—but it does establish an early civilian
position on the issue. Gentili, naturally, does not make value judgments on the merit of
one law over the other. Instead he writes on the coexistence of the two systems in one
national legal body. Gentili states the question as “whether those who profess the English
common law ought to be among the appellate judges when an appeal is taken from a
judge of the Admiralty, or whether those alone should be appointed who profess the
English civil law.”72 Compared to the later treatises on admiralty jurisdiction considered
below, the scope of Gentili’s inquiry is remarkably narrow. He addresses one sliver of
procedure, the appointment of appellate judges. Early in the chapter Gentili notes a
distinction in terminology: instead of the adjectives “English” and “Roman,” he will use
“common” and “civil” to distinguish the affiliations of appellate judges. This is to prevent
confusion about the term “our law,” because the Admiralty Court had been instructed to
give judgments in accordance with “our law.” He notes, “In a sovereign state there is no
law but that of the state itself” (99). This observation reveals Gentili’s insight: the civil
law, by virtue of its practice in England since the Middle Ages, could claim with
certitude to be part of the English national law. Gentili’s second main point involves the
suitability of the civil law for suits brought to the High Court of Admiralty. He argues
that the English common law “lacks the intent, it lacks the power, it lacks the language to
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deal with [foreigners]” (101). This position echoes the later civilian treatises on admiralty
jurisdiction. The civil law, because it was practiced in all countries that surrounded
England, remained far superior for dealing with the suitors who appeared before the High
Court of Admiralty. Gentili, of course, was not antagonistic to the common law—he was,
after all, an honorary member of Gray’s Inn—but, as shown in his recommendation in the
Mendoza affair, he did not hesitate to promulgate an unpopular opinion.
Reports offer a direct link between the cases heard in the High Court of Admiralty
and the reflections of legal practitioners who practiced therein. Although it is unfortunate
that more advocates associated with the court did not publish their personal notes,
Gentili’s Hispanicae advocationis provides a glimpse into what the genre offers.
Interestingly, based on the Restoration treatises, the work’s influence among the civilians
in England appears to be negligible: none cite the Hispanicae advocationis. Golphin,
however, may have owned the 1613 edition.73 Its influence in Europe lies outside the
scope of this dissertation, but it should be noted that the later editions point to a sustained
Continental relevance. And while Gentili’s main purpose in compiling his notes appears
to lie in analyzing the relationship between maritime law and international law, the
Hispanicae advocationis offers what no other printed early modern text on the High
Court of Admiralty does.
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4. Treatises
Treatises represent the largest, richest, and most nuanced category of printed
English maritime law in the early modern period. In one sense, they sit positioned farthest
from the law itself. As Edith Henderson notes, the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century
common lawyer “needed access to three kinds of written material: statutes, form books,
and collections of case law. Access to treatises or texts on particular aspects of the law
would certainly have been helpful but probably, for the fully trained lawyer, not
absolutely essential.”74 While writing explicitly about the common law, the evidence
(lack of treatises on maritime law produced in England until the seventeenth century)
suggests this observation held true for the civilians as well.
The English treatises on maritime law fall into two broad categories: domestic and
international. The former contains treatises that addressed English admiralty jurisdiction.
As discussed above, this issue that had been present since the Middle Ages came to a
head during the early modern period, and a series of both common lawyers and civilians
addressed the struggle over jurisdiction not only in the courts, but also on the page. Some
of these treatises were not published and remained personal references for their authors:
common lawyers William Fleetwood and Matthew Hale each wrote treatises of this type
that were not published until the twentieth century.75 But others found their way to the
printing press, the three most notable being the trio of Restoration treatises published in
the early 1660s by civilians John Godolphin, Richard Zouch, and John Exton. The second
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category of treatises addressed the international law of the sea, and specifically the
question of free seas. John Selden’s Mare clausum (1635; English translation 1652) fits
into this category, as does William Welwood’s An Abridgement of all Sea-Lawes (1613).
Both types of treatises employ some of the same methods, although toward different
ends: while the treatises on admiralty jurisdiction seek to define the Lord High Admiral’s
purview inward, to the point where it ended and the common law began, the international
treatises looked outward and search for the defining line between England’s territorial
waters and the high seas. The significance in both groups of treatises lies in their
integration of the codes, government documents, and reports. They allow scholars, in
other words, to consider how the other three types of maritime law would have been
viewed through the eyes of the early modern common lawyer or civilian. They offer the
most direct engagement with the earlier texts.
In Chapter 4, I consider the early modern response to the question of free seas and
discuss the treatises of Hugo Grotius and John Selden in depth. Here, I would like to
focus on William Welwood’s An Abridgement of all Sea-Lawes (1613), which both
addresses the debate and also provides a more holistic treatment of the law of the sea. As
the first true book on maritime law published in England, it falls somewhere between a
code and a treatise. Given its engagement with Grotius’ Mare liberum, most recent
scholarship on An Abridgement has focused on its contribution to that debate.76 However,
Welwood’s treatise sought to do much more than offer a rebuttal to the great Dutch jurist.
See, for example, J.D. Alsop, “William Welwood, Anne of Denmark and the Sovereignty of the
Sea,” The Scottish Historical Review 59.168 (1980), 171-74 and Martine Julia van Ittersum,
“Mare Liberum Versus the Propriety of the Seas? The Debate between Hugo Grotius (1583–
1645) and William Welwood (1552–1624) and its Impact on Anglo-Scotto-Dutch Fishery
Disputes in the Second Decade of the Seventeenth Century,” Edinburgh Law Review 10.2 (2006),
239-76.
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An Abridgement, Welwood writes, sought to summarize “all Writings and Monuments
which are to be found among any people or Nation, upon the coasts of the great Ocean
and Mediterranean Sea.” Welwood’s treatise looks at a variety of legal problems,
including salvage, piracy, and the duties and privileges of mariners; he cites Rhodian Sea
Law, the Book of the Consulate of the Sea, the Rolls of Oléron, and the Laws of Wisby,
among others. Although reprinted in 1636, the treatise’s impact on England’s civil
lawyers appears negligible, as Exton and Zouch reference it only once in their works, and
Godolphin does not mention it at all, although he may have owned the 1636 edition.77
However, through its synthesis of earlier codes, An Abridgement illustrates the
universalizing impulse among seventeenth-century jurists to produce a uniform, panEuropean law of the sea.
The admiralty jurisdiction debates occasioned the majority of English treatises on
maritime law, and a brief overview of their historical context necessitates an
understanding of these texts. Maritime law was, of course, adjudicated in England in the
High Court of Admiralty, which had its earlier roots in maritime tribunals held in towns
on the coast. Historians have not always agreed on the history of the Tudor High Court of
Admiralty, but one general trend is apparent: the sixteenth-century court enjoyed a far
greater range of causes than the fifteenth-century court.78 The expansion in maritime
activity in the sixteenth century, which included gains in navigation, maritime commerce,
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and naval capabilities, subsequently increased the business of the High Court of
Admiralty during the period. However, despite this burgeoning of legal activity, the court
did not enjoy a truly independent jurisdiction and remained subject to the Crown through
the figure of the Lord Admiral. R. G. Marsden notes that although during the latter part of
the sixteenth century the court enjoyed a near-monopoly over prize cases, Sir Julius
Caesar, judge of the High Court of Admiralty from 1584 until 1606, “had reason to
remonstrate against the interference of the [Privy] council with his judicial functions.”
This was because prize captured without letter of marque was considered illegal.79
In the battle for admiralty jurisdiction, the most powerful weapon in the common law
arsenal was the writ of prohibition. A prohibition could be issued at any time after a suit
had been filed in the High Court of Admiralty; in fact, they could be targeted at any
inferior court that the common law lawyers felt encroached on the jurisdiction of the
common law. The common lawyers based these writs of prohibition on the earlier, preHenrician statutes, such as 15 Ric. 2 c. 3, which had more severely pinched the admiral’s
jurisdiction.80 Prohibitions often involved the use of a legal fiction, which had the power
to move venues from one place to another.81 In the case of legal fictions directed at cases
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filed in the Court of Admiralty, the fiction would state a contract had been signed in
London, not super altum mare, and the common law courts thus enjoyed jurisdiction.
Although originally a King’s Bench writ, all three common law courts were issuing
prohibitions by 1600. It proved a particularly potent weapon, as the “civilians never
achieved any degree of success in questioning the authority of the two principal courts of
common law.”82
Both the civilians and the common lawyers produced treatises addressing the
debate. The nature of the common lawyers’ writing on admiralty jurisdiction defies
expectation: because the common law courts ultimately won the debate, one would
assume their treatises reflected an aggressive stance toward the limits of the admiral’s
purview. But, with the exception of Coke, their writings espouse a more subdued style,
and they spend far more time describing the extent of the admiral’s jurisdiction than
calling for its limitations. And even Coke, the most strident of the opponents of the
admiral’s authority to intervene in matters that did not arise on the high seas, did not
argue admiralty an unnecessary branch of English law. The civilians, conversely,
approached the topic more gingerly: they were conscious of their precarious professional
position as lawyers who practiced the civil law in England, and their writing revealed
their caution. They were careful to never assert the superiority of the civil law over
England’s national law, and they based the largest part of their arguments on statutory
interpretation. But compared with the common lawyers, the civilians’ treatises paint a
more expansive picture of maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction. Their historical
references were deeper, more developed, and better integrated. They considered not only
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that the admiral enjoyed a certain jurisdiction, but why maritime matters required the use
of a separate court; and not only that the suits brought before the High Court of
Admiralty proceeded by the civil law, but why the civil law possessed certain attributes
that made it particularly well-suited for adjudicating maritime matters.
The treatises of William Fleetwood and Matthew Hale have been discussed
extensively by legal historians Prichard and Yale. These texts stand apart from the other
treatises in this chapter because they were not printed, but they offer what no other text of
the period does: a monograph-length text, written by a common lawyer, dedicated to
admiralty jurisdiction. Fleetwood likely began compiling his notes on admiralty
jurisdiction while still a student at the Inns of Court; in his treatise, he sets out to explain
the extent of the admiral’s powers and jurisdiction.83 Almost a hundred years later, Hale
composed A Disquisition touching the Jurisdiction of the Common Law and Courts of
Admiralty in Relation to Things Done Upon or Beyond the Sea, and Touching Maritime
and Merchants Contracts (c. 1675); the text most likely was not intended for
publication.84 This sets it apart from the three civilian Restoration treatises, which not
only were published, but were also written in English to reach a larger audience.
Conversely, Hale’s treatise offers something else: the private thoughts and musings of a
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common law judge on the admiral’s jurisdiction. Not even Fleetwood’s treatise falls into
this category: while not published, it was addressed to a particular person, and Fleetwood
was acutely aware that its contents would be read, considered, and evaluated.
Edward Coke’s writing on England’s admiralty jurisdiction, which formed part of
a much larger work, constituted the most important published common law contribution
to the debate regarding the purview of the Lord High Admiral. Coke’s The Fourth Part of
the Institutes, dedicated to The Jurisdiction of the Courts, attempts to reconcile the
existence of non-common law courts that functioned within the realm.85 It begins with the
“high and most honourable Court of Parliament” and then proceeds to the Council Board,
the Protector, and the Court of the High Steward. Coke’s section on admiralty
jurisdiction, “Of the Court of the Admiralty proceeding according to the Civil Law,”
takes up only a small part of the Institutes. The domain of the Lord High Admiral was
one of seventy-six separate jurisdictions and courts described by Coke.86 In addition to
the chapter on admiralty jurisdiction, Coke also writes on the courts of the Cinque Ports:
as explained in the introduction to this dissertation, the Cinque Ports played an important
role in the early practice of maritime law in England. However, the focus in the Institutes
is not on the Ports’ practice of English admiralty law, but rather the Ports’ status as an

In the “Proemium” of the Fourth Institute, Coke writes, “Of Jurisdictions some be
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one law, some by another; the bounds of all and every several court Courts being most necessary
to be known. [So] the body of the Common wealth is best governed, when every several Court of
Justice executeth his proper jurisdiction” (B1V).
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independent jurisdiction.87 Coke’s chapter on admiralty jurisdiction responds directly to
the complaints of Dr. Daniel Dun, a civilian who served as a judge in the High Court of
Admiralty in the early seventeenth century.88 Dun’s complaint emerged from his
experiences in the court: like many civilians in his position, he became frustrated with the
use of prohibitions by the common law, which slowed down the business of the High
Court of Admiralty considerably. Dun also complained that the common law judges were
not honoring the agreement of 1575, which had been signed by the judges of admiralty
and the common law judges and which sharply delimited their respective jurisdictions.
Coke reprinted Dun’s grievances in his chapter and responded to each in kind.
One of Coke’s points warrants discussion as it obfuscates the relationship
between legal printing and legal authority. The first involves his uncharitable reading of
the statute 15 Richard II c. 3, “Jurisdiction of the Admiral.” The line in question reads,
“Nevertheless, of the death of a man, and of mayhem, done in great ships, being and
hovering in the main stream of great rivers, only beneath the bridges of the same rivers
nigh to the sea, and in none other places of the same rivers, the Admiral shall have
cognizance.”89 As noted above, the Statutes of the Realm had been printed in several
editions since Gutenberg’s press arrived on English shores: the first of these, Machlinia’s
edition of the early 1480s, the Old Abridgement of Statutes, misprinted the above excerpt
from 15 Richard II c. 3 to read “only beneath the points of the same rivers nigh to the
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sea.”90 This resulted from the confusion of two similar French terms, portes and pountz,
and Machlinia’s befuddlement found its way into Pynson’s statute editions of 1497 and
1508. The misprint was corrected in Rastell’s English abridgement of the statutes, The
Grete Abregement of the Statutys of England untyll the XXII yere of Kyng Henry the VIII,
in 1533. In 1609, the judges of the Common Pleas noted the mistake: “[The] 15 of
Richard the 2 is mis-printed, viz. that the admiral shall have jurisdiction to the points; for
the translator mistook bridges for points, that is to say the lands-end.”91 However, despite
this acknowledgment, Coke seized on the misprint and incorporated it into his argument
for limiting the admiral’s jurisdiction and Coke reprints the incorrect translation of the
statute in the Fourth Institute. Prichard and Yale maintain that Coke was the first lawyer
to argue for the limitation of the admiral’s jurisdiction based on the misprint but add that
the power of his belief endured: it appeared in a judicial argument as late as 1713.92 All
three of the Restoration civilian writers summarily dismiss Coke’s attempt to base his
argument on a misprint.
The Restoration treatises that responded specifically to Coke, and generally to the
ever-present threat of the common law’s encroachment on the admiralty’s jurisdiction,
appeared in the early 1660s. John Godolphin’s Συνηγορος Θαλασσιος: A View of the
Admiral Jurisdiction (1661) was published first. His treatise, like a vessel with a
preoccupied pilot, veers left and right, sometimes surging ahead with reckless speed,
other times becoming mired in some immobilizing mud, always beholden to the currents
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of its author’s desultory mind. Coquillette calls Godolphin’s effort “hardly jurisprudence,
much more a charming hodgepodge of authority, uncritically selected and casually
organized,” and Joanne Mathiasen adds that Godolphin in his treatise “seems unaware of
the grand struggle between civil and common law … he writes essentially like a little
man, jealously, though not unpleasantly, concerned about the jurisdiction of his particular
court.”93 Apparently, however, Godolphin’s contemporaries did not share the modern
derision: A View of the Admiral Jurisdiction is the only Restoration treatise to be printed
more than once (a second edition appeared in 1685) in the seventeenth century.
Godolphin proves a peculiar writer with a prose style that can only be described as
purple, and his clumsy attempts to infuse his treatise with a literary flavor mostly fall flat.
Richard Zouch’s The Jurisdiction of the Admiralty of England Asserted (1663) was the
second treatise to be published. Although written almost contemporaneously with
Godolphin’s treatise, the two works sit at opposite ends of the rhetorical and stylistic
spectrum: whereas Godolphin offers a farrago of maritime law, Zouch remains focused,
methodical, and restrained. His treatise is a straightforward response to Coke’s “Of the
Court of the Admiralty.” The effort generates fully competent, and often dry, discourse:
Zouch sets out to dissect, discredit, and dismiss Coke’s arguments against the admiral’s
jurisdiction one by one and he never meanders from this mission. And yet it is in its
pedantry that Zouch’s treatise succeeds. Using Coke’s own cited authorities against him,
Zouch shows how those sources ultimately argue for the enlargement of the admiral’s
purview over maritime affairs.

Coquillette, The Civilian Writers, 186-87; Mathiasen, “Some Problems of Admiralty
Jurisdiction in the 17th Century,” The American Journal of Legal History 2 (1958), 231. Jeffrey
Collins adds, “Godolphin was by no means a sparkling stylist” (ODNB).
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Evocative, effecting, and exuding both legal authority and literary prowess,
Exton’s The maritime dicæologie, or, Sea-jurisdiction of England (1664) represents a
kind of apogee of the Restoration treatises.94 The treatise shares much of its content with
his colleagues Godolphin and Zouch, and yet despite these similarities, Exton manages to
inject fresh air into the debates. While retaining Zouch’s systematic program, he peppers
his treatise with the lissome lexical and semantic associations of a seasoned poet. Not
only does Exton display a formidable grasp of the jurisprudential elements of the debate,
he does so as a great stylist of the English language. Exton divides The maritime
dicæologie into three books. The first, which exposits the admiralty in England, assumes
a historical tenor. The second, which sets out to establish the geographic purview of the
English admiralty, provides the strongest example of the synthesis of codes, government
documents, and reports, and demonstrates how Exton uses these authorities in tandem to
establish the admiral’s jurisdiction over liminal waters. In the third part, the author asserts
that all marine contracts fall under the jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty.
The second part of Exton’s treatise is also the longest. Stretching over twenty
chapters, he seeks to clarify the jurisdictional status of bodies of water separated from the
main sea: ports, havens, and creeks. He summons many types of authorities to his
service: English statutes, readings on those statutes delivered at the Inns of Court,
maritime codes, statutes of admiralty, reports of common law cases, writs and
prohibitions, and commentators on the civil law. A cursory glance at this list might evoke
an anxiety that Exton swerves too closely to Godolphian chaos. However, it is to Exton’s
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credit that he takes the utmost care in organizing and absorbing these sources into his
treatise. His ordering demonstrates his prudence: he begins with a discussion of the
medieval and early modern English statutes that delimited the Admiral’s jurisdiction,
Next, he turns his focus to reports of cases (found mainly in Coke’s Reports) in which the
common law courts handled cases that, Exton argues, should have been adjudicated in the
High Court of Admiralty: he focuses on Lacey’s Case, as well as Constable’s Case and
the Case of the Swans.95 Then he moves to the maritime codes, dedicating a chapter each
to the Rhodian Sea Law and the Rolls of Oléron. It is only in the final third of the second
book that he introduces a detailed outline of the civil law and its attitude toward liminal
waters. He closes with a discussion of the records of the admiralty, and the jurisdictional
disputes between the High Court of Admiralty and courts of Common Pleas, King’s
Bench, and Chancery.
Exton’s organization of this second book reveals the deliberateness with which he
communicated to his audience. Indeed, potential readers of his treatise can be broken into
three categories, common lawyers, civil lawyers, and merchants and mariners. In the
treatise’s introduction, he reaches out to the last group explicitly: “[How] necessary will
it be to keep and preserve the Laws of Nations Civil and Maritime … which is a point I
must leave to be considered by my loving friends the Merchants of England, Owners of
Ships and Vessels, and Sea-trading men that will spare but so much time as to read over
this small Treatise!” (B4V). The list of authorities that would speak to each category of
In the Case of the Swans (77 Eng. Rep. 435, KB. 1592), King’s Bench ruled that swans were
royal fowl, as whales and sturgeon were royal fish, and thus belonged to the monarch through the
royal prerogative. In Henry Constable’s Case (77 Eng. Rep. 218, 22, KB. 1601), King’s Bench
held that the royal prerogative extended to include flotsam, jetsam, and ligan resulting from
wreck of the sea. Lacey’s Case dealt with the extent of admiralty jurisdiction as it related to
criminal law. See Prichard and Yale, clxi-xlxv and 384.
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potential reader differed, and it almost appears as if Exton executed a very deliberate
schema in his ordering of materials. Chapters 1-8 deal mainly with English statutes and
common law cases, the purview of the common lawyer and intended to appeal to his
sense of English legal tradition. Chapters 10-13 appear directed at the English merchant
and mariner mentioned in the introduction, and they include both the maritime codes as
well as documents related to the historical admiralty, such as the Inquisition at
Queensborough.96 In Chapters 14-16, Exton attends to the civil law and its commentators,
a section addressed not only to his civilian colleagues but also to his common law
compatriots, although the minutiae would have been more meaningful to those lawyers
well-versed in the civil law. Finally, Chapters 17-20 synthesize the preceding chapters:
they combine records from both the admiralty and common law courts, as well as
Parliament, to prove conclusively that ports, havens, and creeks lay within the admiral’s
jurisdiction.
In the writing of his treatise, Exton really only had to persuade one group of
readers to adopt his reasoning: the common lawyers. Ostensibly, the merchants, mariners,
and civilians already ascribed to his main arguments about admiralty jurisdiction.97 For
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this reason, he foregrounds the authorities of the common law.98 But he also writes as an
unapologetic proselytizer of the civil law, attempting to convince the reader of its value,
and uses the printed word to bolster his cause. He does not attempt to mask his utmost
faith in the civil law’s merit as a universalizing legal system, claiming boldly, “[Any]one
that hath but once seen the inside of a Civilian’s study, either at home or abroad; for both
are the same, and furnished with books of the same nature and kind; and all Lawyers or
practitioners in the Laws, in all parts of Christendom are Civilians, and do study and take
their degrees in the Civil Law” (131). Instead of merely mentioning that the civil law
prevails in countries surrounding England—Exton boldly titles his chapter, “That the
Civil Law is used and practised in all or most Nations in Christendome”—and pointing to
its universalism in that way, Exton asks his reader to consider the personal libraries of
English and foreign civilians: the similarities render them virtually identical. To a
common lawyer reading Exton’s treatise, perhaps in his own study, and surrounded by
his own books on the common law, this would have been an enlightening mental
exercise, and he would have to admit the common law, when juxtaposed with its erudite
civilian cousin, seemed limited and provincial. Books of the civil law occupy a great deal
of Exton’s energy in this section. Although printing English law has most often been
discussed in terms of the common law, Exton uses it to extol the civil law, and attempts

Exton is, however, no great admirer of Edward Coke’s legal thinking and does not sugarcoat
his disdain. Before picking apart Coke’s interpretation of statute law, he writes, “For here I am to
encounter a great Antagonist, the forementioned Sir Edward Coke, sometime Lord chief Justice
of the Kings Bench” (59). Yet he also incorporates his characteristic wit in his dismissal of Coke:
“Now we may see plainly by what Sir Edward Coke saith in the first place, where he voucheth
this Record, that the Record (as I said before) is very far stretcht, and part which is from thence
deduced and drawn very far fetcht” (85-6).
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to affirm its authority by pointing out the sheer volume of civil (explicitly Roman) law
that had been printed:
What shall we say of the printing and so often reprinting of this large body of the
Law, since printing was first invented, which was but 190 years agone? Next what
shall we say of the so late reprinting this large body with the gloss and case, and
other notes upon the same, with the large index thereunto, in all consisting of six
large volumes in folios, some printed in one country, and some in another; some
printed within these thirty years, some within a shorter time? (131)99
Again, Exton appeals to the universalizing power of the civil law by bending his reader’s
mind to the substantial physical book and its power to unite practitioners from across
Europe. A system of law that remains so uniform over such geographic variation seems
best suited for dealing with maritime affairs.
For the literary scholar, it is Exton’s language that provides the greatest pleasure.
While his legal arguments may appear arcane and his sources inaccessible, his prose style
teems with stylistic riches that serve his jurisprudential ends. Justice, he writes, resembles
a bird: “[She] soars aloft and spreadeth herself over both sea and land, [and] she hath two
Jurisdictions, the one fitted with Laws most apt and proper for distributing of right in all
land businesses, the other furnished with Laws most meet and convenient for the
dispensing of equity in all maritime and sea affairs” (135-36). The metaphor of the bird
permeates his treatise, and he uses the image to illustrate additional points about
jurisdiction. For example, he counters the common law argument that shifting maritime
cases from the High Court of Admiralty to the common law courts increased efficiency
by noting if one of the bird’s wings is removed, “justice must needs fall flat to the
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ground, and can by no other so expand herself, as to extend either her directions unto one,
or reach forth such her efforts to the other” (136). He continues, pointing out that
removing the feathers from one wing and placing them in the other does not make the
bird’s flight any faster; and in the same way, shifting cases moving maritime cases to the
common law courts would not lead to a more effective procedure or just outcome. His
metaphors do not end with the bird, however. When writing on foreign maritime
jurisdictions, he states, “I must confess I am no traveller, and that in that regard have not
been amongst these Mercatorian and nautical judges; but yet have I in my study travelled
through the decisions and determinations of many foreign judicatures, and by that means
(I believe) do know their laws” (144). The exquisite crafting of Exton’s treatise renders
its sometimes-dry subject matter palatable. Its lofty language elevates the maritime law in
England to a higher plane, and from below the civilian, merchant, and mariner can gaze
upon it with pride, and the common lawyer, with awe and new-found reverence.100
The genre of the treatise provided their authors a level of freedom unavailable to
the compilers of the codes and government documents. Unconfined by the pressure to
conform to royal authority or indissoluble legal custom, the treatise writers composed
texts that incorporated earlier sources in a holistic manner. In addition, they tackled the
two major issues of maritime law of their day: freedom of the seas and the admiralty
jurisdiction in England. These issues probe the nature of the sea itself, the role of
maritime law in England, and the very purpose of maritime law. They offer certain legal
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and cultural assumptions of their era, through which the modern critic can more
accurately conceptualize the early modern sea.

V. CONCLUSION
Maritime law affords the twenty-first century scholar rich resources for literary
and cultural understandings of the early modern sea. This is in part because the most
common legal issues adjudicated by the law of the sea make for good stories: tempest and
shipwreck, sunken treasure and salvage, piracy and plunder all enthrall. They occur on a
vast watery plain inaccessible to many readers, one that, even in periods of calm and
tranquility, harbors the faint threat of danger. Early modern writers took advantage of
maritime adventure and incorporated these topics into their works. But a cursory
understanding of these issues fails to engage with them in a meaningful way. Here one
can conjure the codes of maritime law: they provide the literary critic with a contextual
apparatus for understanding what, exactly, motivated Artegall’s judgment in Book 5,
Canto 4 of The Faerie Queene, and what laws, exactly, condemned John Ward to death in
A Christian Turned Turk (1612). The codes of maritime law governed the early modern
sea, and in its poetic or dramatic simulacrum, this sea was governed by a set of
corresponding laws that prove slightly askew, as did all human enterprise in the early
modern ocean.
The texts on maritime law of the period introduce another tool for the literary
scholar. They evince how the sea was conceived of as a legal, jurisdictional, space. In
particular, the treatises on freedom of the seas ponder the nature of the ocean itself: where
it ended and began, the extent to which it could be partitioned off, in what manner it
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could be possessed, and how human-ocean interaction bore on these questions. These
sentiments are particularly useful as they construct theoretical frames for understanding
maritime space as a cultural and literary phenomenon. The legal view of the natural
world differs significantly from the scientific or religious, and maritime law remained
ever present—perhaps in a weathered copy of The Rutter of the Sea—aboard the English
ships traversing the global ocean. As I show in Chapter 4, these legal ideas about the
ocean rest on a spectrum, with Grotius on one end, and Selden on the other, and their
writings help to theorize maritime space in works such as The Faerie Queene and PolyOlbion. The seventeenth-century legal writers provide the twenty-first literary critic with
an early modern theory of the sea.
Legal writing on the law of the sea can also aid in our understanding of how
language works to construct the ocean. The later treatises on admiralty jurisdiction
exploit the literary potential of the language of the sea. Emanating eloquent elucidation,
Exton’s treatise offers the paragon of early modern English writing on maritime law. Just
as piracy and shipwreck appealed to the early modern reader, so did the billowing waves
and watery expanses of the high seas appeal to the early modern poet. The ocean has
produced a myriad of maritime metaphors in the English language not without cause, and
while poets have long recognized its lyric potential, it was not lost on the legal writers of
the period either. The domestic treatises create a linguistic link between the legal and the
literary, one both historically grounded and critically robust.
Finally, the writings on maritime law disrupt our understanding of early modern
legal authority. During the period, the law of the sea shared an uncomfortable
relationship with the common law of England, in large part because of the disputes
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regarding admiralty jurisdiction. The treatises that emerged from this debate call legal
authority into question at times explicitly: the most fraught example is Coke’s willful
misinterpretation of a statute. But they also challenge the established order in a more
abstract way. Maritime law itself required a specialized knowledge, the nuances of which
were only available to the practitioners in the High Court of Admiralty. To the common
lawyers—with the exception of stalwart scholars such as John Selden—this expertise lay
beyond their grasp.
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CHAPTER 2
ROBBERS OF THE SEA
PIRACY IN PROCLAMATIONS, PAMPHLETS, AND PLAYS, 1558-1675

I. INTRODUCTION
“When wee see a Ship alter her course,” colonial governor John Smith advised
young mariners in 1627, “and useth all the meanes she can to fetch you up, you are the
chase, and hee the chaser. In giving chase or chasing, or to escape being chased, there is
required an infinite judgement and experience, for there is no rule for it; but the shortest
way to fetch up your chase is the best.”1 Smith’s instructions reflect a reality of life at sea
for an early Stuart sailor: their vessels remained vulnerable not only to tempest and
shipwreck but also to attacks from pirates and privateers, attacks that often led to
international rancor and financial disaster. And yet in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century
England, far more people encountered piracy on the printed page or the London stage
than on the high seas.
Piracy sells. The maritime crime apparently fascinated the early modern English
public. Shakespeare’s Pericles, Prince of Tyre (1609, performed c. 1606), which contains
a nautical ensemble of mariners, fishermen, and pirates, proved one of the most popular
plays performed during his lifetime. Other plays of the period, such as Heywood and
Rowley’s Fortune by Land and Sea (1655, performed c. 1609) and Robert Daborne’s A
Christian Turned Turk, or The Tragical Lives and Deaths of the Two Famous Pirates,
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John Smith, A Sea Grammar: with the Plaine Exposition of Smiths Accidence for Young Seamen, Enlarged. Kermit Goell, ed. (London: Michael Joseph, 1970), 72-3.
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Ward and Dansiker (1612, performed c. 1612), capitalized on the allure of the robbers of
the sea: these works dramatized the lives and deaths of real English pirates.2 The exploits
of sea marauders were also captured in popular media such as pamphlets and ballads. The
court proceedings of at least one pirate and his accomplices were even printed for wider
distribution in An Exact Narrative of the Tryals of the Pirates (1674). While the fictional
pirates of the London stage were not constrained by historical truth, these popular
accounts purported to convey accurate narratives of piratical exploits. These various
accounts position sea robbers, alternately, as fearless rebels, abhorrent traitors, insatiable
thieves, and repentant sinners. But another printed medium concerning piracy permeated
early modern England: the royal proclamation. Between 1519 and 1610, the government
issued twenty-seven royal proclamations concerning piracy. These royal communiqués
represent a major conduit of information about piracy, one that should not be divorced
from discussions of the popular accounts. In addition, they provide a useful site of
juxtaposition with the period’s piracy plays.
This chapter considers these two main types of messaging which informed the
public of piracy. Previous scholarship on royal proclamations addressing piracy focuses
mainly on their content; it does not engage proclamation as a specific genre, nor the
implications of a reading public that obtained knowledge about the maritime offense
through an official royal medium.3 As a result, the physical manifestation of the
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For example, Claire Jowitt, in her otherwise excellent study The Culture of Piracy, 1580-1630:
English Literature and Seaborne Crime (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), references several
proclamations touching piracy, but does not consider the effect of their physical presentation on
the viewer.
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proclamation constitutes a major component of this analysis, and at the center of my
argument lies a fundamental premise: how early modern readers acquired information
about piracy shaped conceptions of the crime to a comparable degree as did what
information they encountered. Additionally, I look at how seventeenth-century accounts
of sea marauding that targeted a popular audience were informed by printed royal
proclamations. This chapter contends that these proclamations represent both the earliest
and the most ubiquitous printed accounts of piracy in early modern England, and thus
provide a useful tool with which to theorize about the popular accounts.
I begin with a brief exposition of Tudor and early Stuart piracy, using reformedpirate Henry Mainwaring as my anchor: Mainwaring’s biography and writings construct
a valuable alembic in which to distill the early modern crime. I then turn to the genres of
the printed royal proclamation and the popular account and consider, broadly, how these
variant instruments conveyed information about piracy to the early modern reading
public. In the next section, I conduct two case studies that examine the intersection of the
royal proclamation and the popular account. In the first, I inspect the case of English
pirate John Ward, whom James targeted by name in a royal proclamation in early 1609,
and who became the subject of three printed pamphlets later that year. In the second, I
explore the 1639 account of Elizabethan pirates Clinton and Atkinson, A True Relation,
of the Lives and Deaths of the two most Famous English Pyrats. The royal proclamation,
depicted in both print and image, plays a key role in the pamphlet. These case studies
demonstrate the fecundity of staging a dialogue between the popular account and the
royal proclamation. The chapter concludes with a consideration of two of the period’s
pirate plays, A Christian Turned Turk and Fortune by Land and Sea. Ultimately, this
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chapter draws a clean line from the legal to the literary and considers how depictions of
piracy evolved from proclamation to pamphlet to play.

II. HENRY MAINWAIRING AND THE CRIME OF PIRACY
Pirate-turned-pirate-policer Henry Mainwaring opens a useful aperture onto early
modern piracy.4 His biography challenges some assumptions about the crime in the early
Stuart period, and he stands as proof that a pirate occupied a transitory identity, one that
could easily pass from lawfulness to criminality and back again. Mainwaring, born in
1587 and educated at Brasenose College, Oxford and the Middle Temple (although
apparently never called to the bar), was appointed by Lord High Admiral Charles Howard
in 1610 to police piracy in the Bristol Channel. For reasons that still evade historians,
Mainwaring had taken up piracy by 1613: operating under the guise of a privateer, a
murky, politically unstable category, he began to attack Spanish ships on the Barbary
Coast.5 The year 1614 found Mainwaring in Newfoundland, a fertile piratical breeding
ground, where he secured new recruits; and, freshly outfitted and manned, he returned to
Barbary. In the meantime, his extra-judicial exploits had provoked the ire of French and
Spanish authorities—Mainwaring was, by most accounts, an effective pirate—and they
lodged complaints against him in London. This diplomatic nuisance prompted James to
dispatch an English fleet to North Africa to urge Mainwaring to surrender. The vexatious
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Biographical information about Mainwaring taken from G.E. Manwaring and W.G. Perrin, eds.,
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Sir Francis Drake and Sir John Hawkins are perhaps the most well-known of the early modern
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mariner returned to England in late 1615, where he entered into negotiations with the
king and agreed to stop attacking foreign ships; he would, instead, become a hunter of
pirates. The signed agreement is dated June 9, 1616.6
Mainwaring’s evasion of serious consequences, while due in part to his willingness
to surrender, also reveals the ambiguous attitude that English law adopted toward the
crime of piracy. During the Middle Ages, robbery at sea had been a civil, but not
criminal, offense. That is, those merchants and mariners who were attacked by pirates
and who sought justice requested only monetary restitution, not the punishment of the
offending pirates. Legal historian R.G. Marsden observed that during the period piracy
was “triable in the king’s courts, but it seems never to have been a felony at common
law.”7475. In 1294 Sir William Leyburn was appointed the first Lord Admiral of
England’s admiralty, and piracy came to be tried in the admiralty court, which proceeded
according to the civil law of the Continent rather than the common law of England. This
shift proved unsatisfactory. A statute issued during the reign of Henry VIII addressed the
court’s insouciant attitude toward piracy: 28 Henry 8, c. 15 (1536), “An Act for
Punishment of Pirates and Robbers of the Sea,” states, “Where Traitours Pirotes Theves
Robbers Murtherers and Confederatours uppon the See, many tymes escape unpunysshed
because the triall of their offences hath heretofore ben ordered judged and determyned
before the Adymirall or his Lyeutenante or Comissary, after the course of the civile
Lawes”8 Because he deemed the Admiral’s policing of pirates to be insufficient, Henry
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While some English pirates like Mainwaring returned to England from the Barbary Coast, others,
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used the 1536 statute to create a common law tribunal in which the crime of piracy could
also be tried.9 This marked a turning point in England’s treatment of pirates: the number
of pirates executed rose sharply during the second half of the century.
While Mainwaring’s privileged background makes him an outlier among many
other pirates of the early Stuart period, it also illustrates that men who resorted to
maritime crime did not fit into a neat socioeconomic box. The pool of potential pirates
included any individual with a working knowledge of life at sea. Historian John Appleby
notes that for “many recruits, turning to piracy appears to have been an improvised,
urgent response to economic and social conditions, fueled by grievances over
employment, pay and working conditions.”10 Men such as the infamous John Ward, who
originally worked as a fisherman, were certainly drawn from this demographic. More
broadly, it would be impossible to ascertain the motivations of the several thousand
English pirates at work during the early Stuart period—Appleby speculates that given the
high-risk nature of their line of work, men aboard pirate ships witnessed a high turnover
rate, which in turn has led to an underestimation of their numbers—but it seems
reasonable to assume most acted out of discontent as well as cupidity. In the case of
Mainwaring, the pirate’s motivation seems less clear and is not explicitly addressed in his
treatise. But within the popular accounts, as we shall see, the interest in the pirate
transcends his skirmishes on the high seas: it also attempts to understand the pirate
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himself, what made him take up marauding, what kept him menacing the high seas, what
prevented him from embarking on Mainwaring’s reconciliatory route and returning,
repentant, to England.
Because he remained loyal to the Crown, and because he surrendered without
incident, Mainwaring avoided charges in the High Court of Admiralty. Many other
pirates, both English and foreign, did not. If successfully captured, returned to England,
and convicted, these men were transported via cart to Wapping Dock where they faced a
punishment decidedly apt in its framing of maritime justice. In his Chronicles (1586),
Raphael Holinshed includes a contemporary description of the grim fate awaiting guilty
parties:
Pirats and robbers by sea are condemned in the court of the admeraltie, and hanged
on the shore at lowe water marke, where they are left till three tides haue
ouerwashed them. Finallie, such as having wals and banks néere unto the sea, and
doo suffer the same to decaie (after conuenient adnomition) whereby the water
entereth and drowneth vp the countrie, are by a certeine ancient custome
apprehended, condemned, and staked in the breache, where they remaine for euer a
parcel of the foundation of the new wall that is to be made vpon them.11 (313).
In popular accounts of piracy, the moments before execution provided the pirate a chance
to repent; and if these accounts are to be believed, some did. But certain pirates such as
George Cusack proved so diabolical, their cruelty lying so far outside the boundaries of
accepted human conduct—even on the lawless high seas—that scaffold repentance did
not figure into their narratives.
Mainwaring’s good fortune of avoiding a one-way trip to Wapping Dock did not
escape him, and in a gesture meant to express appreciation for his pardon he presented a
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manuscript to King James, Discourse on Pirates, in 1618. This treatise offers a
particularly useful window into the world of early Stuart piracy, one not tainted by the
heavy-handed moralizing or sensationalizing of the popular accounts nor the clinical
detachment of the royal proclamation. When Mainwaring addresses his own foray into
piracy, he adopts a prudently supplicative tone: “I am so far from justifying my own
errors, that I can scarce afford them those reasonable excuses, which might be perhaps
allowable in any other man” (9). He then notes that he fell into piracy “not purposely but
by mischance” (9) and gives a short overview of his activities between 1613 and 1615.
But he does not dwell unnecessarily on this period, and quickly shifts his attention to the
suppression of piratical activity. Mainwaring claims that obtaining new recruits off the
coasts of England and Ireland proved nearly effortless because the “common sort of
seamen are so generally necessitous and discontented” (14). Mainwaring’s main intention
here is not to humanize the pirate, but to view men connected with the crime as rational
agents; suggesting that piracy, as a result, required a rational approach to its suppression.
The remainder of the treatise focuses on the tactics, proclivities, and motivations of the
early Stuart pirate. Mainwaring asserts that the prevention of piracy remains more
important than its suppression, and that those who neglect this aspect do so at their own
peril.
Although it enjoyed a healthy circulation in manuscript, Mainwaring did not
compose Discourse on Pirates for a wider audience.12 Accordingly, its narrow ambit
assures that it remains a pragmatic text: while adopting the prescriptive tenor of a royal
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proclamation, it was not a government document that carried legal authority; and while
recounting the misadventures of a notorious pirate—Mainwaring himself—it does not
succumb to the sensation or scandal of the popular accounts. In addition, it did not
circulate in print. But Mainwaring’s treatise and biography challenge the twodimensional image of the pirate as villain or antihero. They inject nascent sociological
awareness by highlighting how the crime had larger economic and societal causes:
infrequently did piracy result from the questionable proclivities of a few venal seamen.
This is the political world in which the royal proclamations and popular accounts
of piracy appeared, and Mainwaring’s professional trajectory helps us conjure up this
world. His treatise stages robbery at sea as most often a crime of opportunity committed
by discontented, ill-treated, and desperate men. While Mainwaring was in no position to
underscore the excitement of maritime depredation, a main feature of the popular
account, his Discourse on Pirates remains a useful resource for understanding the early
modern crime.

III. PROCLAMATIONS AND POPULAR ACCOUNTS
The printing, circulation, and networks of early modern English news have
attracted a considerable amount of scholarly attention.13 Unfortunately, the material
history of the printed royal proclamation has not: these official government documents,
ubiquitous in the landscape of Tudor and Stuart England, have long been neglected by
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historians, including historians of the book. Christopher Kyle, who has done much recent
work to remedy this scholarly oversight, notes that proclamations “must be one of the
most overlooked categories of printed material in the field of early modern history.”14
This is unfortunate because proclamations cannot be truly understood if divorced from
their physical form. The royal proclamation stretches back far before the arrival of
Gutenberg’s press on English shores: they appeared in incipient form during the AngloSaxon period.15 In the thirteenth century, sheriffs had been charged with proclaiming, and
this happened in two ways: “[The sheriff] caused them to be read in the county court, or
he caused them to be proclaimed generally in public places.”16 (Morris 1968, 218).
During the fifteenth century proclamations began to be displayed publicly, and in 1539
this protocol became permanent through the Statute of Proclamations (31 Hen. c. 8):
“Furthermore be it enacted by the authoritie of this present parliament, that … every
Shereif [must] cause said proclamacions to be fixed and sett upp openly upon places
convenient in every suche towne place or village, upon payne and penaltie of suche some
and somes of money or imprisonment of bodye as shalbe conteyned in the saide

Christopher R. Kyle, “Monarch and Marketplace: Proclamations as News in Early Modern
England,” Huntington Library Quarterly 78.4 (2015) 771. My own thinking about royal
proclamations in early modern England has been largely shaped by Kyle’s scholarship, and in
particular his papers “Engaging the Public: The Performative Visibility of Proclamations in Early
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proclamacion or proclamacions.”17 Proclamations continued to be issued across the
sixteenth century: although estimates vary, largely because historians have not always
agreed on what, exactly, constitutes a royal proclamation, Frederic Youngs estimates that
a total of 446 were dispersed during the reigns of Mary and Elizabeth. The Stuart
proclamations have attracted less attention from historians, but their regular issue
continued throughout the seventeenth century, including during the Interregnum.
How did Tudor and Stuart royal proclamations appear to early modern viewers?
Indeed, their appearance constitutes one of the main channels through which we can
understand them: unlike books of the period, proclamations did not lend themselves to
marginalia or other extant evidence of readership. In addition, they were not typically
collected by private individuals or added to personal libraries.18 But despite these
evidentiary constraints, we do have access to the proclamations themselves; and from
their physical form we can, gingerly, extrapolate the experience of reading the early
modern royal document, as well as speculate about possible effects of this experience on
the viewer.
The early modern period witnessed an increasing uniformity in the physical
appearance of the royal proclamation. In the early Tudor period proclamations were
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produced on parchment and handwritten. By the reign of Elizabeth, proclamations
appeared as one, two, or three folio sheets printed on a single side.19 The top contained
the words “By the King (or Queen)” centered and in a noticeably larger font than the rest
of the document. They sometimes contained a title, but other times did not. The
proclamation ends with “God Save the King (or Queen)” also centered, and beneath this,
we find information about the proclamation’s printing. Their fonts alternate between
Gothic and Roman; Gothic persisted in the printing of proclamations until the end of the
Stuart period. In light of the political upheaval of Mary’s reign, it should not surprise us
that about half of her proclamations appeared only in manuscript: matters of great
exigency precluded the use of print. By the reign of Elizabeth, however, almost all royal
proclamations were printed: Youngs notes that this had become so regular “that one local
official expressed uncertainty about receiving one which was not in print.”20 The general
presentation of the proclamation changed little across the reigns of Elizabeth (fig. 2.1),
James (fig. 2.2), and Charles I and II (fig. 2.3). The promulgation of proclamations also
followed a set formula of “printing, sealing, distribution, and proclamation,”21 but to the
average person, only the act of proclaiming (and the proclamation’s subsequent public
display) had direct bearing on their experience of it.22
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Tudor and Stuart proclamations addressed a wide host of social, military, legal,
economic, and religious topics. In the first ten years of James I’s reign, for example, he
issued a proclamation specifying what flags British ships should fly at sea (64), another
ordering Jesuits and seminarians to quit the realm (66), another forbidding the production
of starch (86), and another prohibiting unauthorized persons from transporting mail
(99).23 Several Elizabethan proclamations occupy themselves with dress; a lengthy
proclamation dated 15 June 1574 sought to enforce statutes of apparel. It states, in part,
“None shall wear spurs, swords, rapiers, daggers, skeans, woodknives, or hangers,
buckles of girdles, gilt, silvered, and demasked: except knights and barons’ sons, and
others of higher degree or place, and gentleman in ordinary office attendant upon the
Queen’s majesty’s person.”24 Various maritime issues are addressed in both Tudor and
Stuart proclamations, including the wages of shipwrights, fraud by ship owners,
shipwreck, anchorage, and fishing, among many others. Given piracy’s impact on
domestic and international affairs, it is not surprising to find it a frequent topic of the
period’s proclamations.
The royal proclamation functioned as more than a receptacle of information,
however. It also represented a tangible manifestation of royal authority sent out across the
realm and displayed publicly a direct line of communication between the monarch and
his or her subjects. As a conduit of exchange, the proclamation required clear language,
uniform appearance, and timely dissemination. These features have led Kyle to conclude
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that “[viewing] proclamations … entails the recognition that effective communication
and effective government were one and the same.”25 The formulaic gestalt of the
proclamations established a sense of expectation on the part of the viewer, and Youngs
argues that this formula helped to solidify the document’s authority. One did not have to
read the document to acknowledge it as a signifier of royal authority, although reading
certainly represented the final link in its chain of authority; a Jacobean proclamation
condemning piracy declares, “[We] strictly command all and every our Officers and
loving Subjects, that immediately after the sight of this present Proclamation, they and
every of them do make diligent search and inquirie in all places … for the said persons
[pirates].”26 Additionally, because the proclamations’ content was, necessarily, mediated
by its form, the information within enjoyed both an inherent authenticity and gravity.
Even matters that readers may have deemed personally irrelevant were elevated to a
position of royal import; and all proclaimed material could ostensibly be trusted—
depending in part, of course, on one’s opinion of the issuing monarch.
Sir Julius Caesar, who served as judge of the High Court of Admiralty between
1584 and 1605, understood the communicatory potential of proclamations. He planned an
admiralty circuit in 1591 designed to mimic the assizes of the common law courts. The
circuit was prompted by Caesar’s frustration at the eschewing of royal authority on the
coasts, particularly in the southern and western counties: the indifferent attitude of local
authorities allowed piracy to thrive, and he figured the presence of a royal official would
help curb the problem. In practice, however, the circuit proved a failure and a

25

Kyle, 774.

26

Larkin and Hughes, 98-99.

90

disappointment to Caesar. Historian L.M. Hill points to several culprits, including local
residents’ reluctance to testify against men who provided them financial windfall; the
unwillingness of local officials to submit to Caesar’s demands; and the Lord Admiral’s
own if distant involvement in acts of privateering and piracy. After Caesar returned to
London, he began to plan another circuit. As part of his preparations, he drafted a
proclamation. According to historian L.M. Hill:
The first suggestion that Caesar made in terms of future circuits was that a
proclamation should be made in the port towns a month before the court was
scheduled to sit. The proclamation would warn all parties who were to be
summoned that if they did not appear they would be sought out and forced to go
before the circuit judge. The sheriff was to read the proclamation in order to avoid
the weak link in the chain of Admiralty authority: the local officials from water
bailiffs to vice-admirals.27
In effect, Caesar recognized that the royal proclamation provided an effective weapon
against the crime of piracy. It carried royal authority to the outskirts of the realm—those
places where piracy flourished—and reasserted the force of the High Court of Admiralty.
According to Robert Steele, the first record of proclamations concerning piracy
date from the reign of Henry VI in the fifteenth century. Proclamations on the subject
remained sporadic until the reign of Elizabeth I, when the diplomatic ill-effects of
English piracy increased. These proclamations on piracy tend to emphasize certain
aspects of the crime. In the first place, they frequently point to its exacerbation of
diplomatic precarity. Elizabeth issued a proclamation in 1602 that avers “all such piracies
and depredations [are] crimes most hateful to her mind and scandalous to her peaceable
government”; she adds that she has issued the proclamation “for the better continuance of
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amity with all other princes and states not enemies to her majesty.”28 The proclamations
also point to the communal aspect of piracy; an Elizabethan proclamation of 1591, for
example, commands parties who may have purchased pirated goods to, within ten days,
report to the proper authorities “with the several prices what they paid and the names of
whom the same was bought, or tokens, deciphering the person and persons as near as
they can remember, and the day, time, and place where and when the same was bought,
exchanged, or received.”29 Reflecting the dominant legal attitude toward piracy, the
proclamations mostly ignore interpersonal violence inflicted by pirates. Legal historian
D.P. O’Connell notes, “Because freebooters have traditionally committed depredation for
acquisitive purposes, and violence against persons has been ancillary to that goal, the law
has been preoccupied with the aspect of theft in piracy.”30 Falling in line with this ethos,
the proclamations emphasize economic and political, but not bodily, injury. Taken as the
sum of their parts, the proclamations reveal a necessarily clinical rendering of sea
marauding. But with the intent of informing rather than entertaining, they nonetheless
might have piqued a reader’s interest and instilled a desire for more substantive or
detailed information about the crime.
For the early modern reader, printed news pamphlets offered a possible occupant of
this niche. These popular accounts fall under the broader genre of early modern news.
Henry Ettinghausen labels this genre the “single event newsletter”, a pan-European
phenomenon that brought news of domestic and international events to the reading
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public.31 These single event newsletters tended to the lurid and fantastical: in his
groundbreaking study of the genre, M.A. Shaaber described the range of their content as
“the doings of the court; murders and other crimes; miracles, prodigies, and wonders;
monstrous births and strange beasts; witchcraft; the plague; acts of God, such as flood
and fire, and the weather; and sporting events.”32 Clearly public palates craved the
macabre. According to Tessa Watt, “Stories of crime were a source of gruesome
entertainment and collective disapprobation” and “Ballads and pamphlets describing
executions were numerous and immensely popular.”33 Accounts of infamous pirates fit
neatly into this genre: they involve far-off, often exotic locales; tempestuous renderings
of life on the high seas; detailed accounts of the robbing of ships; and the capture and
execution of loathsome criminals. Given the content of these single event newsletters, as
well as their low price, scholars once assumed that they were enjoyed only among the
lower classes. Watt, however, challenges this claim and argues that instead they would be
more accurately conceived of as the forerunner of the modern newspaper. An early Stuart
barrister could have conceivably, for instance, represented his clients at Common Pleas
by day and read of the shocking crimes of pirates Danseker and Ward by night.
Legal scholar Jonathan Gutoff has researched fictional representations of piracy
from the 1680s to the twentieth century, where he focuses on film and television. He
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argues that earlier depictions manifest an understanding of the relationship between
piracy and maritime law, and that this understanding decreased with time; in other words,
depictions of piracy moved from the legal-dramatic to the strictly dramatic.34 Gutoff’s
study begins in 1684 with Alexander Exquemelin”s The Buccaneers of America (which
itself was a translation from the Dutch: De Americaensche Zee-Roovers had first
appeared in Amsterdam in 1678). While Gutoff attends mostly to fictional depictions, his
larger point about the legal aspects of piracy can be applied to the popular accounts.
Indeed, the concern with maritime justice builds a bridge between proclamation and
pamphlet, and nowhere is this bridge more navigable than in the popular accounts of Irish
pirate George Cusack. About ten years before The Buccaneers of America, the crimes,
capture, and conviction of Cusack had occasioned three pamphlets infused with legal
sophistication: An Exact Narrative of the Tryals of the Pirates (1674); News from Sea,
Or, The Taking of the Cruel Pirate (1674); and The Grand Pyrate: Or, the Life and Death
of Capt. George Cusack (1675). These three accounts contain elements of the earlier
pamphlets considered in the next section and function as an instructive microcosm of the
popular account. These accounts imbue their retelling of Cusack’s case with authority:
the confection of religious, dramatic, and legal rhetoric offers the reader a
multidimensional portrait of the pirate. A full sixty-six years had passed between the
retellings of Ward and Danseker’s exploits and the capture and death of George Cusack,
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but certain elements in the pamphlets on piracy remained constant throughout most of the
seventeenth century.
The Grand Pyrate opens with a cursory nod to Cusack’s early life: he was born in
East-Meath, Ireland, to a Roman Catholic family. His parents wanted him to undertake
the life of a friar, but he found “the wildness of his youth not agreeing with a Religious
Life” (A2v). A brief stint as a private soldier in Flanders awakened in Cusack a distaste
for authority and he discovered “the severity of that Discipline not agreeing with his
looser temper” (A2v). At this point he placed himself in the service of several privateers.
This movement from legitimate occupation to a life of crime occurs across the popular
accounts, although it deviates from Mainwaring’s assessment. While the latter points to
ill treatment, low wages, and general discontentment as the forces that drive men to
piracy, the former centers the pirate’s temperament, deviant and truculent, as his impetus
for thieving. The pirate himself, and not his circumstances, occasions his subsequent
marauding. As a result, the popular accounts construct a cult of personality early. The
reality of life at sea, with all its unpleasantries and exploitations, recedes into the
background to deliver the pirate a starring role.
On a series of ensuing adventures, Cusack attacks ships and acquires prizes, and
rises through the ranks of piratical hierarchy. These parts of the popular accounts teem
with particulars: details of the pirates’ crimes tantalize the reader while propelling the
narrative forward. The growing audacity of their attacks satiates the craving for baseness.
Cusack’s story contains a particularly poignant example: the pirate and his coconspirators mutiny the Hopewell, a ship bound for Virginia. After taking command of
the vessel, Cusack’s men ransack the crew’s possessions and divide the valuables
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equally. As he attempts to destroy evidence of the mutiny in the ship’s cabin, Cusack
“could not be perswaded to save a great large Bible that constantly lay upon the great
Cabbin Table from the mercy of the Waves” (A4r). When his accomplices attempt to
salvage the book, Cusack exclaims, “You Cowards, what do you think to go to Heaven,
and do such actions as these? No, I will make you officers in Hell under me” (A4r). With
these imprecations, Cusack lifts the Bible from the table and hurls it into the sea: “Go
thou thy way Divinity, what have we do to with thee” (A4v). This transgression positions
him as a maniacal agent of hell; and his symbolic gesture, a later iteration of the pirates
who “turned Turk” and renounced Christianity, magnifies Cusack’s villainy to nearcaricature. Richard Frohock posits that “when Cusack casts the Bible into the sea, he
doubly repudiates God’s divine laws because he returns the creative, divine Word back to
the original oceanic deep out of which God decreed the creation of the heavens and the
earth.”35 Frohock concludes this act parallels Satan’s rebellion in Paradise Lost.
But his shocking antics form only half of Cusack’s tale. Like the other accounts of
piracy, The Grand Pyrate tempers its sensationalism with evidentiary supplements. At
the end of the first part, it prints a series of affidavits presented at Cusack’s trial. These
inclusions act as evidence of Cusack’s misdeeds: testimony from those directly affected
bolsters the credibility of the narrative. The author also includes alleged excerpts from the
pirate’s own journal and a letter from one Richard Wharton to George Nevil concerning
Cusack’s activity in the Plymouth colony. Epistolary supplements can also be found in
the pamphlet on John Ward. The Grand Pyrate counters its lack of royal authority with
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these additions to the narrative: the pamphlets not only strive to tell a story, but to give
readers the real truth, as it happened, not muddied by maritime metaphors or contrived
cliffhangers. In addition, The Grand Pyrate closes with a reprint of the earlier An Exact
Narrative of the Tryals of the Pirates (1674). This judicial appendage, presented with the
somber gravity of legal proceedings, carries a weight akin to the printed proclamation.
Both documents bear an inherent authority, one that reinforces the power of the king to
maintain his peace in the face of sea marauding and depredation.
When accounting for the differences between the proclamations and pamphlets, we
find the proclamations on piracy concerned with the act itself, as well as its economic and
diplomatic consequences. Conversely, the popular accounts revolve around the figure of
the pirate, his character, his motivations, his ultimate end. But in spite of their
incongruencies, the proclamations and popular accounts on piracy converge at several
critical points: they were both printed, but they were not created as lasting objects; they
both purported to convey information in an objective, unbiased fashion; and they helped
inform the early modern reading public about the crime of piracy. But beyond their
obvious divergence—proclamations expressed a royal directive; pamphlets told a story—
certain aspects of the two mediums share a theoretical underpinning, such as their
commitment to conveying the truth.
Broadly speaking, proclamations may be considered prescriptive and descriptive
popular accounts: that is, the popular accounts depict crimes already committed, while
the proclamations provide admonishments against crimes emergent on the horizon. While
this framework proves useful in a cursory sense, closer inspection betrays the nuance
inherent in the conveyance of piracy. The proclamations cautioning potential sea robbers
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almost always begin with a contextual paragraph that explains the motives for the decree.
For example, a proclamation of 21 July 1561 opens, “The Queen’s Majesty, hearing by
report of some of the subjects of her good brother the King of Spain that, notwithstanding
both the severity of justice divers times extended by her majesty against sundry pirates
with pains of death, and also her often arming of certain vessels to the seas for the
apprehension of such offenders [haunt] the seas for to take and seize the subjects and
ships of the King of Portugal …”36 Brief expository declarations such as this, which open
many proclamations, create a descriptive narrative framework. They tell a story that
necessitates the remainder of the proclamation. But at the conclusion of the tale, the shift
from descriptive to prescriptive occurs: after outlining the ills of robbery at sea, the king
or queen prescribes a series of remedies to address the problem. The description services
the prescription by adding context to justify royal intervention.
In contrast, the prescriptive nature of the popular accounts assumes a less overt
manifestation. The claim that royal proclamations prescribe some course of action to
combat piracy requires no additional justification, but the instructive elements of the
popular account prove more elusive. In the first place, the readers of the popular accounts
were most likely not cavorting aboard pirate ships on the high seas, but rather seeking
information about current events or respite from a mundane existence. Thus these readers
sought descriptions of piracy and its subsequent punishment, not legal arguments against
embarking on a life of sea marauding. The popular accounts concern with justice signals
to the reader a moral exhortation. J.A. Sharpe has analyzed the popularity of both public
executions and stories of gallows repentance during the early modern period, noting that
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“gallows literature illustrates the way in which the civil and religious authorities designed
the execution spectacle to articulate a particular set of values, inculcate a certain
behavioural model and bolster a social order perceived as threatened.”37 Of the popular
accounts I consider, the scene of the pirate’s execution is sometimes factitious (as in the
case of Ward) and sometimes deferred to a time outside the narrative scope (as in the case
of Cusack). Nevertheless, these accounts remain interested in conveying the
consequences of the crime to their readers. The positioning of the pirate outside accepted
social mores serves as a warning to the pamphlets” audience to remain within a strict
moral code. It prescribes, covertly, an appropriate way of behaving couched in intrigue
and adventure. And sometimes the prescription is not so covert, as in the account of
pirates Clinton and Purser.
The proclamations and popular accounts complement each other even as they
involve an inherent tension. To the early modern reading public seeking information
about the crime of piracy, the cases of John Ward, Zymen Danseker, Clinton Atkinson,
and Thomas Walton aptly demonstrate these complementary tensions.

IV. TWO PIRATICAL CASE STUDIES
On January 8, 1609, James issued a lengthy proclamation against pirates. On its
face it was rather formulaic: the king informed his subjects that he had been notified of
“manifolde complaints” regarding the “many depredations and Piracies committed by
lewd and ill disposed persons, accustomed and habituated to spoile and rapine.”38 The
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proclamation continues in the anticipated fashion, explicating the diplomatic injury
caused by piracy, reminding subjects of the punishment that awaits offending parties, and
summarizing the preventive steps undertaken to thwart future transgressions. But this
proclamation distances itself from the conventional formula in its two final paragraphs. It
specifically mentions Captain John Ward and his accomplices, notorious pirates who
were harassing ships in the Straits of Gibraltar, and provides a recounting of their nautical
sins which begins: “And whereas divers great and enormious spoyles and Piracies have
bene heretofore committed within the Straits of Gibraltar and other places by Captaine
John Ward and his adherents, and other English pirates.”39 The inclusion of Ward’s name
and deeds speaks to the notoriety he enjoyed during his lifetime—Mainwaring also
mentions Ward in his treatise—and this detail makes the proclamation a particularly
interesting one for discussions of early Stuart piracy.
But the story of Ward does not end here. The year 1609 witnessed three separate
popular accounts of Ward’s crimes: Andrew Barker’s A true and certaine report of the
beginning, proceedings, ouerthrowes, and now present estate of Captaine Ward and
Danseker, Ward and Danseker, Two notorious Pyrates, and Newes from Sea, Of two
notorious Pyrats.40 The first of these, a purported accurate account, takes cathartic
license: Barker incorporates details of the pirates” execution. His reporting amounts to
fake news, however, as Hughes and Larkin note that Ward “was arrested and, with others,
indicted for piracy against Venetian ships in 1607 and 1608” and “although 19 persons
were executed for piracy at Wapping on 22 Dec 1609 [Stow 893] Ward was not one of
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them.”41 The fiction of Ward’s death persisted in Robert Daborne’s 1612 play A
Christian Turned Turk, or The Tragical Lives and Deaths of the Two Famous Pirates,
Ward and Dansiker, considered below. (In point of fact, Ward was living an opulent life
in Tunis in 1612.) These popular accounts act as a supplement to the proclamation of 8
January. They endow readers with the lurid details absent in the proclamation. For at least
a percentage of readers, those who had read (or heard) the 8 January proclamation, the
engagement with the pamphlets would have been mediated by this experience. This case
study speculates on some possible effects of this mediation.
The first account about Ward, Newes from Sea, Of two notorious Pyrats, was
probably written by Anthony Nixon (although published anonymously) and sold by
Nathanial Butter. Its popularity occasioned a second edition later that year. Historian
Greg Bak observes the second edition lent “even greater prominence to Ward’s name in
the title: Ward and Danseker, Two notorious Pyrates.”42 This edition shares most of its
content with Newes from Sea, excepting some prefatory material; additionally, the second
edition contains slight variations in the placement of certain woodcuts. Andrew Barker
also cashed in on Ward’s burgeoning infamy: his A true and certaine report offers the
most exhaustive contemporary account of the two pirates. For this case study, I have
chosen to concentrate on Nixon’s Ward and Danseker, Two notorious Pyrates.
Two notorious Pyrates presents its story in two parts. In the first, a brief
biographical sketch informs the reader of Ward’s voyage to piracy. “This Ward”, the
author tells us, “as base in Birth as bad condition, in the last yeare of her late Majesties
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raigne gave the first onset to his intendments: his parentage was but meane, his estate
lowe, and his hope lesse” (A2r). While a fisherman working in Kent, Ward’s “pride at
last would be confinde to no limits, nor anything would serve him but the wide Ocean to
walke in” (A2r). Like Cusack, Ward’s turn to maritime crime stems from his moral
shortcomings. On the wide ocean, Ward engages in various pillages and plunders,
enriching himself, and acclimating himself to the life of the pirate; he eventually makes
acquaintance with Dutch privateer Zymen Danseker. Ward’s interiority is conveyed in
rich, evocative language: “his heart was on fire” (A2v), “the edge of his courage was
clean taken away” (A3r), “his march was still under the maske of vanity, and folly
attended uppon all his actions” (A3r). When his ship encounters a tempest in the Gulf of
Venice, “his Argosey was filled with waves, her tacklings, sails, and Anchors lost and the
violent storme so dashed her bulkes and bruised her bottom, as she was made altogether
unfit, and unable for resistance, and so was sunke, and cast away” (A4v). Danseker and
Ward part ways, and Ward’s existence becomes increasingly stately. The final chapter of
the pamphlet’s first part hints at Ward’s opulent life in Tunis: twelve of his retinue guard
him, “alwayes standing at his cabin doore” (B3v). By this final chapter, Ward’s depravity
has come to destroy him much like the barnacles encrusting the hulls of his
misappropriated galleons.
The pamphlet’s second part diverges sharply from the adventure, lavishness, and
escapism of the first. It prints a letter sent from the masters of the Charity and the Pearl,
two ships taken by Ward on 6 April 1609. The letter narrates the loss to the ships”
merchant owners in London; it is not unlike the letter printed in The Grand Pyrate. While
both parts of Danseker and Ward’s story presuppose accuracy in their retelling, the
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inclusion of this letter adds another layer of authenticity: it supplies a first-hand account.
Even though “English authorities maintained decidedly tight regulatory control whenever
possible of the domestic news market.”43 (Barker 2014, 167), news pamphlets did not
enjoy the authority of the royal proclamation, and their content had to authenticate itself
more robustly. What better route to legitimacy than a firsthand account? The letter’s
inclusion completes the multidimensional depiction of its subject: Two notorious Pyrates
pulls the reader in, first with the title—tales of notorious pirates seem worthy of
perusal—and then with woodcuts and an exhilarating narrative. After the reader has
passed through these bibliographic layers, they reach the letter of the masters: on one
hand more subdued, perhaps less engaging than the others; on the other pragmatic, like
James’s proclamation, detailing the real economic fallout of piracy.
Two notorious Pyrates includes woodcuts that further substantiate its claims. This
employment of illustration finds no parallel in the printed royal proclamations and thus
offers a fruitful site of analysis for popular depictions of piracy.44 The title page of Two
notorious Pyrates depicts two galleons facing each other: the one on the left flies the flag
of England; the one on the right, a flag of an upward-facing crescent, a clear symbol of
Barbary pirates (fig. 2.4). The ship on the right, in addition, shows two bodies hanging
from the foreyard. On deck two men—presumably Ward and Danseker—are depicted in
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garb that includes the crescent on the ship’s flag, a possible visual cue that the two men
have “turned Turk”, and that Ward has committed treason. In the earlier Newes from Sea
(which includes the same woodcut on its title page), the author explains the image to the
reader: “To content thee, I have here in (white & black inckle) hung him out to thee at
Sea, who could better have wished to have seene him hang’d to death (in hemp) a shore”
(A4r). Because Two notorious Pyrates lacks this prefatory material, the woodcut
produces narrative destabilization: a viewer would probably notice the two hanging men
before the men on deck and may have initially identified them as Ward and Danseker.
This would create an early sense of catharsis, since the “Two notorious Pyrates” of the
title have met justice. But closer inspection would reveal Ward and Danseker below, very
much alive, and responsible for both the capture of the English vessel and the execution
of two of its crew. Given its ambiguity, the woodcut portends the pamphlet’s
sophistication. Unlike the straightforward information about Ward contained in James’s
proclamation, Two notorious Pyrates will stage narrative tension and in turn will offer the
reader entertainment and diversion. Additionally, the depiction of the hanging men
emphasizes Ward and Danseker’s infliction of bodily harm, an aspect of piracy not
emphasized in the proclamations. Two notorious Pyrates opens with a visual reminder of
the pirates’ interpersonal violence, adding human interest to its framing of the crime.
The pamphlet’s additional woodcuts add to the authority of its account by
providing visual evidence to supplement the pirates’ tale. On A1v, we find two more
woodcuts (fig. 2.5): the top shows “Wards Skiffe when he was a Fisherman”;
immediately below is shown “The charity of London, of M. Megs twice taken”. The
juxtaposition of the two vessels is striking: Ward’s fishing boat, barely large enough to

104

contain him and his partner, floats above an impressive galleon. Before the reader can
engage the text itself, they are confronted with Ward’s narrative via woodcut. Like the
supplemental material found after Ward’s narrative, these prefatory woodcuts further
cement the pamphlet’s credibility. They show the reader real things—Ward’s skiff,
Megs’s galleon—to enhance not only its mission to amuse, but also to establish the
account’s reliability. Two notorious Pyrates closes with a list of ships taken by Danseker
and Ward or their confederates; on the final page, without text, we see an image of a lone
sailing vessel bearing the English flag (fig. 2.6). Ostensibly, this galleon was among
those listed on the preceding page. However, beyond this speculation, the stately ship
gliding undeterred through placid waters reinforces the burgeoning state of English naval
dominance. In their final prescriptive act, the proclamations assert royal authority: no
matter what maritime iniquity has occurred, the state holds the power to set things right.
Two notorious Pyrates’s concluding English galleon produces a similar effect: despite the
transgressions of these two notorious pirates, English shipping and commerce will
endure.
The crimes of Clinton Atkinson and Thomas Walton (known more commonly as
Clinton and Purser) occurred about thirty years before those of Danseker and Ward, but a
corresponding popular account did not appear until 1639.45 In the interim, Thomas
Heywood’s play Fortune by Land and Sea (1607-1609, performed c.1609) dramatized
the story of the pirates, and Heywood likely wrote the 1639 pamphlet A True Relation, of
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the Lives and Deaths of the two most Famous English Pyrats (fig. 2.7). Unlike Two
notorious Pyrates, A True Relation opens with an overtly moralizing tone. The first
chapter foregrounds the power of justice: “Justice is a vertue that giveth no man any or
the least priviledge to defraude another, of that which he may call his own” (A3r) and
“Judiciall is that which propperly belongeth to the Bench, & is grounded upon Statutes &
Lawes; instituted and made for the benefit and profit of the Common-weale, to the
depression of vice, and the incouragement of vertue” (A3v). The second chapter does not
abandon this didactic rhetoric and explicates why laws are made: they, the author assures
us, impel one “to live honestly, to hurt no man willingly; to render every man his owne
carefully, and to extort no man forcibly” (A3v-A4r). In the third chapter, the focus shifts
to the opprobrium that results from moral depravity, an opprobrium that follows one’s
death. This observation serves as an appropriate prelude to Chapter 4, which offers a brief
history of piracy from antiquity until the seventeenth century: marauders considered
include Andrew Barton, a Scottish pirate of the early Tudor period (and the subject of a
1630 ballad, A true relation of the life and death of Sir Andrew Barton). Purser and
Clinton finally tumble into this moral, legal, and historical farrago in Chapter 5.
The story of these Elizabethan pirates is a familiar one. After a brief nod to
Danseker and Ward, we learn of Clinton and Purser’s growing acquaintance, facilitated in
part because they are both “of haughty and ambitious spirits” (A8v). The narrative settles
into the standard fare here; telling of the duo’s nautical pillage and plunder, expanding
audacity, and tempestuous tribulations. The second part of A True Relation opens with
the legal fallout of Purser and Clinton’s misdeeds. Elizabeth, upon hearing complaints
that the pair have caused the loss of many ships, dispatches a Vice Admiral to locate the
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pirates and offer them the Queen’s pardon. Upon learning of the potential pardon, Purser
and Clinton, along with their most trusted men, retire to their private cabin to deliberate.
They ultimately reject the pardon, not because they do not appreciate Elizabeth’s
extension of grace, but rather because they fear the High Court of Admiralty: “[But] there
was another feare and doubt to bee made, namely of the strict Court of the Admiralty,
which seldome or never had any mercy of any who had transgressed in that nature” (B7vB8r). Driven by this fear, the two men reject the pardon; in return, the Queen’s council
“have present order that Proclamation should bee made through the kingdome [that] they
should thenceforth bee held no better than enemies unto the State, and meere rebells and
Traytors to their Queene and Country” (B8v).The scenario leads to a comic interlude in
an otherwise solemn pamphlet, a “pleasant accident”, the author informs us, that “I am
loath to overpass, in the executing of these publications” (B8v). By way of this pleasant
accident, the reader encounters a royal proclamation on piracy.
After Elizabeth’s condemnation, a pursuivant is dispatched into the realm to
proclaim Clinton and Purser traitors. Inclement weather causes him to catch a cold and
succumb to laryngitis such “that hee could bee scarcely heard to speake twice his
lengthes distant from him” (B8r), and he finds himself unable to convey the royal
missive. He enlists a country fellow to aid him, and the two set out on market day in a
coastal town to fulfill the Queen’s directive. All appears well until the moment of
proclaiming, when the Pursuivant reads the proclamation to the Country Fellow, who
repeats it inaccurately. “Purser and Clinton”, the Pursuivant whispers; “Who hath lost
their Purses at the Clinke” (C1v) the Country Fellow repeats. The Pursuivant,
understandably, grows vexed, but forges ahead: “Who have lately robb’d divers of our
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ships” becomes “Who have lately rob’d diverse shivers of our Chippes” (C1v) and “flung
the chiefest Merchants over board” becomes “And flung the Merchants Cheeses over
board” (C2r). After several similar errors, the Pursuivant exclaims, “O intollerable”, to
which the Country Fellow dutifully replies: “O intollerable” (C2v). In its furnishing of
respite from the more serious details of Purser and Clinton, the episode takes advantage
of readers’ acquaintance with the papered posts of every English town.
Both text and image add authenticity to the scene’s portrayal of the royal
proclamation. The dialogue of the Pursuivant and the Country Fellow alternates between
Gothic and Roman typefaces (fig. 2.8). On the surface, this allows the reader to easily
distinguish between the two men’s lines, an especially useful typographical aid given the
episode’s general befuddlement. But on a more abstract level, the oscillation mimics the
appearance of the Stuart proclamation. As noted above, proclamations in the first decades
of the seventeenth century alternated between Roman and Gothic typefaces. But of the
extant proclamations from the 1630s, every one was printed in Gothic. It follows that
readers of A True Relation would have associated Gothic font with the printed text on
royal proclamations. In this scene, the lines of the Pursuivant appear in Gothic font; the
Country Fellow’s corresponding malaprops are printed in Roman. Consequently, the text
preserves Gothic as the font of royal authority. Had the entire episode been printed in
Gothic—like the rest of the pamphlet—then it would not have had this effect on the
reader. It is the alternation of font type that reinforces the royal gravity of the
proclamation condemning Clinton and Purser: Roman signifies a dilution of the authority
residing in the Gothic. The pamphlet thus demonstrates a clear acknowledgment of its
readers’ habitual encounters with royal proclamations.
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A corresponding woodcut supplements the scene (fig. 2.9). In it, the two men are
shown standing atop a horse-drawn cart. The Pursuivant is positioned behind the Country
Fellow, who holds the proclamation; the Country Fellow, hat held reverently over his
chest, solemnly repeats the royal decree. At the bottom and barely present in the frame
stand eight subjects viewing the spectacle. The proclamation itself bears the primitive
approximation of the royal seal. This small detail conveys to the viewer that the
document in the Pursuivant’s hand is, indeed, a royal proclamation, one imprinted with
the stamp of legitimacy. This clever interplay between text and image is reinforced by the
reduplication of the woodcut: it occurs in succession (C1r and C2r) so that the reader
cannot encounter the text of the Queen’s proclamation without viewing, if only in the
periphery, this corresponding image (fig. 2.10). Consequently, the subtle presence of
royal authority in an otherwise humorous interlude adds a layer of gravity to Clinton and
Purser’s story. And although Charles issued no known proclamations addressing piracy,
proclamations themselves were still publicly displayed memorials of the King’s
sovereignty. The episode of the Pursuivant and the Country Fellow positions the
proclamation as an unbroken line of royal authority stretching back to Elizabeth; and like
the accounts of Danseker and Ward thirty years prior, it demonstrates that piracy
represented a tangible thread that linked the crown’s proclamatory authority with more
popular forms of entertainment.
Like Two notorious Pyrates, A True Relation contains additional woodcuts. One of
them (fig. 2.11) appears on the title page and then repeats four other times throughout the
pamphlet. The image, similar to the woodcut depicting Ward and Danseker’s piratical
acts, shows two galleons facing each other engaged in battle, as evidenced by the
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discharge of broadsides from both ships. But unlike the corresponding image in Two
notorious Pyrates, each vessel flies the English flag, the merchant ship to broadcast
goodwill, the pirate ship to deceive.46 This woodcut’s recurrence in A True Relation
reminds the reader of the exact nature of the pirates’ crime. It heightens the intrigue and
suspense by documenting both the violence and scale of piracy, and through its repetition
reinforce the scope of Clinton and Purser’s misdeeds. In this way, they function as an
additional layer of testimony by providing the depiction of a crime in progress.47 Because
the pamphlet postdates Fortune by Land and Sea—the former published in 1639, the
latter performed around 1609—a visual depiction of the pirates had already been
established on stage. What A True Relation could provide that the play could not,
however, was a pictorial depiction of the two ships involved in a pirate attack.
The most visually sophisticated woodcut in A True Relation depicts the execution
of the pirates (fig. 2.12). In my later discussion of the early modern Neptune, I address
the period’s visual depictions of the ocean. One important point is the power of the sea to
distort. Even as cartographic and landscape portrayals of land assumed an increasingly
scientific scale, ocean waters rested outside of these constraints, and ships, sea creatures,
and even people assumed wildly inaccurate proportions in relation to their surroundings.

This detail mirrors Clinton and Purser’s depiction in Fortune by Land and Sea, considered in
the next section. In her analysis of the play, considered below, Barbara Fuchs considers this
piratical duplicity and argues that “if state symbols can themselves be plundered on the open
main, there are no guarantees that one is ever in fact attacking subjects of one state rather than
another” (54). Fuchs, “Faithless Empires: Pirates, Renegadoes, and The English Nation.” ELH
67.1 (2000), 45-69.
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Marine Painters of the 17th Century (Rotterdam: Museum Boijmans Van Beuningen, 1996).

110

In the execution scene, the bodies of Clinton and Purser hang at gallows positioned in the
sea. As in the woodcut illustrating the royal proclamation’s dissemination, a crowd of
onlookers fills the bottom of the frame. Two of these spectators are granted individuality:
their heads and faces rise above the crowd. We also see two pointing fingers: one is
directed toward the executed pirate on the left, the other points upward, perhaps as a
visual cue that the pirates, in their dying speeches, have appealed to divine mercy. A
wall—ostensibly the one referred to in Holinshed’s Chronicles in the description of
Wapping Dock—separates the ocean water from the crowd. This framing is conventional
enough and corresponds to both the execution as it appears in the text as well as the
contemporaneous accounts of the pirates’ deaths. It is in the scene’s distorted proportions,
not in its general subject matter, however, that the real interpretive interest lays.
Clinton and Purser constitute the largest figures in the image. Suspended from their
nautical gallows, we can only see their torsos above the water. Heads askew, and eyes
closed, their lives have been consummated, and their presentation offers a dramatic
reminder of the legal consequences of piracy. However, despite their enormity, they
appear paradoxically in the middle ground. In the foreground, between the pirates and
resting at the exact center of the frame, two men row by in a pinnace: although positioned
closer to the viewer, their boat is smaller than the executed pirates. They represent,
perhaps, the minister who heard the pirates’ last confessions and the executioner who
carried out their sentence. In the background, on the horizon, a sailing galleon provides
the image’s vanishing point. The positioning and size of the woodcut’s two vessels
creates a realistic perspective; it is Clinton and Purser’s giant scale that disrupts a smooth
viewing experience. The distorted perspective takes the viewer on a disjointed journey.
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Never finding a comfortable point of contemplation, continually shifting from pirate to
pinnace to galleon and back again, the eyes cannot find repose. Taken as a whole, the
four main figures create a kind of tetrad of maritime justice. The enlarged pirates
represent the gravity of the crime of piracy, and their derailing of the scene’s perspective
signifies how piracy itself disrupts the equilibrium necessary for peaceful trade and
commerce by sea. The smooth-sialing galleon in the distance demonstrates the necessity
of this equilibrium, while the foregrounded pinnace provides the means of this peace. The
woodcuts remind the viewer that restoration of a calm sea requires an appropriate social
hierarchy, even as it relates to perspective.
The woodcuts in the two pamphlets link the popular accounts with the royal
proclamations by establishing the visual element of piracy’s depiction. The
proclamations, by nature, were textual documents, and yet they exuded their authority
through their physical manifestation. In a similar way, the woodcuts visually reinforced
the pamphlets’ content. Just as a viewer of a proclamation could interpret it as a surrogate
for the monarch’s royal authority, a monarch who themselves remained physically
absent, the woodcuts provided the reader of the pamphlet with visual proof of robbery at
sea. They created a piratical simulacrum; they produced their own experience of seeing
piracy with one’s own eyes.
Proclamations and pamphlets each transported the ocean to the cities, churches,
bookstalls, town crosses, and marketplaces of early modern England. They told of crimes
that occurred beyond British territorial waters and often in watery expanses far afield: the
Cantabrian Sea; the Mediterranean; the Straits of Gibraltar. The ocean represented a
dangerous space, one teeming with tempests, sea monsters, the threat of shipwreck, and,
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of course, sea robbers poised for the attack. The vastness and inexhaustibility of the
ocean, which featured prominently in Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius’ defense of open seas,
rendered it frightening, unknowable, “incomprehensible, no less than the air.”48 Even
maps of the early modern period depict the mythological Neptune, poised as ruler of the
seas, surrounded by fearsome creatures of the deep.
It was on this perilous plain that the early modern pirate committed his
transgressions, and accounts of his crime remind us that even he remained at the mercy of
a mercurial sea. The proclamations and popular accounts thus abound with an inherent
drama, one that impels the viewer or reader to forge ahead until the end of the document,
where justice returns, and order prevails. But as John Smith had reminded young
mariners, a chaser never sailed too far behind, and the next pamphlet or royal
proclamation on piracy lay just beyond the horizon. Throughout the early modern period,
these mediums remained complementary pinnaces for the conveyance of information
about maritime crime.

V. THE LITERARY DEPICTION OF THE EARLY MODERN PIRATE
The exploits of Clinton and Purser, and Ward and Danseker, offer a bridge linking
the legal with the literary. As noted above, in addition to appearing in pamphlets, their
stories were dramatized for the London stage in Fortune by Land and Sea (1655,
performed c. 1609) and A Christian Turned Turk (1612, performed c. 1612). The early
seventeenth century abounded with dramatic depictions of pirates: other so-called pirate

48

Hugo Grotius, The Free Sea. Richard Hakluyt, trans. (Indianapolis: The Liberty Fund, 2004),
34.

113

plays of the period include Philip Massinger’s The Renegado (1630, performed 1624),
Thomas Heywood’s The Fair Maid of the West (1631, performed early 1600s) and John
Fletcher’s The Island Princess (1647, performed c. 1619–21). In other plays, such as
Pericles, Prince of Tyre (1609, performed c. 1606), and Hamlet (1603, performed c.
1600), pirates play an auxiliary, yet often important, role in relation to the central
narrative. These fictional accounts of robbery at sea, even those that allege to portray real
pirates, rest several degrees removed from the proclamations and popular accounts.
Consequently, they warrant a separate analysis, one that takes into account their specific
genre: unlike the proclamations, they are not vehicles of royal authority; unlike the
popular accounts, they purport to provide audiences with only an approximation of the
historical personages they depict. Because theoretical approaches to the early modern
literary pirate could occupy this entire dissertation, I offer here only some nascent
analysis on the subject. Using A Christian Turned Turk and Fortune by Land and Sea as
my texts, I point to areas where the current scholarship could use greater attention.
A Christian Turned Turk capitalized on the burgeoning John Ward industry. The
play was written between 1609, when the three pamphlets on Danseker and Ward
appeared—these pamphlets provided Daborne with the main source material for his
play—and 1612, when the play was published.49 It is, more or less, a fictionalized
account of John Ward’s descent into piratical derangement, his conversion to Islam, and
his eventual demise (by way of suicide). The last plot element takes creative license, as in
1612 Ward was living comfortably in Tunis. The play also includes a dramatized
depiction of Zymen Danseker, who functions as Ward’s foil. Although both men are dead
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by the story’s end, only Danseker has redeemed himself. The two historical pirates are
accompanied by a host of characters at sea and on land, in Tunis: the occupants of a
French merchant ship, who are impressed onto Ward’s vessel; Benwash, a Jewish
merchant in Tunis, and his servant, Rabshake; and Agar and Voada, the Turkish wives of
Benwash and Ward. The play foregrounds the ocean as setting: the first five scenes
alternate between Ward’s ship and the French galleon. From the very first scene, when
Ward hoodwinks Ferdinand to serve on the pirate ship, Daborne positions the English
bandit as depraved and lacking capacity for redemption. As Laurie Ellinghausen notes, A
Christian Turned Turk “differs significantly” from other pirate plays because “it places
an unredeemed criminal at the centre of the tale, rather than at its margins, making his
tragic comeuppance—culminating in Ward’s shameful death, alone on foreign shores,
betrayed by his own allies—the main focus.”50 Despite his treacherous relinquishing of
both Christianity and Englishness, however, Ward does not meet his end overwashed by
the tides at Wapping Dock. Daborne allows him to preserve his agency, and his death at
his own hand solidifies his status as archetypical piratical antihero.
Heywood and Rowley’s Fortune by Land and Sea, written between 1607-1609
and performed c.1609, was published until 1655.51 Structurally, the play inverts A
Christian Turned Turk, that is, it begins on land and moves to the sea only in the play’s
fourth act. Indeed, no mention of pirates occurs at all until Act 3, Scene 4. Although
marketed as a tragicomedy, the play unfolds more like a romantic comedy, and all but its
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basest characters avoid a tragic outcome. Indeed, the play’s “fortune” merely rewards
virtue and punishes avarice. It focuses on two families, the Forrests and the Hardings,
whose fortunes have each turned: while the Forrests have steadily lost their family’s
wealth, the Hardings have grown richer. The play’s action centers mainly on Young
Harding, who, to his father’s dismay, marries the impoverished Susan Forrest. Young
Forrest, Susan’s brother, provides the play’s secondary plot, although his narrative can be
thought of more usefully as a plot of juxtaposition: while Young Harding seeks his
fortune by land, Young Forrest sets sail and finds prosperity at sea, and the two
concurrent narratives work in tandem to position the ocean as a space of distorted
morality. The moral program of the land is straightforward: the virtuous are summarily
rewarded with favorable outcomes. On the sea, conversely, Forrest succumbs to the allure
of piracy but still finds himself in fortune’s favor at the play’s end. The power of the sea
to distort, referenced above in the discussion of Clinton and Purser’s execution woodcut,
extends to the ocean’s ethical orientation. Ellinghausen refers to this phenomenon as the
“alterity of the sea.”52
Jowitt and others have noted Fortune by Land and Sea offers a more nuanced
attitude toward piracy than A Christian Turned Turk, and Doh calls it the best of the
period’s pirate plays.53 While the latter positions the crimes of Ward as inherently base,
and their perpetrator beyond redemption, the former frames piracy as a morally
ambiguous infraction, one whose legal status is determined by who is committing it (an
attitude reflected in the historical pirates and privateers of Elizabethan England). Barbara
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Fuchs argues that Fortune by Land and Sea aims to legitimize piracy as a respectable
activity, noting, however, that “the distinction between categories of licit and illicit
commerce appears less clear.”54 One way that Heywood achieves this end is by placing
piracy not completely outside the established order: the play’s pirates, whether Clinton,
Purser, or Young Forrest, operate according to maritime conventions which mimic
corresponding customs on land. As Jowitt notes, “The pirates describe the government on
their ship in similar terms to that of England. When Purser and Clinton reminiscence
about their seaborne exploits they do so in language that mirrors descriptions of
ceremonies and state activities in London.”55 The differences between the two plays’
attitude toward piracy can be explained, in part, by their temporal context, which I
discuss below. Not only were the central figures of A Christian Turned Turk very real,
they were also still very much alive during the play’s composition and first performances.
Most current scholarship on the pirate plays focuses on one of two broad
categories: identity and economics. Recent work on A Christian Turned Turk has
foregrounded Ward’s conversion to Islam. For example, the play appears in Daniel J.
Viktus’s anthology Three Turk Plays from Early Modern England, which centers on antiIslamic and anti-Semitic representations on the English stage as well as the period’s
conflation of Saracens, Turks, and Moors. Viktus notes that Ward (like Benwash)
converts to Islam for the sake of a woman: “Daborne’s play is the tragedy of a man who
puts love before religion and then despairs of God’s mercy.”56 Thus, Ward’s conversion
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adopts intrigue for a more attractive presentation on stage. Other recent work, most
notably by Laurie Ellinghausen and Benjamin D. VanWagoner, has focused on the
economics of piracy in an increasingly sophisticated manner. This scholarship posits that
A Christian Turned Turk represents a kind of nascent capitalism. As VanWagoner
observes, the play articulates “a shift in early modern English economic thought as it
moved toward a form of free-market capitalism exemplified onstage by Daborne’s
pirates.”57 Applying a slightly different economic reading, Ellinghausen argues that
Ward’s tale epitomizes the upwardly mobile member of early modern English society
whose rags-to-riches narrative occupies significant space within the play. The scholarship
on Fortune by Land and Sea, which tends toward historicizing the play within the context
of Jacobean piracy, is best represented in the work of Fuchs as well as Claire Jowitt. This
recent scholarship offers several useful portals through which to engage with the pirate
plays. To these I offer three more. First, I argue that drama afforded its playwrights the
freedom to depict the human—in addition to the economic and political—toll of piracy,
and that it achieves this end through testimony. Second, I consider the temporal contexts
of A Christian Turned Turk and Fortune by Land and Sea and demonstrate how these
contexts had significant consequences for the plays’ portrayals of their respective pirates.
Finally, I posit that the plays construct piratical identity through carefully crafted
language and that a closer analysis of these constructions reveals an increasingly nuanced
portrait of the early modern literary pirate.

Benjamin D. VanWagoner, “Pirate Economics in Robert Daborne’s A Christian Turned Turk.”
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The staging of the interpersonal toll of piracy offers perhaps the most neglected—
and most important—contribution of the plays. The legal and quasi-legal representations
of the crime found in proclamations and pamphlets focus on piracy’s economic fallout.
Injury to individuals assumes a secondary role, and its devastating effects, if mentioned at
all, are presented in a detached, perfunctory fashion. This attitude, as legal historian D.P.
O’Connell observes, reflects the prevailing legal orientation toward piracy.58
Additionally, the pamphlets adopt an ostensibly objective presentation of their subject,
and their appended testimonials from disgruntled merchants highlight the loss of ships
and goods. Emotional or sensational accounts of the cruelty perpetuated by the pirate,
accounts fitting in other crime literature of the period, would seem out of place in
pamphlets committed to the tenor of legal disinterest.59 Drama, however, enjoyed much
greater liberty to recount the true extent of piracy’s damage, not only for the merchant’s
accounts, but also for the captain’s crew, those close to him to whom he harbored a
professional duty, perhaps even an affinity, and who suffered impressment, servitude,
slavery, or death as the result of a pirate attack. The genre of drama opens a window not
only onto the interiority of the pirate, but also the inner world of the pirate’s victims.
Naturally, the plays do not offer this view at the expense of piracy’s economic toll, and
the critical focus on the economics of Fortune by Land and Sea and A Christian Turned
Turk reflects the prevailing interests of Heywood and Daborne. However, the plays’
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additional portrayals of piracy’s human cost offer the literary critic a site to consider how
literature adapts maritime crime and tempers it for non-legal audiences.
A Christian Turned Turk expresses piracy’s interpersonal toll through a form of
testimony. This technique finds a parallel in the account of the masters of the Charity and
the Pearl in Two notorious Pyrates, but while the latter provides a straightforward (and
dry) account, the former deploys the full arsenal of poetic language to convey piracy’s
ruthlessness. The play’s most affecting scene occurs after the capture of the French ship,
when Raymond learns Ward intends to sell his sons as slaves to Benwash. In an extended
speech, Raymond pleads with the pirate for the release of his children. He implores:
Hard-hearted! ‘Man’ I cannot term thee. It’s
A name that bears too much pity in’t,
Compared with so inhumane. Creature, wert thou a father,
These tears would move thee, that bemoan a son’s,
Nay all my children’s, worse than funeral,
Their ever thralldom. But Nature well denied
Issue to thee, lest in thy barbarous guilt
She had been a party when thy affectioned soul
Had felt how much the name of child moves, with what care,
How many jealous fears, we view their infancy;
Lest having felt all this, thy accursed hand
Should yet have dared to make men childless. (6.232-43).
At first, Raymond expresses a tinge of resignation mixed with his pleas: he recognizes
that Ward’s inhumanity has lodged itself so deeply within his being that words, no matter
how well-crafted or eloquently delivered, will not move him. However, Raymond
proceeds, as if love for his sons has overpowered this resignation, and the caesura at line
233 (“Compared with one so inhumane. Creature, wert thou a father”) represents this
shift. The movement to the subjunctive mood signals that Raymond’s speech exists in a
parallel realm, one that lies outside the play, one in which Ward is capable of a change of
heart. Thus, the merchant no longer addresses Ward with the intent of altering his
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resolve, but rather, he addresses the audience in a more general sense, and his lines
assume the function of testimony. Raymond’s grief, poignant and effusive, conveys the
real damage of Ward’s crimes.
One of Raymond’s sons also begs Ward for his freedom. He tells him “for in us
bleed / An aged father, a mother, to whose grief / No other misery can be added” (6.24850). When Raymond realizes their supplications have moved neither Ward nor Benwash,
he launches into an even longer speech: in these lines he petitions Ward more urgently.
Instead of pleading for his sons’ release, he begs that he, too, might be sold alongside
them: “I see you are kind, would not now part us / That twenty and odd years have grown
together” (6.264-65). Raymond assures the pirate and his associates that he, too, can
undertake hard physical labor like his sons: “See, I am not old. / No wrinkle is on my
brow; these are but frowns” (6.268-69). So come, he tells them,
Manacle these arms. You shall see us three
Tug the day’s eye out. There’s not a father
And his two boys shall dare to undertake us.
The sun outvied, we’ll set us down together
and with our sadder cheer outmourn the night,
And speak the happiness we might have lived, too. (6.273-79).
Both of Raymond’s speeches are characterized by caesura and enjambment, as if his
increasing panic over the loss of his sons seeps out into disjointed and overflowing verse.
But even these impassioned lines fail to move their target. In a play that emphasizes
Ward’s great cruelty at every turn, the pirate’s response to the pleas of a distraught father
comes across as exceptionally sadistic: “Ha, ha, ha” (6.290). No, the pirate is not moved,
and Raymond watches in horror as his sons are led away.
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The role of testimony in cases of piracy was paramount, as authorities on land
relied on witnesses for actions that took place at sea.60 In A Christian Turned Turk,
Raymond’s testimony serves assorted functions. It allows Daborne to foreground Ward’s
inhumanity; it injects pathos and alters the pacing of the play’s action. It also allows the
audience to observe the effects of piracy as they unfold, a vantage point all but
inaccessible outside of a play. The immediacy of Raymond’s pleas offers a view of the
pirate’s infractions from within: unlike the royal proclamations, which look primarily into
the future at piratical acts yet to be committed, or the pamphlets, which look into the past
at crimes already commissioned, Raymond’s speech portrays piracy as happening now.
Even within the play, the economic harm inflicted by the pirate is not immediate, and the
full extent of its insidious effects requires time to develop. Conversely, Ward’s wresting
of father from sons produces instantaneous, devastating consequences, and within this
moment piracy’s economic toll appears as only an incidental afterthought.
The use of testimony in pirate plays thus represents an unexplored avenue of
further research. Its representation onstage is, paradoxically, both legal and non-legal,
legal because it expounds the harm inflicted by piracy by those who find themselves in its
path, non-legal because it enjoys the freedom to accentuate non-economic injury. When

60

Prior to 1536, when cases of piracy were handled in the admiralty courts, the issue of testimony
became a problem. The civil law stipulated that pirates could only be convicted if they confessed
or if two witnesses testified against them. However, these witnesses could not also be
accomplices. When the common law courts began to prosecute piracy as the result of 28 Hen. 8,
c. 15, witnesses could be accomplices as well. See Lucas Bento, “Toward an International Law of
Piracy Sui Generis: How the Dual Nature of Maritime Piracy Law Enables Piracy to Flourish,”
Berkeley Journal of International Law 29.2 (2011), 399-455, 403; Andrew Kent, “Piracy and Due
Process,” Michigan Journal of International Law 39.3 (2018): 385-452, 400. For more on the
effects of 28 Hen. 8, c. 15 on English admiralty jurisdiction, see M.H. Prichard and D.E.C. Yale,
Hale and Fleetwood on Admiralty Jurisdiction (London: Selden Society, 1993), cxxxvii-ccl.

122

thinking about the framing of maritime crime in early modern drama, a deeper
consideration of this tension proves productive. In addition, this work could be informed
by recent scholarship on the role of testimony in the period’s literature.61 Positioning the
crime as interpersonal in nature fundamentally reorients it, a move that can occur
seamlessly in drama through the use of testimony.
Temporal context also plays an important role in the interpretation of both A
Christian Turned Turk and Fortune by Land and Sea. This context has not been wholly
ignored by recent criticism: on the contrary, both plays have been the site of rich
historicizing. Fortune by Land and Sea, in particular, has attracted this methodological
approach. A Jacobean work that features Elizabethan pirates teems with interpretive
potential, and the popularity of the early Stuart pirate plays undeniably reflected James’s
increasingly hardline stance toward robbery at sea.62 Heywood and Rowley’s play exudes
nostalgia for Elizabeth and the erratic stance toward the freewheeling English privateers
that characterized her reign. The play, Jowitt argues, “uses values and activities
associated with Elizabeth in James’s reign as a contrast to those promulgated by the new
monarch.”63 I propose a different contextual approach, one that considers the relationship
between the literary pirates and real-life counterparts. These relationships unfold quite
differently across A Christian Turned Turk and Fortune by Land and Sea. Not only do
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these divergent developments impact how the characters of Ward, Purser, and Clinton
evolve across their plays, but also how the plays themselves structure their interests: the
latter is a play about piracy, the former is a play about a pirate.
Ward’s evolving identity occupies a central position in part because he was still
alive during the play’s initial performances. Ward-as-character appeared onstage as an
imposter, because the real Ward existed out in the world, his life still amenable to
additional metamorphoses. It is also conceivable that some viewers of A Christian
Turned Turk had read one (or more) of the earlier pamphlets as well as viewed James’s
proclamation of January 8, 1609. The play then exists at the logical end of a progression
from proclamation to pamphlet to stage, with each point providing a deeper glimpse into
the pirate’s psyche, his proclivities, his temperament and motivations. Not only did the
real Ward evolve during his lifetime, but his representation in print and on stage evolved
as well, with each move bringing him into sharper focus. On stage, he is capable of
evolution—the titular turning—even if this evolution moves in an increasingly precarious
direction eventually leading to his death. His suicide itself marks an important divergence
from the real Ward. In Jacobean England, the ideal legal punishment for Ward’s crimes
would have been extradition to his country of origin, a trial at the High Court of
Admiralty, and a swift execution at Wapping Dock; for viewers of Heywood’s play, this
offstage possibility still existed. So while the pirate’s onstage death provided catharsis
within the play itself, it did nothing to convict the real Ward, and in fact reminded the
audience that he had not yet been apprehended. His fictive self-murder, even the
throwing of his corpse into the entrails of the sea, constituted a mockery of legal justice.
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Juxtaposed with Ward’s dynamic development, Clinton and Purser appear almost
as stock characters. Unlike Ward, the pair had been dead for over twenty years when their
fictional doppelgängers materialized onstage, and their well-publicized execution at
Wapping Dock precluded any other outcome of their lives. Even their last dying
speeches, considered below, seem formulaic on a first encounter. According to Doh, it is
likely that Fortune by Land and Sea originally contained nameless pirates and that the
identities of Purser and Clinton were inserted later.64 The two scenes that add historical
credence to their identities, the promulgation of the royal proclamation (3.4) and the
pirates’ farewell speeches (5.1), do not advance the main plot of the play. Rather, they
feel like interpolations intended to confirm that the pirates onstage do, indeed, correspond
to the historical Clinton Atkinson and Thomas Walton. In Clinton and Purser’s other
scenes, the two retain their anonymity and project a certain interchangeability: unlike
Ward and Danseker, they do not assume distinct characteristics or outcomes. I believe
this directly reflects Clinton and Purser’s achieved position of archetypal Elizabethan
pirates: the passage of time since their execution had imbued them with a mythical status.
The Clinton and Purser of Heywood’s play only roughly approximate their historical
counterparts because they have no need to: they are more closely aligned to the figures in

The later pamphlet further complicates the timeline. By the time Heywood’s A True Relation
appeared in 1639, thirty years had passed since the composition of the play; a full fifty-six years
since the pirates’ watery end at Wapping. Doh speculates that Heywood wrote the pamphlet from
memory and that he did not have a copy of the earlier play before him. The strongest evidence to
support this claim is a close comparison of the royal proclamation scenes. The printed play did
not appear until 1655. It is a slipshod effort: the text is printed entirely in prose and contains
numerous typographical errors. The scene between the Clown and Pursuivant runs all the lines
together in a muddled mess (fig. 2.14), providing only the faintest echo of the scene’s neat and
typographically sophisticated presentation in Heywood’s A True Relation.
64
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a Spenserian allegory than real pirates, and in this capacity they appropriately represent a
nostalgia for Elizabeth’s reign.
Language offers the third site of potential analysis. Royal proclamations assume
the official language of royal authority, and both proclamations and pamphlets must
employ concise prose to convey a sometimes-complicated narrative within a confined
space. The language of drama, however, is not as bound by form or function, and a
greater attendance to its nuance can yield a more robust modern understanding of the
plays’ portrayals of pirates and piracy. Able to engage fully with the literary and the
expansive possibility of language, A Christian Turned Turk remains recurrently
conscious of the pirate’s debt to the ocean. Daborne establishes this linguistic precedent
early. In the first scene, when a lookout spots Monsieur Davy’s French ship on the
horizon, Ward’s men respond with confused shouting. “Why stand you so amazed?” asks
Ward. “Conceive you not the language of the sea?” (1.15). This language of the sea
permeates the play. The first four scenes occur aboard ships, and Daborne peppers his
dialogue with allusion to the ocean in order to reinforce the nautical setting. When
Ferdinand rebukes Ward for his cruel nature, he compares the pirate to an unmanned
vessel at the mercy of a mercurial sea: “Bloodthirsty monster … who like a ship
unmanned, / That’s borne by motion of the violent waves / And giddy winds, doth seem
to make a course / Direct and punctive, till we see it dash / Against some prouder Scylla”
(2.96, 98-102). When Daborne’s play disembarks from its galleons and lands its audience
on the shores of Tunis, these maritime metaphors follow. Ferdinand appeals to Ward,
“Hear us but now, / We’ll forgive all our wrongs, with patience row / At the unwieldy
oar” (7.259-261) and Rabshake tells his master Benwash, “If I should try him, it is
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beyond my compass if he outsail me” (16.147). Thus, Daborne allows maritime language
to flow throughout the play.
A close reading of the final speeches of Clinton and Purser uncovers some
specifics about how the play frames the literary pirate. This moment reveals the pirate at
his most vulnerable, moments from death, and disinclined to dissemble. We witness the
pirate laid bare. The speeches occupy an entire scene not concerned with much else. The
only other characters present onstage, the Sheriff, Hangman, and Silver Oar (the
admiralty officer), deliver some passing lines, but not much else happens: it is a moment
constructed solely through the pirate’s language. The extended dialogue that oscillates
between Clinton and Purser assumes a solipsistic quality. Although they address figures
non-present on stage, such as navigators and fellow pirates, they really seem to be
speaking only to each other, and sometimes only to themselves. Purser dominates the
scene. At times, Clinton appears deferential, almost sycophantic, to his companion; at
others, the two appear as equals. The scene’s tableau-like quality reflects, in part, its
structural relationship to the ballads circulated when the real pirates were executed, and,
in part, its obvious shoehorning into the play; yet the scene can also be read as Fortune by
Land and Sea’s definitive manifesto on the nature of the pirate. Unfortunately, because
the 1655 printing of the play is set entirely in prose, it is difficult to execute a sound
formal analysis of the scene’s verse.65 However, the language itself provides ample
material for consideration.
Heywood infuses the last dying speeches of Clinton and Purser with understated
metamorphosis. As noted above, the ability to transform, to move between identities,
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Doh’s 1980 edition resets the printed prose as verse.
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defined the early modern pirate. In A Christian Turned Turk, Daborne foregrounds
Ward’s transformation in a very tangible way: the title itself broadcasts that the play
features a protean identity. Fortune by Land and Sea also highlights piratical
metamorphosis, and Forrest moves lissomely between the oppositional categories of
pirate and non-pirate. For Clinton and Purser, however, this capacity to change assumes
greater nuance: because the Elizabethan marauders live as pirates and die as pirates, their
role in the play exudes a mechanical prosaicism seemingly impervious to change. But a
closer attendance to the language of their dying speeches reveals they do change, relative
to the sea, and the relationship between pirate and ocean, between “Kings,” Purser
proclaims, “and our realm” (2158), informs this metamorphosis. The most important
linguistic moment of the scene, one that centers the capacity for piratical change, occurs
at line 2223. Purser breaks to address his fellow mariners:
Oh you brave Navigators that have seen,
Or ever had your selves command abroad,
That knew our empire there, and our fall now,
Pitty at least us that are made the scorn
Of a base common Hangman. (2221-25)
The central line here is the clause “That knew our empire there, and our fall now” (2223).
The shift from an adverb of place to an adverb of time produces a resonating dissonance:
rather than a harmonizing there/here or then/now pairing, Purser moves from place to
time within a single phrase. The change of adverbial direction arrests the audience, whose
smooth listening is jarred by linguistic disharmony. It signals that the pirates’ identities,
like their attendant verse, can change. There, not here. Now, not then.
The predominant example of piratical metamorphosis is revealed by juxtaposing
lines 2170-78 (delivered by Clinton) and lines 2257-66 (delivered by Purser), which
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bookend the scene. Clinton begins his speech by addressing Purser, “Whom storms could
never move, tempests daunt, / Rocks terrifie, nor swallowing gulphs affright, / To whom
the base abbysse in roughest rage / Shew’d like a pleasant Garden in a calm” (2171-74).
Heywood employs the conventional language of stormy seas to great effect, and his
intensifying adjectives bring this ocean into even sharper focus: “swallowing gulphs,”
“base abbysse,” “roughest rage.” The playwright uses the negation of verbs to quell these
horrors: Purser is never moved, never daunted, never terrified, never frightened. The
ocean, ever subject to tempests and currents, constantly fluctuates; the pirate, firm,
constant, remains steadfast. The juxtaposition between sea robber and sea does not end
here: at line 2174, Clinton tells us that Purser is not only unmoved by the sea, but he also
possesses the capacity to transform it. His presence on the “light billows” (Purser’s own
description of the sea at line 2159) converts the ocean’s rage into a “pleasant Garden in a
calm / And the Sea-monsters but like beasts at land / Of profit or pleasure” (2275-76).
Superficially, Clinton’s lines convey the fearlessness of his associate in the face of the
hangman’s noose: could a man unmoved by the sea be “Affrighted with a halter?”
(2177). When considered within the context of the rest of the scene, however, they
assume deeper meaning.
Purser’s last lines of the play confirm that the metamorphosis is complete. He
begins by signaling that the end is nigh, that “our sun is all setting, night comes on”
(2257). The scene’s focus on the movement of time, beginning at line 2165—“We have a
flash left of some half hour long”—and punctuated by the Sheriff at line 2195—
“Gentleman, your hour draws near”—concludes not with the consummation of thirty
minutes, but with the setting of the sun. Purser resists the strictures of the land even in his
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last moments. The pirate’s inherent defiance turns to the sea. “The watery wilderness ore
which we raign’d,” he observes, “Proves in our ruins peaceful” (2258-59). A placidity
envelops both the pirates and the sea. In Clinton’s earlier speech, Heywood frames the
ocean as inimical, an entity that must be tamed by the pirates. In Purser’s juxtaposing
lines, the dynamic has shifted, and the pirates find themselves comforted by the
tranquility of the sea. Perhaps all that has changed is the two men’s frame of mind and no
real metamorphosis in relation to the sea has occurred, but Purser disabuses us of this
notion a few lines later. He addresses the Thames, “whose double tides / Must o’rflow
our bodies, and being dead / May thy clear waves our scandals wash away, / But keep our
valours living” (2263-66). In a clear allusion to baptism—itself a kind of
metamorphosis—Purser allows for the sea’s transformative power over the pirates’
transgressions. The dynamic has inextricably shifted, and the ocean, once positioned as
subservient to the pirates, now acts upon them. Both pirate and ocean have transformed in
tandem and power has changed hands, and the sea, paradoxically, exudes a benevolent
domination. The pirates’ understated metamorphosis is a metamorphosis nonetheless, one
informed by the delicacy of shifting language and consummated by the flowing and
reflowing of the sea.

VI. CONCLUSION
Piracy represents the most productive maritime issue to link the legal with the
literary. The other issue that frequently touches both the law of the sea and early modern
literature, shipwreck, proves less useful for this connection. Within early modern English
poetry, romance, and drama, shipwrecks most often serve to propel a plot forward: for
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example, the wreck that opens William Shakespeare’s The Tempest or the wreck of
Pyrocles and Musidorus in Philip Sidney’s The Old Arcadia. Piracy, conversely, presents
a dynamic issue, one that continually develops from scene to scene, page to page, and
proclamation to proclamation. And although the period did produce English shipwreck
narratives which I consider in my conclusion, wreck itself occasioned only a very small
number of royal proclamations. As a result, a focus on legal and literary depictions of
shipwreck would preclude the neat line this chapter draws from proclamation to pamphlet
to play—a smooth transition from an advocate’s bookshelf stuffed with technical
maritime legal texts to the London stage with its romanticized pirates. My next chapter,
however, turns to shipwreck in a much different context: it considers how The Faerie
Queene used this maritime issue not for its dramatic or allegorical effects, but rather, to
explicate Edmund Spenser’s attitude about the admiralty jurisdiction debates in England.
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CHAPTER 3
WRECKED UPON THE SANDS:
MARITIME LAW AND EDMUND SPENSER’S THE FAERIE QUEENE

I. INTRODUCTION
Around 1630, a poor man walking near the sea came across a piece of ambergris.
Ambergris, a wax-like substance that originated in the intestines of the sperm whale, was
highly valued for its role in perfume production; according to contemporaries, the piece
of ambergris in question weighed close to two hundred pounds. The poor man discovered
it “halfe an howre before high water wrapt up in nothinge but les it groweth of it selfe.”1
Civil lawyer William Colman recorded the subsequent legal case in his notebook. The
central legal question, according to Colman, was “whether [the ambergris] doth not
properly belonge to the poore man the finder thereof or hath the lord admirall for the time
beinge any just claime or property therein.”2 In other words, could the poor man keep the
piece of ambergris, or did it belong to the Crown represented in the figure of the Lord
Admiral?
The question did not lend itself to an easy answer; and Colman includes admiralty
judge Arthur Duck’s opinion on the case in his notebook. According to Duck, the
ambergris rightfully belonged to the finder. He based this opinion on the tenets of natural
law: unlike the case of treasure washed ashore following a shipwreck, the piece of
ambergris belonged to nature. Its presence on the beach represented a natural
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William Colman, The Notebook of William Colman, ed. Richard Helmholz, Three Civilian
Notebooks, 1580-1640 (London: Selden Society 2011), 126v.
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phenomenon and unlike goods transported by sea on a ship, it had never had an original
owner. Duck argues that the ambergris could have had such an owner, but that the
difficulty in finding proof of this owner would be prohibitively difficult. Thus, the
ambergris belonged to the poor man, as it had passed directly from nature to the finder. In
the same way, “it is the case of any that finds jewells or precious stones on the sea shore
the finder hath a good title to them.”3 The courts, however, did not wholly agree with
Duck’s assessment of the case, although according to legal historian Richard Helmholz, it
may have influenced the ultimate ruling. The parties reached a compromise: instead of
allowing the finder to keep the ambergris outright, the Lord Admiral took possession of it
and then paid the finder an annual pension.
In Book V of Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene, Artegall, the knight of
justice, finds himself confronted with a similar legal quandary. After attending the
nuptials of Florimell and Marinell in canto 3, Artegall, the Knight of Justice, encounters
brothers Amidas and Bracidas on the seashore. When he approaches, Artegall notices a
sea-battered coffer before them. The older brother, Bracidas, explains the nature of their
dispute: they had each been bequeathed an island, but over time, the “devouring ocean”
had removed soil from Bracidas’ island and deposited it on Amidas’s, increasing its size.
This development has, understandably, left Bracidas disgruntled. But the fraternal discord
does not end here. Bracidas further explains that he had been betrothed to Philtera, but
that the lady had discarded him in favor of his brother, Amidas, who possessed the larger
island. Lucy, who was herself betrothed to Amidas, despairs when she realizes she has
been abandoned and attempts to commit suicide by throwing herself into the sea. As she
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is tossed about by the ocean currents, she regrets her impulsivity, grabs onto a
fortuitously placed coffer to stay afloat, and eventually washes up onto Bracidas’ island,
where he claims it as marine salvage. Philtera objects, as the coffer contains her dowry
and was lost at sea. Amidas, the younger brother, then interrupts and argues that while
Bracidas has been truthful about the islands, the treasure chest rightfully belongs to him,
as it contains Philtera’s dowry.
After listening to the brothers’ testimony, Artegall renders judgment. He
concludes that Amidas has the right to Bracidas’ accreted land that has increased the size
of his island, and that Bracidas has the right to the treasure chest that has washed up upon
his shore. Artegall’s decision includes a statement on the whimsical nature of the sea:
For equall right in equall things doth stand,
For what the mighty Sea hath once possest,
And plucked quite from all possessors hand,
Whether by rage of waues, that neuer rest
Or else by wracke, that wretches hath distrest
He may dispose by his imperiall might
As thing at randon left, to whom he list
So Amidas, the land was yours first hight,
And so the threasure yours is Bracidas by right. (V.iv.19)
The judgment leaves Amidas and Philtera displeased but satisfies Bracidas and Lucy.
Artegall, having addressed the brothers’ dispute, resumes “his old quest” (V.iv.20) from
which the matter on the seashore has distracted him.
This episode appears to fall outside of the narrative structure of Book V: on its
surface, it does not advance the book’s plot nor link to other moments in the poem.
Consequently, the Amidas/Bracidas incident has long puzzled critics. Extant scholarship
on Artegall’s judgment has typically fallen prey to one of the following pitfalls: it has
focused on the episode’s legal issues but ignored its role in the larger context of the
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poem; has used the legal issues to support a larger, but not expressly legal-historical,
argument; has ignored the specific legal issues to support a divergent, non-legal
interpretation; or has attended to the legal issues while failing to fully appreciate their
significance.
In this chapter, I offer a new interpretation of the Amidas/Bracidas seaside
dispute. My reading of the episode rests on the central premise that maritime law
pervades The Faerie Queene: from Guyon’s voyage to the Bower of Bliss, to Marinell’s
claim to prize on his jewel-encrusted shore, to Florimell’s kidnapping and imprisonment
by Proteus, Spenser’s allegory teems with maritime infraction and its corresponding legal
problems. As a result, Artegall’s judgment rests not in a narrative vacuum, but rather
engages productively with these earlier moments. Additionally, I argue that Spenser’s
treatment of certain legal issues within the episode reflects his conscious engagement
with the admiralty jurisdiction debates, the most important issue concerning maritime law
in England during the late sixteenth century.
I begin with an overview of recent criticism on Spenser and the law. Next, I
consider the different oceans of The Faerie Queene and demonstrate their broader
narrative and allegorical functions within the poem. Next, I analyze the problem of
jurisdiction within these oceans and argue that the law of the sea undergoes a
distinguishable evolution across Books II, III, IV, and V. Finally, I offer my
interpretation of the Amidas/Bracidas episode, which considers the legal components of
Artegall’s judgment and places it within the larger trajectory of maritime law within The
Faerie Queene.
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II. SPENSER AND THE LAW
Although he was not trained as a lawyer, Edmund Spenser has long attracted
scholars interested in the legal aspects of his works. This is due in part to the poet’s
knowledge of the law: in his administrative roles in Ireland, he both required an
understanding of legal matters and also demonstrated a personal interest in legal reform.
Additionally, The Faerie Queene abounds with legal and jurisprudential issues that
reflect the historical reality, and at moments Spenser uses the poem as a mouthpiece for
his own positions on the political issues of his day. These biographical and literary
intersections have provided the modern scholar a puzzle: what did Spenser think about
the legal questions of his day, how were these opinions reflected in his imaginative
literature, and what methodological tools can be used to link the legal with the literary,
and the civil servant with the poet?
Criticism on Spenser and the law can be divided broadly into two groups:
scholarship that predates and postdates the law and literature turn in early modern literary
studies that occurred in the early 2000s.4 The work before this turn already recognized
the rich payoff of putting Spenser’s work in conversation with the law. Older
monographs such as Jane Aptekar’s Icons of Justice: Iconography and Thematic Imagery
in Book V of The Faerie Queene (1969) and T. K. Dunseath’s Spenser’s Allegory of
Justice in Book Five of The Faerie Queene (1968) deal tangentially with the
jurisprudential aspects of the poem, but they do not engage with substantive law or the
role of the common law in English legal history. Both works develop modes of
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interpreting Book V which focus on textual allusion and the theme of justice.5 Angus
Fletcher’s The Prophetic Moment (1971) remains one of the most valuable assets for
developing an understanding of the law in Spenser. Most of these earlier studies of
Spenser and the law focus, appropriately enough, on Book V, such as W. Nicholas
Knight’s “The Narrative Unity of Book V of The Faerie Queene: ‘That Part of Justice
which is Equity’” (1970). Most of this scholarship relies on textual interpretation, and
when more contextual lenses are applied, they are rarely legal-historical. Diane ParkinSpeer’s “Allegorical Legal Trials in Spenser’s The Faerie Queene” (1992) diverges from
this tradition and can be read as a forerunner to later work on the law in Spenser. ParkinSpeer argues that two trials within The Faerie Queene, those of Duessa and Mutabilitie,
demonstrate Spenser’s antipathy toward the English common law. While published
before the turn to law and literature, Parkin-Speer’s scholarship uncovers methods to
understand Spenser’s legal thinking and attitude toward the jurisprudential issues of his
day.
This framework allowed Spenserians to apply greater legal nuance to their
scholarship; in particular, scholars have attended to the question laid out by Parkin-Speer
and tried to ascertain Spenser’s attitude toward the common law from both his poetry and
prose. One early example, Robin E. Bates’s “‘The Queene is Defrauded of the Intent of
the Law:’ Spenser’s Advocation of Civil Law in A View of the State of Ireland” (2005),
traces Spenser’s aversion to the common law in A View and asks whether the work
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Wisdom, Desire and Love, and Justice and Peace.
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reveals a preference for the civil law of the Continent. James Schiavoni’s “Royal
Prerogative versus the Common Law in A View of the Present State of Ireland and The
Faerie Queene, Book V” (2010) investigates how the struggle between common law
courts and prerogative was reflected in Spenser’s writing. To date, Andrew Zurcher’s
seminal Spenser’s Legal Language (2007) represents the most engaged scholarship that
links Spenser with early modern English law. Zurcher positions the jurisprudential
aspects of Spenser’s works (The Faerie Queene, Two Cantos of Mutabilitie, and the lyric
poetry) in a framework that accounts for Spenser’s acute attention to the effects of
language and the use of legal diction present in all his works.6 Zurcher’s work considers
legal issues such as contract, property, defamation, and equity. His reading of Marinell
and Florimell, considered below, provides his most sophisticated contribution to Spenser
and the law: it accounts equally for legal and historical context, linguistic gravity, and
allegorical convention. Spenser’s Legal Language sits squarely at the center of my
theoretical reading of maritime law in The Faerie Queene.
Despite this impressive body of work on the law and Spenser, the role of maritime
law in his imaginative writings has never been addressed by critics. On one level, this is
understandable: as this dissertation more broadly argues, the question of maritime law
and English Renaissance literature remains unprobed in the current scholarship. But
despite this explanation, the neglect of the law of the sea in The Faerie Queene appears a
particularly egregious omission. In the first place, as noted in the Introduction, maritime
law represents a distinct form of law from both common law and civil law. Critics who

Andrew Zurcher, Spenser’s Legal Language: Law and Poetry in Early Modern England
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attempt to analyze moments of maritime adjudication in the poem while failing to
account for this distinction cannot achieve the level of sophistication required for a
robust, legally nuanced reading. Second, the role of maritime law in England, and in
particular the admiralty jurisdiction debates, constituted a major legal question of
Spenser’s time. While the question directly affected the immediate concerns of lawyers
and mariners, it also raised more abstract issues regarding royal authority and the role of
the civil law in common law England, and Spenser surely had an opinion on it. And third,
The Faerie Queene itself contains several distinct oceans, and these oceans witness
several incidences of maritime transgression. To overlook the role of maritime law in
Spenser’s allegory hinders the poem’s interpretive potential and cuts off a major avenue
for understanding the poet’s attitude toward the legal machinery of his day.
Ultimately, my approach to interpreting maritime law in The Faerie Queene
combines aspects of both older and more recent work on law in Spenser. From Aptekar,
Dunseath, and Fletcher I borrow a strong textual and thematic engagement with the
poem; from Zurcher, Bates, and Knight I borrow a closer attention to real legal issues in
late sixteenth-century England. My reading of Spenser attempts to synthesize these
critical approaches to provide a holistic theory of the law of the sea in the allegory and, in
turn, offer an explanation for the Amidas/Bracidas episode.
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III. THE OCEANS OF THE FAERIE QUEENE7
The Faerie Queene is, itself, a metaphoric ship. The reader engages with the poem
as a passenger on a nautical voyage: the stanzas ebb and flow as the tide and the narrative
envelops the poetic vessel like the ocean water, at times calm, serene, at others,
threatening, violent, impenetrable. Spenser acts as our pilot, guiding us through his
allegory, stopping from time to time so that we may appreciate his linguistic prowess,
picking up and depositing characters and plotlines on the shore, and anchoring our
interpretation in his moralistic vision. The ship conceit depends not only on critical
speculation: Spenser himself informs the reader at the beginning and end of canto 12,
Book I of our nautical enterprise:
Behold I see the hauen nigh at hand,
To which I meane my wearie course to bend;
Vere the maine shete, and beare vp with the land,
The which afore is fayrly to be kend,
And seemeth safe from storms, that may offend;
There this fayre virgin wearie of her way
Must landed bee, now at her journeyes end:
There eke my feeble barke a while may stay,
Till mery wynd and weather call her thence away. (I.xii.1)
And:
Now strike your sailes yee iolly Mariners,
For we be come vnto a quiet rode,
Where we must land some of our passengers,
And light this weary vessell of her lode.
Here she a while may make her safe abode,
Till she repaired haue her tackles spent,
7

Georgia Ronan Crampton offers what is perhaps the most thoughtful commentary on the
meaning of the sea in The Faerie Queene: “Most of all the sea is a recurrent, an enveloping,
motif. Setting and symbol for Britomart, setting and home for Cymoent, connected with Arthur as
apt sign for all his incertitudes, the ocean may be either peril or refuge, as it will be for the
wounded Marinell, but it is always the medieval sea of fortune, the rich and ambiguous flux that
wrecks some and bestows wealth on others, that speaks with many voices, that tosses up our
losses” (218). Crampton, “Spenser’s Lyric Theodicy: The Complaints of the Faerie Queene
III.iv,” ELH 44.2 (1977), 205-21.
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And wants supplide. And then againe abroad
On the long voiage whereto she is bent:
Well may she speede and fairely finish her intent. (I.xii.42)8
Why a ship, and why an oceanic voyage? One critic who has considered this question at
length, Jerome Dees, argues that the “ship conceit helps to establish a pattern of
relationship between the narrator and the central characters of each book, between the
concern for and struggle with his poem and the contingencies that they face in their
various quests.”9 The ship conceit does indeed offer a narrative coherence, but it also
draws attention to The Faerie Queene as an essentially maritime poem. In Books II, III,
IV, and V, major plot points coalesce in the sea. Like Britain, Faery Land feels fenced in
by the ocean, and while the poem presents a kind of geographic instability, the perilous
seas offer—paradoxically—a fixed entity. Adding to this nautical cohesion is the impulse
across the poem to impose order on these maritime spaces, to tame them in the way that
Faery Land itself has been subjugated. In her discussion of Spenser’s depiction of Proteus
in Books III and IV, Isabel MacCaffrey contends that the sea is “a matrix of life and
figure for ‘huge eternal chaos’ which supplies Nature with substance.”10 Maritime law,
within the context of The Faerie Queene, develops to temper this chaos, and its
progression yields a steady mollification of the sea.
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Every ocean in The Faerie Queene offers some kind of legal problem, and thus
Spenser invites the reader to view the sea as an essentially legal space. This allegorical
layer occurs not haphazardly, but on a set trajectory, and like the poem’s movement
through maritime space it follows a deliberate, traceable progression. After the pilot has
struck his sails at the end of Book I, the reader meets Guyon in Book II, which marks the
beginning of a larger structural descent into the ocean. This voyage begins in the first
canto of Book II, with the introduction of Guyon’s quest to destroy the Bower of Bliss.
Two oceans feature in this book: The Idle Lake, which has been identified by critics as
the Mediterranean, and Acrasia’s Sea, traversed during Guyon’s journey to the Bower of
Bliss in canto 12. Spenser describes the Idle Lake as “this wide Inland sea, that hight I by
name / The Idle Lake, my wandring ship I row” (II.vi.10). Guyon’s voyage across
Acrasia’s Sea emphasizes that ocean’s vastness: “Two dayes now in that sea he sayled
has, / Ne euer land beheld, ne liuing wight” (II.xii.2). These oceanic bodies each serve the
practical function of navigation, as well as the metaphorical role of presenting Guyon
temptations and obstacles that could impede his mission.11 Guyon’s interaction with the
sea, as well as the reader’s, remains on the water’s surface, with his ship gliding through
the waters without penetrating the fathoms below.
Books III and IV continue and deepen—both literally and metaphorically—the
ocean’s function in The Faerie Queene. The shift occurs on a linguistic, as well as
narrative, level: the ocean spaces in Book II are labeled “lake” or “sea”; in Books III and
IV, a shift to “maine” and “deepe” signifies a geographical transfer to the high seas. Early
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I consider the question of freedom of the seas in relation to Book II of The Faerie Queene in
the following chapter.
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in Book III, Britomart’s complaint on Marinell’s strand, which mimics the traditional
Petrarchan blazon, addresses the sea directly: “Huge sea of sorrow, and tempestuous grief
/ Wherein my feeble barke is tossed long” (III.iv.8). Britomart’s complaint, one scholar
argues, also demonstrates her comfort with the sea. The sea that Britomart addresses sits
adjacent to Marinell’s jewel-encrusted shore. Another ocean emerges in canto 7, when
Florimell flees from the Witch’s Son and finds herself in a fisherman’s boat. Proteus, the
infamous shapeshifting sea god, rescues her from the rapacious mariner only to hold her
hostage in an underwater prison for eight months. At the end of Book IV. Marinell’s
mother Cymoent enlists the help of Neptune to release his beloved from Proteus’s
captivity. In Book V, the ocean features in the episode with the Egalitarian Giant, in
Artegall’s adjudication of the brothers’ conflict, and the defeat of the Souldan at the
hands of Artegall and Arthur.12 Finally, Book VI, like Book I, is largely bereft of oceans
and instead adopts a pastoral setting.
This brief overview of the oceans of The Faerie Queene demonstrates a general
pattern: the metanarrative begins removed from the ocean in Book I, enters it through the
voyages of Guyon in Book II, descends outward and downward through Proteus’s
kidnapping of Florimell in Books III and IV, arrives back at the shore for the nuptials of
Marinell and Florimell and Artegall’s episode of adjudication on the strand in Book V,
and returns completely to land in Book VI. Additionally, the progression establishes
another pattern: it shows that every ocean in The Faerie Queene lies under the
jurisdiction of a particular figure. Spenser offers not one unified ocean without
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This last episode, in which Spenser depicts a metaphoric approximation of the defeat of the
Spanish Armada and moves the battle from the sea to a lawn, lies outside my analysis in this
chapter.

143

jurisdictional boundaries; rather, he gives us Acrasia’s Sea, Marinell’s Sea, Neptune’s
Sea, and Artegall’s Sea. This cordoning off of ocean space creates the need for a unified
law of the sea in Faery Land. It invites the reader to ask how legal issues are adjudicated
in each sea, if general principles of maritime law are at play, and to what extent Acrasia,
Marinell, Neptune, and Artegall exercise dominion over their respective oceans.
Both the poem’s spatial movement through Faery Land’s oceans and the
introduction of legal issues in each sea underpin my analysis of the Amidas/Bracidas
episode in Book V. Indeed, I argue that the episode represents a culmination of maritime
law in The Faerie Queene in which the law of the sea has acquired the power to fully
contain the tempestuous ocean. In this way, the poem mirrors the historical development
of maritime law: the legal issues that arose at sea were not confined to any one
geographic area, and the impulse to create a uniform body of law drove the earliest
maritime codes. Although at times an inaccurate simulacrum of this legal-historical
development, Spenser’s poem exhibits a conscious engagement with the underlying
principle: maritime chaos can be constrained by a measured, uniform system.

IV. JURISDICTION AND THE FAERIE QUEENE’S SEAS
The Faerie Queene engages with various issues touching maritime law, which
include jurisdiction, piracy, wreck, and marine salvage.13 These issues culminate in the
conflict between Amidas and Bracidas in Book V, and their evolution throughout the
poem provides a central prism through which to understand this episode’s significance.

13

The poem also addresses the question of free seas, mainly in Book II. I consider this issue and
its incorporation into The Faerie Queene in the next chapter.
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The depictions of these issues in the poem do not necessarily correspond to their legal
and historical reality: young civil lawyers who aimed to practice at the High Court of
Admiralty were not reading Spenser’s allegory for insight into adjudicating maritime
cases. Therefore, it is not my argument that Spenser sought to present a realistic depiction
of these legal problems. Instead, he weaves them in under the guise of allegory, and their
careful inclusion in The Faerie Queene signals Spenser’s own commentary on admiralty
jurisdiction in England. Of the legal issues listed above, I focus mainly on the poem’s
incorporation of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the sea establishes the source from which all other admiralty
issues in the poem flow. In the first place, it creates maritime boundaries: my contention
that ocean space in The Faerie Queene contains four well-defined seas rather than
contiguous ocean space is established through jurisdiction. That is, four different
figures—Acrasia, Marinell, Neptune, and Artegall—exercise adjudicatory power that
cordons off distinct maritime space. The tenuous geography of Faery Land itself offers no
clues that assume these divisions, and previous critics such as Isabel MacCaffrey and
Kirsten Tranter have erroneously implied that all oceans in the poem belong to the same
broad entity, a conclusion that betrays the sophistication with which Spenser fashioned
his allegory’s seas. In actual maritime law, the division of ocean space is unstable
enough: an area as small as the English Channel has long attracted competing claims of
dominion from both the French and the English, and the question of freedom of the seas
rested, in part, on the possibility of delimiting ocean waters.14 In a poem as spatially
labyrinthine as The Faerie Queene, in which clear topography is at best an afterthought,
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I address this issue in the next chapter.
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these divisions appear to defy demarcation. However, the task lies within reach when the
question of jurisdiction is applied.
In his depiction of the ocean in The Faerie Queene, Spenser faces a conundrum:
does jurisdiction establish maritime boundaries, or do maritime boundaries establish
jurisdiction? This question can be answered in two complementing ways. First, a
consideration of moments in the poem where jurisdictions clash shows the unseen, yet
ever-present, jurisdictional boundaries at work in these moments. These clashes of
jurisdiction in the poem, however, resolve neatly, and their clean outcomes represent how
sharply Spenser draws his maritime lines. The second way of deducing oceanic
boundaries sans geographic clues lies in a close reading of the individual seas. The nature
of each aquatic domain differs; the language Spenser employs to describe each ocean
implies that they inhabit different physical spaces and are, by extension, exclusive. Thus,
in addressing Spenser’s jurisdictional conundrum, it appears maritime boundaries enjoy a
reciprocal relationship with jurisdiction: in Faery Land, the two reinforce each other in a
way that leaves no doubt that Spenser recognized the importance of clear jurisdictional
limits in the application of maritime law.

1. Acrasia’s Sea
The Faerie Queene’s first sea belongs to Acrasia. The poem defines this sea with
the language of chaos: Spenser assails Guyon’s senses and ours with reminders that the
waters surrounding the Bower of Bliss teem with tempests, sea monsters, and every snare
that may engulf an allegorical—or early modern—mariner. The poem marks off the sea
as a distinct geographic space early in canto 12: after sailing for two days in open waters,
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apparently unimpeded by nautical obstacles (“Ne euer land beheld, ne liuing wight”
(II.xii.2)), Guyon, on the third morning, finds himself in a vexatious sea: “Vpon the
waues to spred her trembling light / An hideous roring far away they heard, / That all
their sences filled with affright, / And streight they saw the raging surges reard / Vp to the
skyes, that them of drowning made affeard” (II.xii.2). The implication that they have
entered Acrasia’s domain becomes evident as the canto progresses, and this early stanza
draws a clear demarcation between the open seas of Guyon’s two-day voyage and the
chaotic waters that define the remainder of his journey. In the next stanza, we learn that
the Gulfe of Greediness sits on this jurisdictional line, which acts as a symbolic division,
an unyielding partition marking off the calm, steady waters of the jurisdictionally
ambiguous high seas from the, paradoxically, tightly controlled and yet simultaneously
anarchic ocean of Acrasia.
Guyon’s subsequent voyage through this sea represents The Faerie Queene’s
most sustained engagement with the ocean. The reader, like Guyon, experiences
Acrasia’s territorial waters with an intimacy unparalleled in the rest of the poem. This
point is significant: the ensuing chaos becomes synonymous with ocean space in Faery
Land. For forty-four stanzas, Guyon and his crew are bombarded with every maritime
obstacle imaginable. After their jolting encounter with the Gulfe of Greediness, they
notice an immense boulder and realize the Gulf and Rock act in cahoots, with the former
tossing unsuspecting ships into the latter. Here Spenser employs the language that will
frame Acrasia’s Sea as a whole: the Gulfe is “violent and greedy” (II.xii.5), it sucks “the
seas into his enthralles deepe” which seem “more horrible then hell” (II.xii.6). Opposite
the Gulf, Guyon beholds the ships that have met their ruin on “sharp cliftes” where “the
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ribs of vessels broke” and had “beene wrecked late” (II.xii.7). The violent language
continues as Guyon, the Palmer, and the Boatman forge ahead. Spenser depends
especially on adjectives to construct a tempestuous sea in perpetual flux: dangerous,
detestable, whirling, restless, surging, dreadful, resounding. In stanza 34, Spenser makes
explicit the nature of this ocean: “And this great Vniuerse seemd one confused mas.” The
vivid verse that enwraps the entire first half of the stanza lays the foundation for the
luscious descriptions of the Bower of Bliss that follow, and the most straightforward
reading of Acrasia’s Sea positions it as lacking restraint. The sea, thus, assumes two
meanings: the one restricted to Book II, which serves to highlight the importance of
temperance, and the larger function that extends to Book V, which illustrates the poem’s
evolving understanding of maritime space.
Although Acrasia enjoys jurisdiction over her sea, her villainous nature
exacerbates rather than tempers its inherent chaos. In stanza 26, we learn that some of the
obstacles she has employed to shield her bower result from her own sorcery: after
encountering a panoply of sea monsters, the Palmer informs his fellow passengers that
“For these same Monsters are not these in deed, / But are into these fearefull shapes
disquiz’d / By that same wicked witch, to work vs dreed” (II.xii.26). Although the
implication remains ambiguous (“disguised” here means transformed), these lines could
be interpreted to show the chaos in Acrasia’s Sea is not inherent, and that its waters
contain ordinary sea creatures that incite fear only through her manipulation. This
interpretation highlights her absolute dominion since she not only controls her sea, but
also controls the perceptions of those who traverse it. In the end, it is not Acrasia who
calms the transgressors of her sea, but rather the Palmer: “But soone as they approcht
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with deadly threat, / The Palmer ouer them his staffe vpheld, / His mighty staffe, that
could all charms defeat: / Eftesoones their stubborne corages were queld, / And high
aduanced crests downe meekely feld” (II.xii.40). The Acrasian Sea remains in chaos not
because order eludes it, but because Acrasia directly benefits from the disorder and
chooses not to intervene.
Acrasia’s Sea features a moment that implies a conflict of jurisdiction. Although
the sorceress demonstrates no interest in procuring legal consequence for the offenses
committed upon her waters—her cavalier deportment merely extends the lawlessness
endemic to the Bower of Bliss—another potential arbitrator, Neptune, arrives on the
scene: “The waues come rolling, and the billowes rore / Outragiously, as they enraged
were, / Or wrathfull Neptune did them driue before / His whirling charet” (II.xii.22).
Later, in Book IV, we learn that Neptune functions in the allegory as more than a mere
mythical figure who commands the tempests: he exercises adjudicatory power over the
ocean when he impels Proteus to release Florimell. And yet in Acrasia's Sea, he enjoys no
such clout. He appears, plays his tempestuous role, and then departs. His legal authority
does not extend to the sea surrounding the Bower of Bliss. In this passage, Spenser shows
that within Faery Land, as in early modern England, admiralty jurisdiction involves not
only geographic boundaries, but jurisdictional limits as well. Neptune's legal power is
rendered moot when he ventures from his own sea and enters the domain of Acrasia.
Defined by its chaos, the disordered Acrasian Sea frames our readings of the
poem’s subsequent oceans. The Palmer’s intervention, while almost an afterthought, sets
an important precedent. Although the Palmer rectifies the transgressions of the
tumultuous waters with metaphysical acumen rather than legal principles, he shows that
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an ocean mired in maritime crime can be controlled. In Faery Land, the whims of nature
and lawlessness that have saturated Acrasia’s Sea do not sentence ocean space to
indefinite chaos.

2. Marinell’s Sea
The poem’s next ocean emerges in Book III, canto 4. Unlike Acrasia’s Sea, which
Spenser presents in a continuous, unbroken narrative, Marinell’s Sea is offered
piecemeal, and whereas the former unfolds through rich description, the latter
materializes through different characters’ relationships to it. This fragmentation suits
Marinell’s Sea: unlike the straightforward jurisdictional schema of Acrasia’s domain,
Spenser subjects the ocean in Book III to administrative ambiguity, and a careful parsing
of its moving parts is required to settle the question of proper jurisdiction. Consequently,
when juxtaposed with Acrasia’s Sea in the preceding book, Marinell’s Sea extends the
poem’s increasingly sophisticated engagement with admiralty jurisdiction.
We first come to know this sea through Britomart, who approaches it from the
land. After departing from Redcrosse Knight at the opening of canto 4, she begins her
quest in search of Artegall: “So forth she rode without repose or rest, / Searching all lands
and each remotest part, / Following the guydaunce of her blinded guest, / Till that to the
seacoast at length she her addrest” (III.iv.6). The encounter with Marinell’s Sea, thus,
originates on the shore and moves outward. This contrasts with Guyon’s journey across
Acrasia’s Sea: the latter involves movement inward, from the open, unbound ocean into
the sorceress’s territorial waters. These oppositional approaches clarify the types of
jurisdiction each ocean concerns itself with. For Acrasia, the main concern involves how
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far her domain stretches into the sea, and how much of this space she can control. For
Marinell, conversely, the central question concerns his domain inward, from the edge of
the water to the shore. Indeed, this preoccupation with the coast defines his sea in the
same way Acrasia’s ocean is defined by chaos. The stanza immediately preceding
Britomart’s arrival at the shore further establishes this point. Spenser does not describe
the ocean as a detached entity out there, but rather unveils its gestalt through its
interactions with the shore: “Tho hauing vewd a while the surges hore, / That gainst the
craggy clifts did loudly rore, / And in their raging surquedry disdaynd, / That the fast
earth affronted them so sore” (III.iv.7). This stanza reveals two important points about
Spenser’s treatment of Marinell’s Sea: first, it has been defined in terms of its conflict
with the land, and second, our view of it comes to us from Britomart’s shoreside point of
view.
The second point becomes clearer in the next three stanzas in which Britomart
addresses the sea directly in a complaint. The view of the ocean before her comes
mediated not only through Spenser’s language, but also through Britomart’s relationship
to the ocean. Usually her complaint is interpreted inward, revealing more about her
mental state than about the sea itself. Paradoxically, however, it is through this mediation
that the poem’s clearest, most accessible overview of maritime law emerges. Britomart
begins her complaint by describing a metaphoric sea of grief marked by Acrasian chaos:
“Huge sea of sorrow, and of tempestuous griefe, / Wherein my feeble barke is tossed
long, / Far from the hoped hauen of reliefe, / Why doe thy cruel billowes beat so strong”
(III.iv.8). Britomart’s words call to mind Guyon’s own journey in the preceding book, but
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her internal struggle against a mercurial sea remains firmly situated in her mind.15 The
reference to her frail vessel reminds the reader that her interaction with the ocean must be
mediated by a man-made object, just as our interaction with Marinell’s Sea must be
mediated by Britomart’s perception of it. Similarly, as noted above, this sea can only be
defined in relation to the shore. This point establishes the emergence of a nascent
maritime law: the tempestuousness of the ocean becomes a burden only when a feeble
bark attempts to traverse it, just as its ferocity emerges only when the waves come
crashing upon the shore. Thus, any attempts to quell its volatility must originate on the
land, as the land, and things associated with it, are the real source of the conflict.
The second stanza of Britomart’s complaint expounds the danger of sailing in
turbulent waters. But no longer do the waves toss her bark on the high seas: she has
begun a drift closer to shore, which subjects her to greater danger: “For els my feeble
vessell crazd, and crackt / Through thy strong buffets and outrageous blowes, / Cannot
endure, but needes it must be wrackt / On the rough rocks, or on the sandy shallowes”
(III.iv.9). Spenser’s inclusion of spondees and trochees in the final line reflects the
disharmony of this maritime chaos, as if his verse itself remains subject to a
temperamental ocean and, like Britomart’s bark, his familiar iambs become battered and
mangled when tossed against the rocks. The coast contains its own inherent danger: even
the pilot and boatswain prove impotent “gainst tyde and winde” (III.iv.9). The turbulence
that Britomart’s bark—and heart—encounters in these first two stanzas finds resolution

One could argue that Guyon’s journey is an internal one as well, in which he battles against the
vice of intemperance. While this remains an important part of his quest, his voyage to the Bower
of Bliss also implies material, physical interaction with the sea; conversely, Britomart’s struggle
against grief remains exclusively psychic and internal.
15
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in the third. Here, the object of her complaint shifts from the ocean itself to Neptune,
“Thou God of windes, that raignest in the seas / That raignest also in the Continent”
(III.iv.10). Neptune possesses the authority, Britomart declares, to “blow up some gentle
gale of ease” which will transport her bark “[unto] the gladsome port of her intent” where
she will find safety. Britomart closes her complaint with a pledge to consecrate a votive
tablet to the sea god if he delivers her from the inimical ocean.
These three stanzas offer a microcosm of oceanic evolution across The Faerie
Queene: their relatively early appearance—the narrative has not yet realized its most
robust engagement with the sea—foreshadows the apogee of this progression reached in
the Amidas/Bracidas episode in Book V. Britomart’s metaphorical journey (like
Guyon’s) begins on the high seas, where her ship is tossed on tempestuous waves. In the
second stanza, she moves closer to land, and closer to danger, as strong winds push her
toward sand bars and perilous rocks. Finally, in the last stanza, she appeals to Neptune for
safe delivery from her nautical torment. Textually, this progression across stanzas
correlates with the oceans of Books II, III, and IV: Acrasia’s Sea is marked by chaos and
anarchy and exists far from the coast; Marinell’s Sea demonstrates an intimate, reciprocal
relationship with the shore signaled in the second stanza. Neptune’s Sea, which stretches
across Books III and IV—a textual reflection of its breadth—appears in the last stanza in
the figure of Neptune himself. And Britomart’s appeal for Neptune to release her both
foreshadows Florimell’s eventual release from Proteus’s bower and reveals the sea god’s
adjudicatory power to subdue maritime disorder. Britomart’s journey inward to safety not
only reflects the serenity of port waters, but also links Neptune with that serenity. In his
capacity to calm the waves, the sea god sets a precedent for the poem’s later, more legally
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sophisticated remedies for rectifying oceanic infractions, and Britomart’s desired port
represents the regulating character of maritime law.
While making her complaint, which has transported the reader to the high seas
and back again, Britomart remains firmly rooted to the coast. Spenser notes she sits
“downe upon the rocky shore” (III.iv.7) before addressing the formidable waters. Her
presence on this shore both foregrounds and foreshadows the ensuing jurisdictional clash.
Up until this point, the coast has appeared uninhabited: with the exception of Glauce,
Britomart sits alone. Although we learn later that the shore is awash with the prize from
shipwrecks, in the canto’s opening stanzas this coast appears to be es communis omnium,
a thing belonging to no one. Britomart reacts with shock, then, when she sees a figure
who “far away, one all in armour bright, / With hasty gallop toward her did ryde”
(III.iv.12). Britomart, who has removed her own armor during this seaside sojourn,
quickly redons it and prepares for battle, her “former sorrow” transmuted into “suddein
wrath” (III.iv.12). The subsequent duel between Britomart and the as-yet unidentified
Marinell abounds with interpretive potential, but given its proximity to the sea, one could
read it as a battle for jurisdiction. Spenser’s language describing their conflict emphasizes
its ferocity: “Strongly the staunge knight ran, and sturdily / Strooke her full on the brest,
that made her downe / Decline her head, and touch her crouper with her crown”
(III.iv.15) and “by mischaunce / The wicked steele through his left side did glaunce; /
Him so transfixed she before her bore / Beyond his croupe, the length of all her launce”
(III.iv.16). Britomart’s fierce attack sends Marinell tumbling down onto the “sandy
shore.” In the next stanza, Spenser modifies his description slightly, describing the beach
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as the “precious shore” (III.iv.17). The small adjectival shift from “sandy” to “precious”
changes the tenor of the knights’ skirmish: suddenly, much more is at stake.
In conflicts over admiralty jurisdiction in English law, coasts have always
presented jurists with problems. Whereas the line between territorial waters and the high
seas fell under the purview of the international law of the sea, the issue of admiralty
jurisdiction within England remained a domestic issue that centered on liminal spaces
such as coasts, bays, havens, and rivers, those bodies of water that, geographically, fell
within counties but remained subject to maritime law through the unbroken flowing of
the sea.16 Thus, the location of the Britomart-Marinell scuffle is more than incidental. It
transcends an isolated conflict between two aggressive knights and offers a glimpse into
the battle for admiralty jurisdiction fully realized in the Amidas/Bracidas episode. Critics
have often read Marinell as the complement of Florimell.17 This interpretation feels
natural: not only do the two join together in marriage in Book V, but their names
themselves illustrate harmonization: Florimell of the land, Marinell of the sea. However,
Britomart and Marinell complement each other in a similar fashion: they are both knights,
and we know enough of their respective backgrounds to link them decisively with land
and sea. A significant portion of Merlin’s prophecy in canto 3 relates to Britomart’s
lineage. Similarly, later in canto 4, we learn of Marinell’s family background: his mother,
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See Westerman, The Judicial Bay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 32-61. The portion
of coast covered by water at high tide is referred to as the foreshore which is described as “neither
dry land nor sea and … constantly being covered and uncovered by water, driven by tidal
processes.” Derek J. McGlashan et al., “The Foreshore: Geographical Implications of the Three
Legal Systems in Great Britain,” Area 36.4 (2004), 338-47 (338).
17

See, generally, Thomas P. Roche, The Kindly Flame: A Study of the Third and Fourth Books of
Spenser’s Faerie Queene (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 150-94; William Blissett,
“Florimell and Marinell” Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900 5.1 (1965), 87-104.
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Cymoent, is herself the daughter of Nereus, the old man of the sea; his father is Dumarin,
whose name implies of the sea. (Interestingly, Spenser provides no such lineage for
Florimell.) Considering the ways Marinell and Britomart supplement each other within
the narrative aids in the interpretation of their clash: Marinell, of the sea, represents
maritime law; Britomart, of the land, represents the common law (or, less controversially,
a general terrestrial law); and the precious shore that stages the battle represents the
admiralty jurisdiction debates.
Britomart wins their chivalric tussle. Marinell is thrown to the sandy—or
precious—shore suffering from an apparent mortal wound, while the “martiall Mayd
stayd not him to lament” and forges ahead down the coast. Here the nature of Marinell’s
shore is clarified: as she rides over the strand, “She saw bestrowed all with rich aray / Of
pearles and pretious stones of great assay, / And all the gravell mixt with golden owre”
(III.iv.18). His coast is coated with the prize from the shipwrecks that have occurred in
his waters. Marinell’s “rich strand” has implications for deducing the jurisdiction of his
sea. Britomart, despite her victory, does not stop and linger among the treasure: “Whereat
she wondred much, but would not stay / For gold, or perles, or pretious stones an howre, /
But them despised all; for all was in her powre” (III.iv.18). Her indifference to this trove
of treasure invites a clear juxtaposition with Guyon, who grows in thrall of Mammon and
his cave in Book II. The description “Great heapes of gold, that neuer could be spent: / Of
which some were rude owre, not purifide” (II.vii.5) further links Marinell’s treasure with
Mammon’s by signaling the practical worthlessness of the unpurified ore that comprises
both of their caches. Britomart’s immunity to Marinell’s riches, despite her victory at
battle, suggests more than a stronger resolve than Guyon. Instead, it implies that
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jurisdictional lines have not been redrawn, and that despite his momentary incapacity,
Marinell remains in legal control of his sea.
Spenser provides an explanation for Marinell’s treasure, a detail left out of his
account of Mammon’s Cave. Marinell has acquired his prize legally: it is his right.
Raised by a nymph in a rocky cave, Marinell grows into a “mighty man at armes, and
mickle fame” who rises through the proverbial ranks of Faery Land. Meanwhile
Cymoent, Marinell’s mother, appeals to her father, Nereus, “To doen his Nephew
[grandson] in all riches flow” and “Eftsoones his heaped waues he did commaund, / Out
of their hollow bosome forth to throw / All the huge threasure, which the sea below / Had
in his greedy gulfe devoured deepe” (III.iv.22). In the eighteenth century, John Upton
linked the figure of Marinell with the Lord Admiral.18 These stanzas provide the strongest
evidence of this correlation. In the first place, Marinell’s military prowess is highlighted:
he grows into a “mighty man at armes” and, in his martial ascent, is able to subdue a
great number of other knights and turn them into his vassals. The position of Lord
Admiral carried both military and legal significance, and Marinell occupies these
complementary roles: militarily in his skirmish with Britomart; legally in his right to the
treasure washed up upon his strand. Because the Lord Admiral enjoyed jurisdiction over
both the territorial waters of England as well as those liminal spaces of coast, bay, river,
and haven, Marinell’s movement from sea to land begets no fracture of his jurisdiction:
he, like the Lord Admiral, enjoys command over both water and coast. The implication is
clear: Marinell’s Sea, defined by its adjacency to his strand, represents a distinct

“I have all along thought, and am still of the opinion, that Lord Howard, the Lord High Admiral
of England, is imaged under the character of Marinell.” Cited in Henry John Todd, The Works of
Edmund Spenser vol. 4 (London, 1805), 337.
18
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jurisdictional space within the poem. The figure of Marinell himself carries with it the
legal authority of the English Admiralty, and his purview is defined by the historical
limits of his office.19 Britomart, who in this canto represents English law—an
interpretation fortified by her association with Artegall, the Knight of Justice—remains
unmoved by Marinell’s treasure not only because she operates above greed, but also
because she has no legal right to the riches of the sea. Marinell’s fall onto his jewelencrusted strand serves as a vital reminder that although he has been injured, his wound
has not diminished his right to prize: admiralty jurisdiction in Faery Land remains
unaffected.

3. Neptune’s Sea
Here it might end. Here the poem may require no additional need to temper its
tempestuous seas. Having established the danger of maritime disorder, Spenser has
positioned Neptune—a convenient proxy for the international law of the sea—as the
figure to calm this chaos; and having demonstrated the peril of malleable jurisdictional
lines, he has offered Marinell—a formidable approximation of the English Lord
Admiral—as the figure to maintain inflexible legal boundaries. And yet Marinell’s Sea
represents only the second of the four oceans in the poem. The third is introduced later in
Book III, but it does not fully materialize until the end of Book IV: Neptune’s watery

Various critics have noted Marinell’s indifference to his own treasure and offered differing
explanations for it. In “Early Modern Masculinities and ‘The Faerie Queene’,” English Literary
Renaissance 35.2 (2005), 210-47, for example, Lisa Celovsky argues Marinell’s jewel-encrusted
strand represents his willful infertility. In my analysis, his indifference is clear: during the
sixteenth century, the English Admiralty had become besmirched by the cupidity of certain
admirals who cared more about lining their pockets than maintaining order in English waters. By
showing that Marinell can accumulate the windfall of wreck while not falling under its spell—
unlike Mammon—Spenser provides a model for the proper conduct of the English Lord Admiral.
19
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realm casts a wide net over The Faerie Queene, and the broad extension of its
jurisdictional tentacles represents the geographic scope of the international law of the sea.
As I argue elsewhere in this dissertation, Neptune’s role in The Faerie Queene has
been consistently overlooked in the scholarly literature.20 This is partly because scholars
have focused on his mythical manifestations in the poem. Such an approach renders the
sea god rather forgettable: playing a purely pedestrian part, his greater allegorical
significance proves unworthy of deeper investigation. In fact, Neptune’s representation is
two-pronged: not only does he occupy a mythical role, but he provides a legal function as
well, and the latter is what makes his character fundamental to the poem’s progression. If
Acrasia’s Sea can be defined by its chaos, and Marinell’s by its shore, then Neptune’s
Sea can be defined by its law. And this law offers the reader a sophisticated legal process,
one dependent on the written word, implying a codification of the law of the sea, and one
intricate enough to require an entire canto. By transcending his mythical function,
Neptune demonstrates that his earlier control of the weather only calms the ocean on a
superficial plane. It is his adjudicatory power to remedy maritime tort that brings lasting
tranquility to the sea.
Neptune’s Sea begins, and ends, with Florimell. Marinell’s betrothed spends
much of the poem fleeing from other men: first the Forester, then the Witch’s Son, then
the Witch’s Beast, and finally the Fisherman. She spends the greatest time, however,
imprisoned in Proteus’s Bower deep in the depths of the sea. Florimell’s narrative serves
two functions in relation to maritime law. First, it anticipates the analogous story of Lucy
in the Amidas/Bracidas episode and in turn creates a link between Marinell and Artegall.
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This argument begins in the next chapter and culminates in Chapter 5.
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Second, it establishes both Neptune’s jurisdiction in relation to Marinell and the nature of
maritime judgment in the poem. Spenser opens by establishing the high stakes of the
episode: he subjects Florimell to the only act of maritime interpersonal violence in the
poem. Having rejected the advances of the Witch’s Son, Florimell finds herself pursued
by a beast conjured by the Witch herself; this beast chases her to the shore, where she
jumps into an idling fishing boat. Florimell discovers the apparent safety of this boat is a
mere mirage: when the fisherman awakens, he sees the “blazing beauties beame” of
Florimell, whose “rare light of his bote did beautifye” (III.viii.22) and becomes overcome
with desire. The fisherman’s reaction at seeing Florimell’s snowy skin contains rather
graphic sexual innuendo: “The sight whereof in his congealed flesh / Infixt such secrete
sting of greedy lust / That the drie withered stocke it gan refresh / And kindled heat, that
soone in flame forth brust” (III.viii.25). Florimell’s oceanic respite from the advances of
the Witch’s Son transforms into a nightmare, as the fisherman proceeds to attempt to rape
her: he throws her down in his boat as she valiantly resists. The fisherman comes far
closer to raping Florimell than do her earlier pursuers, the Witch’s Son as well as the
Forester, in Book III. Here Neptune’s Sea succumbs to Acrasian chaos. Unlike the land,
where Florimell has been able to flee from her assorted would-be attackers, the ocean
offers her no reprieve. The fisherman’s boat represents a lawless space, and the fisherman
himself is bound to no apparent codes of decorum.
Spenser underscores the distance that lies between the fisherman’s boat and the
relative safety of the shore. This emphasis provides the clearest geographic evidence that
Neptune’s Sea lays beyond Marinell’s domain, even before the introduction of legal
nuance and clear jurisdictional boundaries between Marinell and Neptune in Book IV.
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When Florimell leaps into the fisherman’s boat in canto 7, the shore is described as
“roaring” and its apparent violence dissuades the Witch’s Beast from aquatic pursuit.
When Florimell’s narrative resumes in canto 8, we learn “her selfe was far away”
(III.viii.20) and that “Long so she on the mighty maine did float, / And with the tide
drove forward carelessly” (III.viii.21). We learn that the distance traversed has produced
a calming of the seas: “For th’ayre was milde, and cleared was the skie, / And all his
windes Dan Aeolus did keep / From stirring up their stormy enmity” (III.viii.21). When
juxtaposed with both Guyon’s journey to the Bower of Bliss and Britomart’s complaint,
Florimell’s jaunt out to sea reaffirms that tempestuous weather afflicts Faery Land’s
coastal waters; the “mighty maine” enjoys relative freedom from the capriciousness of
the shore. When the fisherman awakens, Florimell tells him they “sith far in sea” and “the
great waters gin apace to swell, / That now no more we can the mayn-land see”
(III.viii.24). The fishing boat now floats super altum mare, on the high seas, and although
the waters begin to swell, it is not a storm that threatens Florimell, but the isolation of
their location. Neptune’s mythical prerogative to control the winds proves meaningless in
the face of maritime tort: only a legal intervention can remedy a legal problem.
Proteus, whose intercession thwarts the fisherman’s attack, functions in the poem
as an early modern pirate. He materializes at the fisherman’s boat and notices the ensuing
struggle: “And comming to that Fishers wandring bote, / That went at will, withouten
card or sayle, / He therein saw that yrkesome sight, which smote / Deepe indignation and
compassion frayle / Into his hart attonce” (III.viii.31). Proteus delivers Florimell, it
seems, from the fisherman’s advances, and the sea god takes “that old leachour”, ties him
to his chariot, and casts him up upon the shore. Unfortunately, however, he does not offer
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Florimell a similar conveyance to land, and instead shepherds her to his bower. This act
positions Proteus as an allegorical pirate, and his abduction of Florimell as an act of
piracy. As noted in the previous chapter, the early modern pirate—both historically and
literarily—comprised a protean figure. He often moved lissomly across identities,
between the contrasting identities of pirate and non-pirate, and demonstrated equal
comfort in each. Proteus himself, of course, embodies oceanic shapeshifting. Florimell
also undergoes a metamorphosis in the sea: she transforms from snowy maiden to
maritime prize, a shift that foreshadows Lucy’s fate in Book V: upon jumping into the
sea, she transforms from jilted lover to marine salvage.
Proteus’s intervention underscores another point: Neptune’s Sea represents the
only ocean space into which the reader can descend.21 Not only does Spenser pull us
outward, far beyond the safety of the shore, but he also pulls us downward, into the
bowers of both Cymoent and Proteus. The language of their description helps to establish
their similarity: “Deepe in the bottome of the sea, her bowre / Is built of hollow billowes
heaped hye / Like to thicke clouds, that threat a stormy showre” (III.iv.43) corresponds
with “His bowre is at the bottome of the maine, / Vnder a mightie rocke, gainst which do
raue / The roring billowes in their proud disdaine” (III.viii.37). In a later description of
Proteus’s dungeon, Spenser employs enjambment to simulate the effect of a descent to
the ocean floor:
Deepe in the bottome of an huge great rocke
The dongeon was, in which her bound he left,
That neither yron barres, nor brasen locke
Did neede to gard from force, or secret theft
21

In Book V, Lucy plunges into the sea in a thwarted suicide attempt, which offers a glimpse of
the ocean’s underside. But her subaquatic encounter lasts, apparently, only a few moments, and it
cannot compare with the underwater narratives of Marinell and Florimell in Books III and IV.
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Of all her louers, which would her haue reft.
For wall’d it was with waues, which rag’d and ror’d
As they the cliffe in peces would haue cleft;
Besides ten thousand monsters foule abhor’d
Did waite about it, gaping grisely all begor’d. (IV.xi.3)

This movement downward allows Spenser to create even more distance between the
safety of Marinell’s Strand and the threat of open waters. Although anachronistic in its
application—Grotius published Mare liberum (1609) ten years after Spenser’s death—the
Dutch jurist used this fact in his support of free seas: the ocean presented a space unsuited
to permanent human occupation, which precluded any possibility of its possession.
Spenser raises the stakes by pulling Florimell and Marinell to the ocean’s depths for a
period of seven months. While land-dwellers can traverse the surface of the sea within
the safety of a sailing vessel and thus temporarily inhabit maritime space, the ocean floor
represents a truly inaccessible space that defies any occupation at all.22
Why does Spenser associate the ocean’s depths with Neptune’s domain? Because
it allows the reader to fully disengage from physical presence on land. In turn, this offers
additional evidence that Neptune’s Sea falls out of the jurisdictional confines of Faery
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The ocean floor was not an entirely inaccessible space during the early modern period,
however. Marine salvage sometimes necessitated attempts to recover valuable items lost during
shipwreck. This development dates to at least the Greeks, who employed diving methods to
recover goods lost at sea. In England, the wreck of the Mary Rose, a carrack that sank in the
Solent in 1545, offers the most well-known early modern example of attempted underwater
salvage. Salvors (who included the Italian Piero Paola Corsi) tried to access the wreck for seven
years before finally abandoning their mission in 1552. Twentieth-century technological
advancements finally allowed for the excavation of the Mary Rose between 1979 and 1982, and
the ship contained a treasure trove of items that shed light on life aboard a Tudor ship. See Frank
J. Frost, “Scyllias: Diving in Antiquity,” Greece and Rome 15.2 (1968), 180-85 and Lionel
Casson, “Excavating Underwater,” in Seafarers and Sea Fighters of the Mediterranean in Ancient
Times, second edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 23-29 for more on the
ancient practice of underwater excavation. See Margaret Rule, The Mary Rose: The Excavation
and Raising of Henry VIII’s Flagship second edition (London: Conway Maritime, 1990) for more
on the sixteenth-century attempts to salvage the Mary Rose.
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Land’s national law. Through both geographical inaccessibility and separate judicial
process, Neptune’s waters resist attempts at control from the shore. As a result, this vast
and unwieldy space requires not only law itself, but another type of law—an allegorical
approximation of the international law of the sea—in order to govern itself. Neptune
himself further exemplifies the full break from land. He is not beholden to Faery Land’s
conventions, traditions, or laws, nor does he pledge his fealty to any figure on land. This
detachment endows him with an air of impartiality that mirrors the disinterest inherent in
maritime law.23
After leaving her to languish in Proteus’s dungeon for seven months, a passage
denoted in the poem not only by narrative time but also by textual space—fourteen cantos
have passed from her initial imprisonment in III.viii until her release in IV.xii—Spenser
finally lays the groundwork for Florimell’s liberation. In the last two stanzas of Book IV,
Neptune’s Sea finally shifts from the mythological to the legal, demonstrating a
sophisticated engagement with maritime law. The marriage of the Medway and Thames,
which occupies the better part of canto 11, is among the most discussed episodes in all
Spenserian scholarship and does not warrant additional parsing here. Rather, what
interests me in cantos 11 and 12 is the legal language employed by Spenser: these cantos
witness an emerging jurisprudential sophistication that culminates in Book V. Canto 11
opens with a return to Florimell’s narrative: Spenser reminds the reader of her captivity.

In Chapter 1, I noted Richard T. Robol’s heuristic model of admiralty jurisdiction. This model
assumes that maritime law considers the policing of the sea in matters such as piracy and the
protection of seamen as a goal that serves an international, as opposed to mere national, purpose,
and that national courts sitting in admiralty remain sensitive to the needs of the international
community and are not driven by national interests alone. See Robol, “Admiralty's Adjudicatory
Jurisdiction over Alien Defendants: A Functional Analysis,” The Journal of Maritime Law and
Commerce 11.4 (1980), 395-452.
23
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Proteus’s unsuccessful wooing has led him to throw her “into a dongeon deepe and blind,
/ And there in chaynes her cruelly did bind, / In hope thereby her to his bent to draw”
(IV.xi.2). The dungeon represents another inaccessible ocean space, and for seven
months Florimell “Ne euer euening saw, ne mornings ray, / Ne euer from the day the
night descride, / But thought it all one night, that did no houres diuide” (IV.xi.4).
Meanwhile, Marinell has endured his own languishing incapacitation: still in Cymoent’s
bower, “he yet in languor lyes, / Ne can be cured of that cruell stroke / Which Britomart
him gaue, when he did her prouoke” (IV.xi.5). Marinell finally finds his condition
repaired when his mother enlists the aid of Tryphon, who applies a restorative salve.
The marriage of the Thames and Medway contains one moment of jurisdictional
tension that illustrates Marinell’s and Neptune’s respective domains. As the sea gods
gather in Proteus’s Hall, Marinell stands on the outside, “for he was halfe mortall, being
bred / Of mortall sire, though of immortall wombe, / He might not with immortall food be
fed, / Ne with th’eternall Gods to bancket come” (IV.xii.4). While this detail reveals
something about the metaphysical hierarchy of Faery Land, it also evinces the line that
separates Marinell from Neptune. While they both command a portion of the sea, the
nature of Neptune’s dominion reflects his nature itself: as a god, he enjoys omnipresence
over his waters, which stretch across unfathomable distances. Marinell, conversely, is a
mortal, and his territorial waters are defined by their limits both inward and outward. As
a result, Marinell cannot cross the tangible threshold that lies at the entrance to Proteus’s
Hall, just as he cannot cross the imperceptible line that separates his waters from
Neptune’s high seas. Thus, when he hears Florimell’s “lamentable voice” while pacing
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outside the hall, Marinell lacks the authority to rescue her, which sets in motion an
intricate legal process to secure her release.
This process begins with Florimell’s complaint in stanzas 6-11. This complaint
loosely mirrors Britomart’s in Book III: it begins with a general plea to the gods before
addressing Marinell directly, as Britomart begins her own with a general plea to the sea
and concludes with a direct appeal to Neptune. Florimell’s entreaty to Marinell outlines
her “wretched case” (IV.xii.8); both this language, as well as her shift from a supplication
to the gods to the request for intervention from an authoritative figure, signal to the reader
the movement from mythological to legal. She tells her betrothed “if that life ye vnto me
decree, / Then let mee liue, as louers ought to do, / And of my lifes deare loue beloued
be” (IV.xii.10). Stanzas 10 and 11 also reference judicial opinion as it relates to
Florimell’s release: “doom” and “judgement” further emphasize the legal nature of her
request. She explains further the futility in petitioning Proteus herself: “The whiles I him
condemne, and deeme his paine, / He where he list goes loose, and laughes at me”
(IV.xii.11). In effect, Florimell seeks an intervention from Marinell, but unlike her
metaphysical supplication to the gods, she couches her request to him in the language of
the law, the language with which he is most conversant, and the law which has the power
to release her.
Florimell’s complaint moves Marinell, who has hitherto resisted their union, to
seek her release in order to marry her. However, he finds himself at an impasse, and “for
griefe of minde he oft did grone, / And inly wish, that in his powre it weare / Her to
redresse: but since he meanes found none / He could no more but her great misery
bemone” (IV.xii.12). Marinell’s recognition that he lacks the jurisdictional authority to
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rescue Florimell himself vexes him, and his mind begins to consider the different courses
of action he can pursue to procure her release. Spenser’s description of Marinell’s
deliberation conjures the image of an admiralty lawyer pacing his office in Doctors’
Commons with a particularly recondite case before him, and the subsequent stanzas offer
a glimpse into Marinell’s method of decision-making. He first considers a measured
approach: “Some while he thought, by faire and humble wise / To Proteus selfe to sue for
her discharge” (IV.xii.14). Appealing to Proteus directly yet subserviently, in recognition
of his jurisdictional disadvantage, appears attractive to Marinell on its face; yet turning it
over in his mind, he changes course. Rescuing Florimell, however, remains his goal, and
within the same stanza he considers “with sword and targe / Her forth to fetch, and
Proteus to constraine: / But soone he gan such folly to forthinke againe” (IV.xii.14).
While implying that Marinell battles in equal parts his devotion to his mother and his
desire for Florimell, this stanza also reveals that Marinell is developing his legal
reasoning skills. The release of Florimell requires a carefully considered course and
Marinell’s impetuousness will impair his intent.
Marinell becomes increasingly absorbed in thought. “In this sad plight,” Spenser
tells us, “he walked here and there, / And romed round about the rocke in vaine, / As he
had lost him selfe, he wist not where” (IV.xii.17). When the feast of the sea gods ends,
Marinell is impelled to depart with Cymoent, leaving Florimell behind in Proteus’s
dungeon. Upon returning to her bower he succumbs to lovesickness, and Cymoent, who
thinks he is still suffering the effects of Britomart’s attack, grows rankled. She confronts
Tryphon, who claimed to have healed Marinell previously, and accuses him of fraud:
“Therefore to Tryphon she againe doth hast, / And him doth chyde as false and
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fraudulent, / That fayled the trust, which she in him had plast” (IV.xii.23). Tryphon
denies her accusations, telling her that Marinell suffers from a more recently inflicted
malady, and Cymoent learns on her journey home that love has caused her son’s latest
incapacitation. Marinell confesses to her his love for Florimell, and Cymoent “gan a fresh
to chafe, and grieve in euery uaine” (IV.xii.27). Critics have interpreted the MarinellCymoent dynamic as one of an overprotective mother and her discontented son, and the
text in canto 12 supports this conventional reading. However, in my variant
interpretation, the two assume the roles of lawyer and client. Because Marinell has been
rendered incapacitated, Cymoent must visit Neptune in his stead and advocate on behalf
of her son for the release of Florimell: she functions much in the same way as the
advocates of Doctors’ Common who represented their clients in the High Court of
Admiralty. In Marinell’s case, his incapacitation can be read as his jurisdictional limit: he
lacks the legal authority to appear in Neptune’s court, a prohibition that sharply delimits
his territorial waters from the rest of the ocean.
Spenser infuses the next five stanzas with the language of the law. Cymoent
appears before Neptune and makes “humble suit vnto his Maiestie” for her son’s life
(and, by extension, the release of Florimell) because a “cruell Tyrant [Proteus] had
presumpteouslie / By wicked doome condemn’d [Marinell], a wretched death to die”
(IV.xii.29). Neptune responds, “Daughter me seemes of double wrong ye plaine, / Gainst
one that hath both wronged you, and vs: / For death t’adward I ween’d did appertaine /
To none, but to the seas sole Soueraine” (IV.xii.30). In the next stanza, Cymoent pleads
her case, lending to the facts of the case a legally informed interpretation:
To whom she answered, Then it is by name
Proteus, that hath ordayn’d my sonne to die;
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For that a waift, the which by fortune came
Vpon your seas, he claym’d as propertie:
And yet nor his, nor his in equitie,
But yours the waift by high prerogatiue.
Therefore I humbly craue your Maiestie,
It to repleuie, and my sonne repriue:
So shall you by one gift saue all vs three aliue. (IV.xii.31).
Cymoent’s appeal showcases her ease with the legal aspects of the case. She appears not
so much as a distressed mother, but rather as a lawyer pleading for her client’s release
and employing the requisite knowledge of the law to achieve that end. In effect,
Cymoent’s argument reduces Florimell to property that Proteus has unlawfully pilfered
and that, due to his “high prerogative,” belongs rightfully to Neptune.24 While her speech
to the god of the sea assumes the tenor of deference, her tone could also represent the
performative language assumed in court, further signifying her allegorical transformation
into a legal professional.
Neptune grants Cymoent’s request without further deliberation. At this moment
we witness a verdict handed down at sea, a crucial piece of evidence when adducing the
poem’s attitude to maritime law. Neptune delivers his judgment and “streight his warrant
made, / Vnder the Sea-gods seale autenicall, / Commaunding Proteus straight t’enlarge
the mayd” (IV.xii.32). Cymoent delivers the warrant to Proteus, who “reading it with
inward loathfulnesse, / Was grieued to restore the pledge, he did possesse” (IV.xii.32).
For the first time in The Faerie Queene, we observe a maritime case from the
commission of a crime to its ensuant verdict and remedy. Acrasia’s Sea has witnessed
egregious infraction without legal intervention; Marinell’s Sea has witnessed legal
intervention without crime, at least within the frame of the poem. Only in Neptune’s Sea
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I address Florimell as property below, in the section on salvage.
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does the entire legal process unfurl. Neptune’s judgment, written and placed under his
imperial seal, approximates the codification of maritime law. In effect, Spenser has
established a lawless sea and then introduced the appropriate means by which to tame it:
binding written law, an elaborate juridical procedure, recognized jurisdictional
boundaries, and actors familiar with the innerworkings of this legal system.

V. BRACIDAS AND AMIDAS
From the chaos of Acrasia’a territorial waters, to Marinell’s jewel-encrusted
shore, to the deepest depths of the Neptunian ocean, Spenser takes the reader on a voyage
through the diverse jurisdictions of Faery Land’s seas. On this journey we witness
tempestuous chaos and its disastrous consequences: an ocean with no discernable law to
monitor maritime infraction. We see the sometimes-heated conflicts that result when two
jurisdictions clash, and we observe the emergence of an efficient method for remedying
offenses committed at sea. The Faerie Queene, of course, contains a fourth distinct ocean
space that witnesses legal unrest. After attending the nuptials of Marinell and Florimell in
the Castle on the Strand, Artegall sets off and comes upon Amidas and Bracidas, swords
drawn, on the cusp of a trial by battle. I have already given an account of this episode
above, but it is worth mentioning another detail about it in relation to the poem’s other
engagements with maritime law, one that adds an additional interpretive layer: the events
that lead to the brothers’ dispute occur outside of the narrative frame. This distinction
proves noteworthy, because the reader is left to consider the conflict and its sequence of
events based on testimony alone. The poem’s earlier oceanic infractions—Acrasia’s
meddling with free passage across her waters, Britomart’s unwitting attempt to encroach
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on Marinell’s jurisdiction, Proteus’s emboldened act of piracy—occur within the
narrative frame. Insofar as the reader trusts Spenser, the reader can also trust the veracity
of these moments. Cymoent’s appeal to Neptune begins to shift this narrative paradigm a
bit, because Neptune (ostensibly—Spenser does not make this explicit) himself does not
witness Florimell’s abduction or imprisonment, and he must make his judicial ruling
based on Cymoent’s account of it. However, the reader knows this account to be true
because they themselves have witnessed it. Conversely, the case of Amidas and Bracidas
depends solely on their interpretation of earlier events. This reliance on witnesses
introduces legal sophistication to Artegall’s judgment by adding testimony as a method
for addressing maritime conflict.
Artegall’s judgment on the strand remains one of the most curious episodes in all
of The Faerie Queene. The earliest synthesis of Amidas and Bracidas criticism occurred
in the 1932 Variorum Spenser edition of Book V.25 In the notes of this edition, the editors
drew upon Gough, Upton, and others to provide a rather straightforward legal explanation
of the episode, in which they focus on the issues of alluvion (citing the Digest as well as
references to Hugo Grotius) and wreck (deciphering the Elizabethan law of wreck and
determining that Artegall erred in his application of the law).26 The underlying analysis is
strong, but the commentary does not consider why Spenser chose alluvion, wreck, and
marine salvage as the issues dealt with on the strand, a central question to understanding
the episode. Edwin Greenlaw’s monograph Studies in Spenser’s Historical Allegory
(1932) attempts to put the Amidas/Bracidas affair into a more nuanced historical context.
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Edmund Spenser, The Faerie Queene Book Five, ed. Ray Heffner, in The Works of Edmund
Spenser: A Variorum Edition vol. 5 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1932).
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Heffner, 194-95.
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First admitting that the moment on the strand appears somewhat incidental, he argues that
it is rooted in historical reality: “But the incident is apparently founded on fact, since it
refers, I believe, to the story of Northumberland’s claim of treasure cast ashore in his
jurisdiction in 1560, and possibly also to his claiming of Mary on the ground that she had
landed in his territory.”27 In 1940, Herbert Nelson squarely dismissed Greenlaw’s
contention, showing among other things that Greenlaw had confused some basic facts of
the Northumberland incident. In addition, Nelson argued, the origins of Amidas and
Bracidas remain obscure: if the episode were based on an actual legal case, that case had
not yet been discovered. Alternatively, Nelson posits, the episode may be rooted in an
Irish folktale (now lost) or merely a hypothetical law case employed by Spenser to
illustrate matters of equity. This last hypothesis belongs to Nelson, who argues that a
strict application of the law in the case of the brothers would result in an injustice, and
that only by ignoring the law and applying equity would a desirable outcome occur.28
Scholarship in the decades after Greenlaw and Nelson attempted to place the
Bracidas-Amidas legal dispute in the larger context of Artegall’s quest for justice.
According to Fletcher, the episode conveys the sacredness of Artegall’s judgments:
although Philtera and Amidas harbor displeasure at Artegall’s ruling concerning the
coffer, they acknowledge the authority with which he makes it. Fletcher argues, “The
higher form of respect for such judgements seems to be adoration; right judgement is a

Edwin Greenlaw, Studies in Spenser’s Historical Allegory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,
1932), 141-42.
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Herbert B. Nelson, “Amidas v. Bracidas,” Modern Language Quarterly 1 (1940), 398-99. This
interpretation, that Artegall’s handling of the Amidas/Bracidas dispute illustrates the workings of
equity, seems to be the one most commonly favored by critics.
28

172

kind of miracle.”29 Dunseath, like Nelson, interprets the episode as a moment of equity
and argues that in the canto Artegall shifts from a judge of criminal cases, such as
homicide and theft, to equity; in this shift “he assumes the role of a civilian.”30 Dunseath
also claims that the Amidas/Philtera, Bracidas/Lucy pairings, along with the comparable
pairings of Artegall/Britomart, Florimell/Marinell, and Bourbon/Flourelis, further
elaborate on Spenser’s investigation, woven throughout Books III and IV, of the
dialectics of love.31 Russell Meyer argues that the episode requires Artegall to possess
knowledge of international law, namely, the law of the sea.32 More recent scholarship on
Amidas and Bracidas usually reflects the critical interests of the scholar in question and
imposes an interpretive schema to match these interests. Mary Bowman, for example,
reads the episode in light of her larger thesis about Book V, namely, that Artegall’s role
can usefully be understood through the lens of gender. Consequently, she interprets the
episode as illustrative of “an elision of women’s agency and a tendency to treat women as
property.”33 Sean Kane reads the episode as the “recognition of the rights and claims of
others” and notes the “balance of the situation—even the symmetry of the Roman names
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Dunseath, 124. “Civilian” in this context does not denote a practitioner of civil law, but rather
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M. Pauline Parker’s treatment of equity in The Allegory of The Faerie Queene (Oxford: Oxford
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and the fact that the two men, like all men, are brothers—is testimony to the power of
rational justice that permits the self to identify with others beyond the sphere of physical
appearances.”34 Andrew Zurcher has adopted a more legally nuanced position, correctly
identifying the two main legal issues present in the episode as alluvion and wreck: he
states the former belongs to the civil law, the latter, the common law.35
My reading of Artegall’s intervention on the strand rests on three interpretative
points. The first posits that Artegall is the allegorical depiction of the common law of
England. The second considers the specific legal issues that Spenser included—alluvion
and accretion, wreck, and marine salvage—and the relationship between these issues and
English common law. Finally, my analysis considers the episode against the backdrop of
the poem’s larger treatment of maritime jurisdiction. Using these three points in tandem,
my reading demonstrates that the Amidas/Bracidas episode reveals an alternative
understanding of Spenser’s attitude toward the common law, insofar as it relates to
admiralty jurisdiction.
Parsing Artegall’s allegorical function in Book V lies at the center of the
episode’s messaging. As scholars have noted, Book V resumes the familiar pattern
established in Books I and II: a single knight, with a single mission, sets out on a clearly
delineated quest. Along the way, he is met by various trials and travails that attempt to
separate him from his resolve. Eventually, the knight prevails and successfully fulfills his
quest, aided in part by houses of instruction: the House of Holiness, Alma’s Castle, and
the Temple of Isis. Books III and IV deviate from this basic formula, although Book III
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Sean Kane, Spenser’s Moral Allegory (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 153.
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Zurcher, 144-45. I disagree slightly: although alluvion has its origins in Roman law, the
common law had developed its own method for remedying the issue.
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retains the device of the single knight.36 Because Artegall correlates to Redcrosse,
Guyon, and Britomart in this structural setup, the reader is invited to find an allegorical
meaning in him which transcends his simple narrative function.37 While it is easy to read
Redcrosse, Guyon, Britomart, and Artegall as embodiments of the moral virtues of their
respective books, with Artegall representing Holiness, Guyon representing Temperance,
and so on, this interpretation adopts a simplicity that betrays Spenser’s allegorical
sophistication. Nevertheless, scholars have reached quasi-consensus on the meaning of
the poem’s more central characters and episodes. Nohrnberg, unsurprisingly, associates
Redcrosse with several figures, including Adam, Moses, the Church, Everyman, and
Theseus.38 On a more intertextual level, Redcrosse’s mission to defeat the Dragon and
free Una’s parents invites us to view him as a representation of Saint George; his battles
with Despair and the False Una construct him as an errant, and then reformed, Christian.
Guyon, the knight of temperance, like Redcrosse, “is fragmented, and his qualities,
impulses, and states of mind are personified to provide a moral analysis of the action as it
proceeds.”39 Of the poem’s heroes, argues Maurice Evans, Guyon has provided critics the
greatest difficulty in interpretation.40 His story has been alternatively read as a
microcosmic retelling of the Iliad and Odyssey (Hamilton); the figure of the Christian
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Indeed, nearly every character, event, and place in The Faerie Queene contains an allegorical
element. However, the allegorism of Redcrosse, Guyon, Britomart, and Artegall form the
lynchpin of the poem, both structurally and thematically.
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James Nohrnberg, The Analogy of The Faerie Queene (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
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warrior (Heale); and temperance itself (Meyer).41 For her part, Britomart has been read as
the female counterpart of Arthur as well as Queen Elizabeth. The larger point is that
Artegall, like the poem’s other heroes, does not represent only one figure or ideal. As a
result, I do not allege that my reading of him as the common law is authoritative, but
rather one piece of the kaleidoscopic allegory.
Based on these various interpretations, I believe that Artegall is the allegorical
representation of the English common law.42 At the crux of this conclusion rests
Britomart’s dynastic betrothal to Artegall. If Britomart represents the destiny of Britain
and Artegall represents an evolving legal sophistication, then their impending nuptials
may herald the development of the common law in the incipient English nation.43 When
Britomart sees Artegall for the first time in Merlin’s mirror, “By straunge occasion she
did him behold, / And much more straungely gan to loue his sight” (III.ii.18). This love
induces the female warrior to undertake a quest for the Knight of Justice that spans three
books. The pair finally meet at the end of Book V, when Britomart beheads Radigund
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Meyer further notes that Redcrosse must learn how to be holy; conversely, Guyon symbolizes
temperance from the beginning of Book II. In this sense, Artegall more closely resembles
Redcrosse than Guyon, as he goes through multiple moments of erudition, e.g., with Astraea and
at the Temple of Isis.
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When ascribing a form of law to Book V, some critics, e.g. Dunseath, have identified natural
law. This is not surprising, given the importance of natural law theory to the early modern
intellectual mind. However, I argue that Spenser included enough details of specific legal issues
to invite a more legal (rather than philosophical) interpretation. However, the relationship
between natural law and common law in Book V remains a rich site of potential scholarship. For
a discussion of the theoretical relationship between the common law and natural law, see Richard
O’Sullivan, “Natural Law and Common Law,” Transactions of the Grotius Society 31 (1945),
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Robin E. Bates notes the appeal of the common law to the people of England: “Because it
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and releases Artegall and the other captives. Andrew Fichter argues “Artegall is the
perfect complement to Britomart, which means in part that he is as limited in his way as
she is in hers at corresponding points in their respective evolutions.”44 In other words,
they require each other to fulfill their respective quests. Fichter adds, “Ultimately the
reconciliation of Britomart and Artegall will require the establishment of a kind of
feminine ascendancy that paradoxically does not emasculate.”45 Within the poem, the
complementary qualities of femininity and masculinity that characterize Britomart and
Artegall—even when these qualities are transposed, as with Britomart’s victorious duel
against Marinell—reflect the symbiotic relationship between English monarch and
English law. Spenser makes Britomart’s allegorical function more explicit than
Artegall’s: her name, as well as Merlin’s explanation of her lineage, quashes any doubt.
Spenser leaves more ambiguity surrounding Artegall. By the sixteenth century, however,
the common law had become synonymous with the English state, and humanist attempts
to supplant it with a universalizing European civil law never gained purchase. If
Britomart’s allegorical corollary provides Faery Land with legal order, then there can be
little doubt this law is English, and common, in nature.
The deliberate inclusion of alluvion and accretion, marine salvage, and wreck
provides the second point of interpretation. Alluvion and accretion offers perhaps the
most intriguing of the three, because they are rooted in Roman law and concern the
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movement of land via water.46 In the case of Bracidas and Amidas, this movement has
deprived Bracidas of a portion of his island. In effect, the sea has seized his land and
granted it to his brother. Although alluvion and accretion find their roots in Roman law,
their insertion in Book V signals the centrality of land law to the common law. One of the
most important legal actions in the first centuries of the common law’s development, the
assize of novel disseisin, demonstrates the land’s significance. In effect, this action
provided a remedy for a landowner who had recently been seized of land. The action
aimed to thwart a resort to self-help measures to reclaim the land in question, for
example, the landowner’s enlistment of friends and neighbors to forcibly eject the
offending party. The action proved popular, and as a result, English landowners viewed
ownership of land as the foundation from which all other legal rights flowed. Legal
historian Donald W. Sutherland notes, “To generations of freeholding Englishmen [novel
disseisin] was largely synonymous with security under law. The rights that protected
property in lands and tenements were the most important in the world for medieval
men.”47 Legally, alluvion and accretion bear only a tangential relationship to the assize of
novel disseisin, but the general principle of the loss of land links the two concepts. It
appears deliberate that Spenser inserted a legal problem originating in Roman law that
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Accretion refers to the movement of the water; alluvion refers to the subsequent movement and
redepositing of the land and is distinct from the similar concept of avulsion. Legal historian
Joseph L. Sax writes, “The accretion/avulsion distinction embodies one of the baffling riddles of
property law. Unfortunately, it cannot be dismissed as a mere artifact of antiquarian interest. The
rule has serious contemporary relevance, for it determines ownership and use of our shorelines.
The law provides that when the water’s edge shifts ‘gradually and imperceptibly’ (accretion), the
property boundary moves with it. But where the shift is ‘sudden or violent’ (avulsion), the
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Future Proposed,” Tulane Environmental Law Journal 23.2 (2010), 305-68. Alluvion and
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also touched a fundamental aspect of the common law. In addition, the movement of land
inherent in alluvion and accretion also holds the power to shift jurisdictions: within Faery
Land, alluvion and accretion transform the sea into land, and the land into the sea.
Naturally, this in turn affects jurisdiction: a space that has been hitherto under the
purview of maritime law now finds itself beholden to the national law of Faery Land, and
vice versa. Because it affects both land ownership and admiralty jurisdiction, alluvion
provides a productive framing of the entire Amidas/Bracidas episode: its concern with the
ownership of land definitively links the brothers’ dispute with English common law,
while its interest in the shifting of jurisdictions alludes to the reciprocal relationship
between admiralty and common law.
Wreck and marine salvage constitute the episode’s other legal issues. The legal
history of these matters lies far outside the scope of this chapter; indeed, the evolution of
the English position on the matter has proven difficult for even legal historians to trace.
John J. Kenny and Ronald R. Hrusoff note the different reasons for this obstacle as it
relates to wreck:
First, there are relatively few cases on the subject, and one is consequently thrown
back on such authorities as Bracton, Coke, and Blackstone—who are often in
disagreement. Moreover, the cases and other authorities are concerned almost
exclusively with property resulting from shipwreck—and particularly with wreck,
which forms only a small part of such property. Finally, though the law of
treasure trove developed separately from that governing property recovered from
the sea and has its own distinct principles, there has been some interaction
between these two areas, the exact nature of which is not easy to ascertain.48

Kenny and Hrusoff, “The Ownership of the Treasures of the Sea,” William and Mary Law
Review 9 (1967), 383-401 (384). Kenny and Hrusoff point to an additional problem: “Another
difficulty stems from the fact that terms such as ‘wreck’ are often used imprecisely. Thus ‘wreck’
is sometimes used in its strict sense, to mean property lost at sea which has come to shore, and
sometimes is loosely used to include flotsam, jetsam, and ligan” (384n.4).
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Traditionally, note Kenny and Hrusoff, the national law of England maintained that
unclaimed goods washed ashore belonged to the sovereign. In the early thirteenth
century, the King’s ownership of treasure that resulted from shipwreck had already been
established, and Henry de Bracton argued that the law of nations had displaced natural
law (which held abandoned goods belonged to the finder) in such cases:
Things which are considered derelict are also said to be the goods of no one.
Things such as treasure are likewise said to belong to no one due to the passage of
time. This is also the case when the owner of a thing does not appear, as with
wreck of the sea … and things which formerly belonged to the finder by natural
law are now the property of the sovereign by the law of nations.49
The Black Book of the Admiralty also addressed the issue and held that those who had
goods lost in a wreck had a year and a day to claim the spoils: “Item, lett inquiry be made
about all those whoe suffer wrecke of any shipp or boate perished upon the sea
whereabout man, cocke, dogg, or catt doth escape alive, and the owner thereof, or of all
the goods which were therein, come within a yeare and a day to challenge the ship or
goods.”50 Given the multifarious jurisprudential opinions on wreck and marine salvage in
England across the centuries, I will not attempt to relitigate Artegall’s judgment on the
strand. The larger point is that legally, wreck and marine salvage represent complex
issues with competing interests.
Neither alluvion and accretion nor salvage present strictly maritime issues. Most
instances of accretion occur on rivers.51 In the same way, salvage can involve both ocean
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and land, and its developmental relationship to treasure trove, however poorly
understood, precludes the legal problems it presents as arising only at sea. This is key:
Spenser could have just as easily staged the conflict between Amidas and Bracidas on a
river and lost nothing of its narrative force, nor would he have sacrificed the larger points
it illustrates about equity. The two brothers could have lived on opposite banks; Philtera’s
dowry could have traveled with the river waters and become embedded on Bracidas’
shore, constituting treasure trove. Thus, it is not only significant that Spenser chose
alluvion and salvage as the legal issues to feature, but that he chose to adjudicate them on
the seacoast. This setting invites the reader to view Artegall as sitting in admiralty, and
we are invited to consider more than just his application of equity when interpreting the
episode. This aspect of the brothers’ narrative is also key: it is not only the case itself that
is significant, but also who adjudicates it.
The development of maritime law across The Faerie Queene demonstrates that
the law of the sea requires effective judges. Acrasia’s Sea succumbs to chaos because no
such judge is present, and Acrasia herself is unwilling to police her waters. But of course
Spenser does not allow the poem’s oceans to remain in disorder. In Book III, Marinell
emerges as the arbitrator of his coast, and in Book IV Neptune remedies infractions
committed on the high seas. By the time, then, that Artegall arrives on the scene and
hears the brothers’ dispute in Book V, the poem has offered two figures who are
ostensibly better suited to decide an admiralty case. This is particularly true since Spenser
has emphasized the maritime nature of the dispute at hand, and the judgment itself occurs
on the coast. The reader must then ask: why Artegall? Marinell appears to have
jurisdiction over the strand of Faery Land: his duel with Britomart in Book III establishes
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this point. Similarly, Philtera’s wreck and Lucy’s seizing of the dowry chest occur in the
sea itself, the undisputed domain of Neptune. Based on the precedent set earlier in the
poem, either Marinell or Neptune appear to be the appropriate judicial figures to settle
Book V’s fraternal squabble. As with the legal issues presented, having either of them
judge the case would not muddy the issue of equity: Spenser could just as easily illustrate
his underlying point if Neptune or Marinell acted in Artegall’s stead. Here the allegorical
readings of all three figures become crucial to understanding the episode: Marinell as the
Lord Admiral; Neptune as the international law of the sea; and Artegall as the common
law. Three entities have the authority to hear the brothers’ case, and Spenser chooses the
one with the most tenuous relationship to admiralty jurisdiction.
Considering the legal historical context in which Spenser wrote brings the
meaning of the episode on the strand into focus. The increasing tension between the
common law and the High Court of Admiralty over the appropriate arbitrator of certain
maritime causes and the proper extent of the Lord Admiral’s jurisdiction informs
Artegall’s intervention and, more significantly, signals Spenser’s attitude toward the
issue. In matters in which both the admiralty and the common law of England can claim
the authority to hear a case, The Faerie Queene suggests that the common law should
prevail. This revelation uncovers more than just the poem’s framing of maritime law. It
also invites us to rethink Spenser’s own attitudes toward the relationship between civil
law and common law in sixteenth-century England. I am not prepared to argue that the
poem advocates unequivocally for the common law: on the contrary, Marinell’s
association with the Lord Admiral and Neptune’s disinterested judgment on the high seas
show that many maritime causes could not be dealt with effectively by the national law of
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Faery Land (or England). In addition, Spenser’s poem does not exist in a textual vacuum,
and his other writings reveal his apparent affinity for the civil law. But The Faerie
Queene demonstrates that this preference was not absolute. The poem’s ever-evolving
attitude toward the law of the sea ends on the strand, and its final maritime judgment is
not delivered by an admiralty judge, but rather a common law judge sitting in admiralty,
stepping for a moment outside his usual purview. In the cosmos of Faery Land, this shift
remains possible, and believable: the law of the land spilling out a little into the sea does
not disrupt the legal order, nor does it impede Artegall on his quest for justice. In a
similar fashion, Spenser seems to be hinting that the common law’s adjudicatory power
over certain marine causes will not disturb the delicate balance of English legal authority.

VI. CONCLUSION
Although not classified as primarily a poem of the sea, The Faerie Queene’s
engagement with the ocean informs the narrative at almost every turn. Maritime space
transports characters on critical quests; links narratives across books; sunders then
reunites central figures. This exchange with the sea, however, transcends the poetic and
the narrative. It also positions the sea as a legal space, one in which law and order prove
necessary to quiet tempestuous ocean waves and transgressive protean impulses. The
evolution of maritime law in the poem follows a neat, easily traceable path—sometimes
eschewing historical reality, but providing the reader with a primer on the importance of
order at sea. To argue that Spenser wrote the poem’s oceans with an explicitly didactic
mission may be overstating his intention—or not. The evidence is inconclusive. But he
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does provide enough clues in relation to the Amidas/Bracidas episode to deduce its
commentary on a contemporary legal debate.
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CHAPTER 4
ROUND ABOUT THE GLOBE:
SPENSER, DRAYTON, AND THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1603, the Dutch East India Company captured a Portuguese cargo ship, Santa
Catarina, in the Straits of Singapore and returned with it to the Netherlands. In response,
Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius anonymously penned Mare liberum (1609), which argued for
free seas. Two English lawyers offered responses to Grotius: William Welwood in An
Abridgement of all Sea-Lawes (1613) and John Selden in Mare clausum (1635). Both
men argued for closed seas and asserted England’s dominion over its territorial waters.
These works remain a linchpin in our current understanding of the early modern law of
the sea and seventeenth-century conceptions of ocean space.
The central premise of this dissertation argues that all human-ocean interactions
of the early modern period were mediated by some form of law, whether maritime law,
customary law, international law, or an admixture of the three. Additionally, it contends
that a nuanced understanding of these legal conceptions of the ocean is essential to
developing a cultural understanding of the early modern sea. The preceding chapter
considered Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene in relation to the early modern English
admiralty jurisdiction debates and the evolution of maritime law in Europe. This chapter
continues an analysis of Spenser’s allegory but moves away from the domestic debates
and toward debates involving the international law of the sea. It also includes Michael
Drayton’s long chorographical poem Poly-Olbion (1612, 1622) into its analysis, as
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Drayton wrote in Spenser’s wake, and while his poem remains indebted to it predecessor,
it also fundamentally reorients readers’ perception of the ocean.
I begin the chapter with a brief exposition of the legal and historical context of the
question of freedom of the seas and the debate between Hugo Grotius (who argued for
mare liberum) and William Welwood and John Selden (who argued for mare clausum).
This section does not focus on the strict legal principles of open seas and closed seas;
rather, I show how these writers, through their conceptions of the ocean, defended these
principles. The second part of the chapter uses these oceanic conceptions as a tool of
literary interpretation. I analyze two moments in each poem: in The Faerie Queene, I
consider Guyon’s voyage to the Bower of Bliss (Book II) and the evolution of the
character of Neptune (Books II, III, and IV). In Poly-Olbion, I ponder the catalog of
English voyagers (Song 19) and the nymphs’ song in honor of Neptune (Song 20).
Through a close reading of these moments, I extract general principles that reflect the
authors’ cultural understandings of the ocean. Ultimately, this chapter argues that the
oceans of The Faerie Queene align with the features of the Seldenian sea, while the
oceans of Poly-Olbion replicate the Grotian sea, and I conclude with a brief discussion of
how such an approach can further develop the current literary and cultural understanding
of early modern maritime space.
I do not suggest a one-to-one correspondence between legal arguments about the
freedom of the seas and The Faerie Queene or Poly-Olbion, or that the poets composed
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their poems with any deliberate allusions to the legal debate itself.1 In the first place,
Spenser died ten years before the debate’s inception, and the first part of Poly-Olbion was
published just three years after the appearance of Grotius’ pamphlet; the publication of
the poem’s second part in 1622 preceded Selden’s Mare clausum by thirteen years.
Additionally, even if Drayton were aware of the debate—which is very likely, given both
his acquaintance with John Selden and the political gravity of the matter—he left no
explicit reference to it in his poem.2 Rather, this chapter links the legal with the literary in
a more abstract, and theoretical, fashion, and foregrounds certain cultural assumptions
about the sea in the early modern period.

II. LEGAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The concept of mare liberum has its roots in antiquity.3 Under Roman law, at least
in theory, the sea remained open to all: it was considered res communis omnium, a thing
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In this sense, I deviate from recent work on the subject. Sandra Logan, for example, argues that
Drayton composed certain passages in Part I of Poly-Olbion as a deliberate engagement with
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different type of analysis in this chapter. In addition, whereas Logan focuses on Part 1 of the
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187

belonging to no one.4 And yet, for the Romans, the international law of the sea remained
limited mostly to the Mediterranean. It would be over a millennium before Magellan and
Drake launched their global circumnavigations, and the seventeenth-century debates
reflected the law catching up with the political, navigational, and geographic realities of
the early modern period. In the Middle Ages, the general attitude of jurists had tended
toward mare liberum, in both theory and practice. During the sixteenth century, a number
of jurists, most notably Alphonso de Castro and Fernando Vasquez of Spain, returned to
the question in light of expanding navigational and technological advances, but although
they argued for free seas, they did so via an appeal to earlier Roman sources: their
writings did not advance the nature of the debate.
This turn occurred when Grotius published his Mare liberum anonymously in
1609.5 The work was most likely written between 1604 and 1605, a period during which
Grotius had been retained as legal counsel for the Dutch East India Company. Grotius’
treatise was short and originally intended as a chapter in a longer work that was not
published during Grotius’ lifetime. Much of Mare liberum remained political and
explicitly addressed the conflict with the Portuguese, who were attempting to monopolize
trade routes to the East Indies, rather than arguing for mare liberum in a more general
sense. Although he does not offer credit, Grotius borrowed a considerable portion of
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For a discussion of the concept of mare liberum in Roman law and its impact on the early
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Mare liberum from Italian-born lawyer Alberico Gentili.6 Gentili, who argued for open
seas in his De iure belli libri tres (1598), resolved a common problem with the concept.7
The high seas, even if free, required a certain degree of policing: the crime of piracy
represented a major diplomatic threat during the sixteenth century, and it behooved
governments to deal with the infraction as expeditiously as possible.8 Gentili’s solution
was to separate the concept of possession of the high seas from its jurisdiction, so that
states could still punish pirates without claiming ownership of the sea. In 1625, Grotius
published a more mature work, De jure belli ac pacis, which fully developed his theory
of mare liberum.
In 1613, lawyer William Welwood provided an unofficial English response to
Grotius, which appeared as a chapter in his longer work An Abridgement of All SeaLawes, entitled “Of the Community and Propriety of the Seas.”9 Welwood’s rebuttal
adopted a theological tenor: he averred that God had granted man dominion over the
world, and that thus the sea was indeed capable of possession. Welwood also observed
the precariousness of fishing reserves, noting that during the preceding twenty years the
herring population off the eastern coast of Scotland had diminished dramatically. In 1615,

For more on Gentili’s influence on Grotius and their shared importance to modern international
law, see K. R. Simmonds, “Hugo Grotius and Alberico Gentili,” German Yearbook of
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See Chapter 1 for more on Welwood’s Abridgement. Two important non-English responses to
Mare liberum also followed: Franciscus Seraphin de Freitas’ De iusto imperio Lusitanorum
asiatico (1625) and Joannis de Solorzano Pereira’s Disputationem de indiarum (1629). See C. H.
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Welwood translated and expanded this chapter in his De dominio maris in order to reach
a wider Continental audience that included Grotius, who could not read English.10
Grotius’ treatise, although expressly directed toward the Portuguese, alarmed
James I, who issued “A Proclamation touching Fishing” in 1609 in response.11 By 1619,
James had grown increasingly vexed by international maritime affairs and sought legal
guidance from lawyer John Selden, who offered the king a draft of Mare clausum by
summer of that year. However, this draft remained unpublished, most likely because
James did not wish to spur a dispute with Denmark, whose claims to the North Sea
conflicted with Selden’s drawing of English territorial waters. When Charles I assumed
the throne in 1625, he was initially consumed by war with Spain and France, but the next
decade aroused his maritime concerns and in 1635 he asked Selden to rewrite Mare
clausum to assert English sovereignty over the North Sea, a space on which the Dutch,
according to the English, were encroaching.12 The book, divided into two parts—the first

See J.D. Alsop, “William Welwood, Anne of Denmark and the Sovereignty of the Sea,” The
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directly rebutted Grotius’ arguments for mare liberum, while the second demarcated
England’s territorial waters—reached the printing press later that year; readers would
have to wait until 1652 to read the work in an English translation.13 Selden’s Mare
clausum remained unparalleled in seventeenth-century English legal literature in its
engagement with earlier writers on the question of free seas, both classical and medieval,
and he frequently used Grotius’ sources to make the opposite argument. He also
displayed extensive knowledge of early English legal history and the history of the
English admiralty. Ultimately—and improbably—Selden argued that English national
waters stretched southward from the western coast of Ireland to the northern coast of
Spain, eastward to the German sea, and northward to the limits of habitable space.14 Of
the three treatises considered, only Selden’s included maps (fig. 4.1), which demonstrate,
visually, the possibility of containing the sea.
Grotius never responded to Selden’s Mare clausum. By the 1630s he had
renounced his Dutch citizenship and found refuge in Sweden, where his legal
representation of Queen Christina effectively rendered his continued defense of the
principle of mare liberum politically untenable: Swedish claims to the Baltic Sea
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conflicted with those of the Netherlands, and Grotius could not risk arousing his client’s
ire.

III. LEGAL CONCEPTIONS OF THE SEA
Grotius’ Mare liberum and Selden’s Mare clausum approach their subject from
different methodological and political directions: Pitman Potter notes that “the works of
Grotius and Selden and their coadjutors were products of personal and national desires
rather than works of pure and unbiased juristic science.”15 But if we step back and
analyze their attitudes toward the ocean itself, we find that the Grotian and Seldenian
conceptions of the sea contain certain features that can be uncoupled and distilled to form
an interpretive literary lens. This lens, in turn, provides a more nuanced understanding of
Spenser’s and Drayton’s depictions of oceans.
Both Grotius and Selden appealed to natural law in their treatises, and yet they
employed different techniques in their arguments. For Grotius, natural law in relation to
the sea could be extracted from an observation of the physical nature of the ocean itself: it
contained certain qualities which precluded the possibility of its possession. For Selden,
this natural law rested in the long history of human-ocean interaction, and he used four
types of authority—classical, biblical, patristic, and rabbinic—to demonstrate this
reciprocity. And, of course, he held that these interactions involved an element of human
dominion.
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Grotius’ main argument, that the high sea cannot be possessed, can be reduced to
two key observations about the nature of maritime space: first, its vastness and
unsuitability for permanent human occupation; and second, the inexhaustibility of its
main resource, navigation. Grotius, as the Romans had done before him, equated the sea
with the air, “seeing the sea is incomprehensible, no less than the air, it can be added to
the goods of no nation.”16 In his De jure ac pacis, Grotius even goes so far as to defend
taking water from the ocean.17 On navigation, he countered the assertion that the first
country to traverse a part of the ocean could consequently claim possession: “But if they
call this possession, that they have sailed before others and after a sort opened the way,
what could be more ridiculous? For seeing there is no part of the sea into the which
someone hath not entered first, it will follow that all navigation was possessed of some”
(34). This argument has particular resonance when directed at the Portuguese: Magellan
had crossed the Pacific Ocean almost a hundred years earlier, and no one would argue in
good faith that the Portuguese could claim dominion over such a vast space. Grotius
declares that “neither people nor any private man can have any property in the sea […]
seeing neither the consideration of public use nor nature permitted occupation” (32). In
other words, while humans can enter the sea for purposes of fishing and navigation, they
cannot live in the sea, at least in the same way they can live on land, and because
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ownership remains intrinsically tied to the concept of occupation, the ocean as
uninhabitable space in turn precludes it from ownership.18
Selden’s Mare clausum is a long work, around five-hundred printed pages, and it
more closely resembles Grotius’ De jure belli ac pacis than his Mare liberum. He only
devotes three chapters to rebutting the arguments put forth in Chapter 5 of Grotius’ 1609
treatise: in the first (Chapter 20), he counters Grotius’ claim that possession of the sea
necessarily precludes freedom of navigation; in the second (Chapter 21), he dismisses
Mare liberum’s contention that the continual motion of ocean waters renders its
ownership impossible; and in the third (Chapter 22), he refutes the assertion that the sea
remains impervious to fixed boundaries, a prerequisite of ownership, as well as the notion
that the sea’s inexhaustibility shields it from possession. Selden asks, “What is this
[freedom of passage] to the dominion of a thing, through which Merchants and Strangers
are to pass? Such a freedom of Passage would no more derogate from it […] then the
allowing of an open waie for the driving of Cattel, or Cart, or passing through upon a
journie.”19 According to Selden, navigation and commerce were free so long as they did
not impinge on oceanic dominion. Regarding the alleged mutability of the sea, Selden
asks “are not Rivers and Fountains much more in a perpetual Flux or motion? Rivers
always run forward, wherewith the Sea being compared, it seem’s to stand immovable”
(127). And yet, Selden notes, these rivers can be subject to private ownership and
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dominion in spite of their inconstancy. In the next chapter, Selden attacks the argument
that oceans cannot be realistically demarcated and points to advancements in cartography
that rendered oceanic boundaries more tenable, as well as the ways different authorities
had addressed this jurisdictional quandary.20 Finally, he argues that a seemingly infinite
supply of resources has no bearing on a thing’s possessibility. Here he uses the example
of a candle, which if used to light a plentitude of additional candles, does not cease to be
the possession of its owner.
In summary, the oceans presented in these legal treatises can be reduced to the
following qualities: the Grotian sea is infinite, boundless, continually in flux, unsuitable
for permanent human occupation, and inexhaustible for purposes of navigation; the
Seldenian sea is relatively stagnant, open for navigation only insofar as dominion is not
affected, capable of definite boundaries that stretch far beyond the shore. In addition, the
inexhaustibility of its resources does not impact its potential for possession.

IV. THE OCEANS OF THE FAERIE QUEENE AND POLY-OLBION
I will now shift my focus from the legal to the literary and discuss four moments
in Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene and Michael Drayton’s Poly-Olbion. Why put
these poems in conversation with the question of open seas? I contend that, despite
certain similarities on a superficial level, the poems’ depictions of the ocean rest at two
ends of a spectrum, and that the legal rhetoric employed by Grotius and Selden provides a
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useful theoretical tool for conceptualizing this spectrum. And although both The Faerie
Queene and Poly-Olbion contain poetic depictions of the sea, their constructions of these
aquatic spaces diverge significantly: while Spenser uses narrative as his primary
constructive tool, Drayton builds the seas of Poly-Olbion with language. To put it bluntly,
not much happens in Poly-Olbion’s seas. Intriguingly, this loosely parallels the writings
of Selden and Grotius: Selden develops a sustained historical narrative to build his
defense, while Grotius uses the language of natural law to defend the freedom of the seas.
Another important difference between the poems involves their unity: despite its
abundance of seemingly disparate episodes, The Faerie Queene is most usefully
considered as a complete entity. Conversely, Poly-Olbion consists of truly independent
histories, myths, and legends, linked only by their geographic trajectory and poetic style.
Ultimately, my attendant readings demonstrate that the opposing conceptions of maritime
space central to the legal debates can be located in the period’s poetry as well, and that
Spenser and Drayton each assemble their oceans with a conscious investment in
explicating the nature of the early modern sea.
In the preceding chapter, I provided an account of the progression of Spenser’s
depictions of the ocean in The Faerie Queene. This exercise demonstrates the poem’s
clearly defined maritime motion: Spenser’s allegory begins removed from the sea in
Book I, enters it during the voyage of Guyon in Book II, descends outward and
downward through Proteus’ kidnapping of Florimell in Books III and IV, arrives back at
the shore for both the nuptials of Marinell and Florimell and Artegall’s episode of
adjudication of the brothers’ dispute in Book V, and retreats completely to land in
pastoralized Book VI. In addition, the entire poem can be viewed as a ship, with the
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reader as passenger: the final stanza of Book I notes, “Now strike your sailes yee iolly
Mariners, / For we be come vnto a quiet rode, / Where we must land some of our
passengers, / And light this weary vessell of her lode” (I.xii.42). Having dropped off the
characters of Book I—Una, Red Crosse, and Archimago—the ship leaves the port and we
now journey to the quest of Guyon in Book II. Appropriately enough, the poem’s
subsequent engagements with the ocean occur with the reader looking on from a freshly
rigged sailing vessel.
Within this trajectory, Guyon’s journey to the Bower of Bliss represents The
Faerie Queene’s most sustained engagement with the ocean and is thus a natural point to
enter analysis of the poem in the context of free seas. In his quest to destroy Acrasia’s
bower, Guyon must first undertake a perilous journey across the sea during which he is
bombarded by various assailments. Critics have long noted that Spenser modeled this
episode on Book I2 of Homer’s Odyssey, but, as A.C. Hamilton notes, “While Ulysses
endures four dangers (the Sirens, the Wandering Rocks, the two rocks of Scylla and
Charybdis, and the island of Thrinacie), Guyon endures twelve, and these are designed to
exhaust all possible dangers and combination of dangers on sea, land, and in the air.”21
Hamilton argues that the deliberate effusiveness with which the episode is composed
lends to it an element of humor. Guyon’s dangers, Hamilton notes, never present him any
real threat, unlike those of Ulysses: whereas Ulysses loses all his companions on the
journey, the Palmer and Boatman emerge intact. Spenser also modeled this episode on
the journey of Ubaldo to the Isle of Armida in Tasso’s Gerusalemme liberate. Because
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the outcome of Guyon’s voyage is predetermined, the attendant dangers in the episode
lose some of their edge. The payoff, however, allows the reader to ponder more leisurely
the character of Acrasia’s Sea.
The voyage to the Bower of Bliss begins in a state of relative tranquility.
Following his visit to the House of Alma in the preceding canto, at which Guyon recovers
his strength after his faint in Mammon’s Cave, he undertakes his journey: “Two dayes in
that sea he sayled has, / ne euer land beheld, ne liuing wight” (II.xii.2). This respite—not
only on his journey to Acrasia’s dwelling, but also in the larger context of Book II—
makes the distress of his impending nautical obstacles when he crosses the threshold of
the high seas into Acrasia’s territorial waters even more daunting. He encounters the Gulf
of Greediness early, in stanza 3, which sucks into its “devouring jawes” (II.xii.4) ships
that sail too close. Next, Guyon and his crew sail past the Rock of Vile Reproach, “a
dangerous and detestable place” (II.xii.8), that repels most types of fish and birds; only
cormorants and seagulls dare to approach it. The Palmer tells the other passengers the
Rock’s destructive powers flow from “lusfull luxurie and thriftlesse wast” (II.xii.9). The
Wandering Islands come next, transitory plots of land that lull passersby into a sense of
false security: once on land, they “wandreth ever more uncertain and unsure” (II.xii.12).
After a seductive sighting of Phaedria, the enchantress first introduced in canto 6,
Guyon’s boat floats by the Quicksand of Unthriftyhed, which wrecks unsuspecting
vessels in its entrails. Once mired in the sand, mariners find “neither toyle nor traveill”
(II.xii.19) might recover their ships. The Whirlpool of Decay that sucks in ships follows,
and then a tempest: “the waves come rolling, and the billowes rore” (II.xii.22) and “huge
sea monsters abound” (II.xii.22). Other non-nautical snares emerge, but at last Guyon
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prevails, and the indefatigable Boatman rows his passengers to the entrance of the Bower
of Bliss. The episode raises inescapable questions about navigation in a sea over which a
sovereign—in this case, Acrasia—has claimed both jurisdiction and dominion. As noted
in the previous chapter, Acrasia’s Sea remains in chaos not because order eludes it—the
pacifying interventions of the Palmer prove this—but because Acrasia directly benefits
from the disorder and chooses not to intervene. In effect, Guyon’s voyage demonstrates
not only the harm beget by closed seas, but also the potential profit to those invested in
keeping them tightly controlled.
Unlike The Faerie Queene, Drayton’s Poly-Olbion seems at first glance an odd
poem in which to ponder the question of mare liberum: its focus on the geography,
history, and mythology of every county of England and Wales endows it with a domestic,
terrestrial flavor. The poem appears bereft of any unifying narrative or central figure
beyond the Muse, who, Jean Brink observes, acts primarily “as an agent for
prosopopoeia.”22 However, the ocean plays a central role in Poly-Olbion: Joan Grundy
observes that Neptune is the only deity in the poem “whose presence is really felt.”23 He
touches nearly every song, even those of landlocked counties, because every county
contains rivers, and in Drayton’s cosmos, rivers are accountable to the sea. In his
discussion of Song 10, Richard Hardin notes that for Drayton the sea “is an eternally
shifting place for man; the rocks of the past should provide him with both a reference
point for navigating, and a model for stability. Yet because man’s position is eternally
shifting […] the rocks themselves seem temporary, as they remain only momentarily in
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his sight.”24 Hardin makes this observation to expound Drayton’s theory of history, but it
has equal value in positioning Drayton’s sea as Grotian: mutable, unstable, always in
flux. And this Draytonian ocean, most legible in Songs 19 and 20, provides a poetic
glimpse into the mare liberum/mare clausum debate. Drayton dedicates part of Song 19
to a catalog of the English voyagers; borrowing heavily from Richard Hakluyt’s The
principall navigations, voiages, and discoveries of the English nations (1589), Drayton
uses Song 19 to stretch a broad canvas on which to paint his panorama of national
maritime pride. He considers mariners from the quasi-apocryphal Robert Machin and
Nicholas of Lynn to the very real Drake, Cavendish, and Raleigh. Describing
navigational feats invites a contemplation of the nature of the sea itself: in Song 20,
Neptune gathers the water nymphs and commands them to perform a nymphall in his
honor. This performance, more so than any other place in Poly-Olbion, explicates the
nature of Drayton’s sea. The nymphall positions the ocean as an unbounded space,
stretching across the globe: no mention is made of its Englishness and no hint of the
demarcation between territorial waters and high seas is given. Both Songs 19 and 20
escape the geographic domesticity which characterizes the rest of Poly-Olbion and hence
provide the modern critic an alembic in which to distill the poem’s conception of the
ocean.
Drayton’s catalog in Song 19 remains just that—a catalog, a list, and thus lacks
the drama inherent in Guyon’s voyage. The poet moves from one account to the next with
no interest in rising action; no apogee; no resolution. At a few moments, however, he
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breaks the seeming monotony and inserts micronarratives: his account of the ill-fated
Robert Machin provides a good example. Machin falls in love with a woman (unnamed
in both Hakluyt’s and Drayton’s accounts); her parents do not consent to their marriage,
and so the star-crossed lovers sail south. A tempest washes the pair ashore on the island
of Madeira, where Machin’s bride dies of seasickness. Meanwhile, some shifty mariners
abscond with Machin’s ship, leaving him stranded on the island. He builds a modest altar
for his beloved, fashions a small boat from a tree, and is “Put foorth againe to Sea, where
after many a flaw, / Such as before themselves, scarce Mortall ever saw; / Now miserable
men could possibly sustaine, / Now swallowed with the waves, and then spu’d up againe”
(19.269-272).25 But Machin’s maritime misfortunes are not a total waste, as they serve to
“amuse our owne [world]” (19.274). Each of these small navigational narratives remains
linked not through any culmination of plot, but through the growing tapestry of English
navigational prowess. The catalog’s approximate chronological progression creates a type
of continuity, but, as noted below, Drayton underscores the continually expanding
geographic scope of the voyages rather than their advancement through time. In a sharp
structural departure, Spenser’s account of Guyon delineates the clearly defined stages of
beginning, middle, and end, and the whole episode provides closure to Book II. This
structural opposition provides a link to early modern ocean spaces: Drayton’s poem, like
the Grotian sea, resists narrative containment. Conversely, Spenser’s poem exists within
the framework of clear, clean narrative boundaries.
The poetic differences between the two works also contribute to their depictional
disjunction. Each Spenserian stanza employs iambic pentameter, familiar yet delectably
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versatile, to relay the dramas of Faery Land. This meter, well-suited to the progression of
a plot, allows Spenser to craft intricate and interwoven storylines. At the end of each
stanza, however, he incorporates an alexandrine, which serves as a trusty engine to propel
the narrative forward.26 Each stanza comprises a discrete unit, self-contained, much in the
way the Seldenian sea remained cordoned off with tidiness and cartographic precision.
Resisting English Renaissance poetic tradition, Drayton composed Poly-Olbion in
alexandrines.27 The extra two syllables per line are particularly well-suited for a poem
that engages so intensely with geographic matters. Parker Duchemin observes that
Drayton “found that the alexandrine offered certain immediate advantages for a long,
slow, sprawling, usually undramatic poem like Poly-Olbion. Its compulsive forward
motion faithfully reflects the poem’s itinerary from place to place.”28 The alexandrines,
though, have a sometimes stifling effect on the narrative structure, as if the extra two
syllables stretch the poet too far, and superfluous words creep in and crowd out the
poem’s dramatic potential. As a result, Poly-Olbion at times assumes the shape of a
disjointed chronicle rather than providing a holistic portrait of England and Wales.29 But
it is precisely this lack of narrative tension that affords Drayton the leisure to craft his
evocative illustrations of land and sea, one that stops and lingers on their beauty, one that
See Richard Danson Brown, “Unusual staff: the archeology of the Spenserian stanza,” for a
recent discussion of Spenser’s poetic form: Brown, The Art of The Faerie Queene (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2019), 139-91.
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is Grotian in its vision and depth. Additionally, whereas Spenser has separated his verse
into stanzas, Drayton’s songs contain no lines breaks. Each song runs for hundreds of
continuous lines, and the reader is left to parse out any arbitrary divisions of its content
for themselves. This structural framework also correlates with the boundlessness of
Grotius’ free seas which can be demarcated only by the adjacent shore.
Language itself provides an essential component in the analysis of these episodes’
treatment of aquatic space, especially the poems’ depiction of human-ocean interactions.
Although Spenser uses other moments in the poem to describe the ocean itself, two
instances in Guyon's journey stand out for their use of poetic language to construct the
sea. While this linguistic construction is more of Drayton's domain, most notably in
Neptune's nymphall but also in his catalog, Spenser's treatment of the subject foregrounds
the characters' oceanic dominion. Spenser notes the Boatman rows so vigorously that “the
hoare waters from his frigot ran / And the light bubbles daunced all along / Whiles the
salt brine out of the billowes sprong” (II.xii.10). Later, as they approach the Bower of
Bliss, Spenser conjures up an additional image of Acrasia’s sea: “Ye might have seen the
frothy billowes fry / Under the ship, as thorough them she went / That seemd the waves
were into yvory / Or yvory into the waves were sent” (II.xii.45). This linguistic
engagement with the sea provides the reader intimacy. It places us in the boat, looking
just over the edge at the confection of salinity, water, bubbles, and billows. And a thing
immediately perceivable appears much more capable of possession than one existing on
an unfathomable scale. Grotius recognized this fact and employed sweeping, abstract
language as a result. This focus on the relationship between perception and possession
also finds a parallel in the physical manifestations of Mare liberum and Mare clausum as
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books: Selden’s treatise included maps (fig. 4.1), which clearly demarcated the
boundaries of the English sea, while Grotius constructs the ocean through language
alone.30
Drayton’s catalog, conversely, seems to distance the voyagers from the actual sea.
Their navigations occur on an almost abstract plane which at times seems not to penetrate
the physical world at all, or at least does not emulate Spenser’s aura of empiricism. For
example, Drayton makes frequent reference to the sphericity of the globe; the vastness of
ocean spaces; the expanse of travel at sea: “this earthly ball” (19.365), “mightie sea”
(19.302), “this mightie Round” (19.332), “the surging Maine” (19.315), “flowing of the
Seas” (19.213); for the reader, this has the effect of viewing the voyages on a map or a
globe, rather than from the starboard of a ship. In addition, his emphasis through
language such as “farre distant shores,” (19.233), “the most unknowne” (19.240), and
“that further world” (19.274) foregrounds the vast distances traversed by the English
mariners. Because this global ocean exists on such an incomprehensible epistemological
plane, its possession and dominion seem beyond reach. These competing oceanic
portrayals vacillate between Grotius’ and Selden’s conceptions of the sea. In Spenser’s
case, Acrasia’s ocean feels contained, directly accessible, and almost suffocatingly
stagnant. Not only are Guyon’s movements policed, but his—and our—views of the
ocean remain limited to the immediate surroundings: beside the boat, underneath it, just
off in the distance.

One could argue that Poly-Olbion’s allegorical maps, considered in the next chapter, represent
a similar concretization of possession. But these cartographic appendages depict only the sea in
relation to the adjacent counties: no effort is made to portray the high seas traversed by Drayton’s
voyagers.
30
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Guyon’s voyage lends itself to a straightforward allegorical reading. Because he
functions as the Knight of Temperance, the obstacles he encounters in Acrasia’s sea act
as moral temptations that stand between him and an ideal Christian ethic, and situating
these temptations within an ocean journey had deep cultural precedent. The early modern
motif of shipwreck has been addressed perhaps most eloquently in the work of art
historian Lawrence Otto Goedde, who writes, “The tempestuous sea has always occupied
a vital place in man’s consciousness of the world and of himself. Apprehended as tragic
circumstance and as deeply resonant symbol, it has been an unfailing source of metaphors
for the vicissitudes of existence.”31 Many times, this consciousness assumed the role of
cautionary tale, and the model of maritime disaster as metaphor for moral depravity is
represented in both shipwreck narratives of the early modern period and in an earlier
literary work, Das Narrenschiff (The Ship of Fools) immensely popular across Northern
Europe at the turn of the sixteenth century.32 Das Narrenschiff equates moral depredation
with a ship of fools representing every human foible and shortcoming, sailing toward
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inevitable destruction. Shipwreck narratives, popular especially in Portugal, adopted a
theological tenor when accounting for tragedy at sea.33
Guyon’s journey, while existing within these cultural frameworks, transcends
conventional interpretations. Shipwreck and tempest contain a certain limitation when
applied to the episode in Acrasia’s sea. The shipwreck narratives make clear that their
maritime mishaps have resulted from some type of sin or moral shortcoming and are
therefore the punishment of an angry God. For the sake of interpreting The Faerie
Queene’s oceans, this omnipotent entity is represented by Neptune; my analysis of
Florimell's imprisonment below expands on this observation. But during Guyon's
journey, Neptune is mentioned only once. He does not control the sea but is, apparently,
acted upon through the whims of Acrasia: in a tempest she conjures, the “waves come
rolling, and the billows rore / Outragiously, as they enraged were, / Or wrathful Neptune
did them drive before / His whirling charet, for exceeding fear” (II.xii.22). Indeed, within
the context of canto 12, Spenser inserts no figure that assumes the role of moral
arbitrator, and this deeply shapes the canto’s interpretive framework.34 I would go so far
as to argue the episode resists a moralizing elucidation, and the obstacles Acrasia places
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in Guyon’s path represent hindrances to his free movement, rather than mere moral
allurements.
On an allegorical plane, this parallels the Portuguese attempt to thwart open
Dutch commerce in the East Indies. Economic interests undergirded the question of free
seas in the early modern period, and I posit that these interests, more so than legal or
political considerations, drove the debate. At the heart of the Dutch East India Company's
ire rested anxiety concerning Portuguese control of trade routes in the East Indies. Being
cut off from open navigation had dire consequences for Dutch economic stability. In the
same way, the responses of both James I and William Welwood to Grotius’ Mare liberum
had been prompted by trepidation concerning fishing rights in English waters.
Interestingly, these monetary interests were supported both by open seas and closed seas:
open seas facilitated commerce, and closed seas helped preserve fish populations.
Moreover, curbing the crime of piracy had clear economic advantages. Spenser, as a
result, composed the episode in Acrasia’s sea with clear allusions to the economic
precarity of maritime passage. On his journey, Guyon passes some wrecked ships laden
with treasure. The first instance comes as they pass the Quicksand of Unthriftyhed: “They
passing by, a goodly Ship did see, / Laden from far with precious merchandize, / And
bravely furnished, as ship might bee, / Which through great disaventure, or mesprize, /
Her selfe had ronne into that hazardize” (II.xii.19). As the crew passes the Rock of Vile
Reproach, they behold the ruins of several ships: “On thother side, they saw that perilous
Rocke, / Threatning it selfe on them to ruinate, / On whose sharp cliftes the ribs of
vessels broke / And shivered ships, which had beene wrecked late” (II.xii.7). When they
see the scene of marooned ships in the Quicksand, they even witness mariners and
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merchants laboring to recover their “rich wares” (II.xii.19). Shipwreck entailed
significant monetary loss, and Spenser capitalizes on this truth by highlighting the
economic devastation of Acrasia’s snares.
This focus on the economics of commerce by sea foregrounds the larger interest
of Book II with wealth; consider, for example, the episode in Mammon's cave in canto
7.35 But even more compelling is Spenser's recognition of the sea as a site of economic
expansion. The trajectory extends beyond Guyon's voyage: at the beginning of Book III,
when the reader encounters Marinell’s shore, we find it covered in “Exceeding riches and
all pretious things” (III.iv.23), the “wealth of the’East” (III.iv 23), and “Gold, amber,
yvorie, perles, owches, rings / And all that els was pretious and deare” (III.iv 23).
Marinell’s windfall, notes Spenser, results from an exceptionally generous ocean.
Additionally, the episode in Book V in which Artegall adjudicates the case of Amidas
and Bracidas involves the central question of ownership of Philtera’s shipwrecked
treasure chest. Even Mammon’s corrupting riches ostensibly came to him by means of
the sea, as his cave lies beyond the Idle Lake. In Faery Land, the economic utility of the
ocean remains inextricably joined to the ocean itself, and its wealth must be protected and
guarded: hence, it is always possessed, either through proper means (Marinell’s jewelencrusted shore and Philtera’s treasure chest) or improper (Mammon’s Cave and the
plunder of Pollente and Munera). Nothing of value in Faery Land, it seems, exists as a
thing belonging to no one.

See David Landreth, “At Home with Mammon: Matter, Money, and Memory in Book II of The
Faerie Queene,” ELH 73.1 (2006), 245-74.
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Poly-Olbion, however, deviates significantly from this economic ethos. The poem applies
a much more open attitude toward wealth and resources: most often, the poem conceives
riches as the bounty of the natural world and constructs a sense of communal ownership,
and the forests, birds, plants, and herbs of Poly-Olbion are each res communis omnium,
things belonging to no one. For Drayton, the wealth of these resources does not result
from their possession, but rather from an experience of their qualities. This feature is
perhaps nowhere more apparent than in Song 13’s description of the afternoon sun:
“Suppose twixt noone and night, the Sunne his halfe-way wrought / (The shadowes to be
large, by his descending brought) / Who with a fervent eye lookes through the twyring
glades, / And his dispersed rayes commixeth with the shades” (13.167-170). Like the air
and the sea, the evasive nature of sunlight positions it as immune to human possession,
and yet this evasiveness does not diminish its abundance. As a result, Drayton’s natural
resources escape The Faerie Queene’s anxiety of possession: in fact, their multitude
renders possession redundant. These vastly divergent ideas regarding the role of
possession map on neatly to the free seas debate. Grotius argued that infinite resources
rendered the sea common to all men, to be used and enjoyed as a common good and went
so far as to assert that ocean water itself could be removed from the sea. Selden asserted
the converse, that a thing’s plentitude has no bearing on its ability to be possessed.
Both Spenser and Drayton enlist the catalog in their construction of the sea, which
extends our understanding of their economic programs, particularly in Poly-Olbion.
Drayton’s employment of the device in Song 19 has already been discussed, but he uses it
in other places in Poly-Olbion to describe the marvels of nature. Spenser, in canto 12,
catalogs loathsome sea creatures (stanzas 23 to 25) and foreboding fowl (stanzas 35 and
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36). Fittingly for this analysis, Drayton includes a catalog of fish in Song 25 as well as of
birds in Song 8. A juxtaposition of these catalogs highlights a fundamental difference in
each poets’ conception of the natural world, one that further engages their poems with the
debate of free seas. Spenser, in accordance with the general atmosphere of doom that
characterizes Guyon’s voyage, positions nature as an inimical force meant to restrict
movement rather than provide resources. For example, in his catalog of marine life, he
notes the “ugly shapes” and “horrible aspects” are all “dreadfull pourtraicts of
deformatee” (II.xii.23); the “dreadfull fish” of Acrasia’s sea “hath deserv’d the name / of
Death” (II.xii.24). And the horrors seem almost without end: “All these, and thousand
thousands many more / And more deformed Monsters thousand fold” (II.xii.25). This
frightening farrago stands in direct opposition to Poly-Olbion’s catalog of marine life.
Drayton, who extols the plentitude of the Washes, documents not only the aquatic
creatures’ culinary appeal (“The Conger finely sous’d, hote Summers coolest food; / The
Whiting knowne to all, a generall wholesome Dish; / The Gurnet, Rochet, Mayd, and
Mullet, dainty Fish; / The Haddock, Turbet, Bert, Fish nourishing and strong” (25.162165)) but also their utility in erotic enterprise: “The Sperme-increasing Crab, much
cooking that doth aske, / The big-legg’d Lobster, fit for wanton Venus taske, /
Voluptuaries oft take rather then for food” (25.180-182). Drayton’s scrumptious seafood
and salacious shellfish stress the salubrious generosity of the sea.36 Fishing rights
comprised a major point of contention in the seventeenth-century debates, but questions
of the maritime jurisdiction of fisheries stretched back to antiquity. As the result of

Similarly, Spenser’s and Drayton’s catalogs of birds accentuates the poems’ contrasting views
of nature.
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escalating political tensions, the nature of the debate shifted during the early modern
period.37 While his focus is on freedom of navigation, Grotius also foregrounds the
bounty of oceanic resources: he argues that fishing “everywhere ought to be free to
foreigners, that servitude cannot be imposed on the sea, which cannot serve” (32),
although he does not go so far as to argue that fish are an inexhaustible resource. Drayton
does not portray an endless supply of fish either, but his lines on the aquatic wealth of the
Washes illuminate their plentitude. These sharply opposing depictions of the natural
world provide further insight into the question of free seas. For Drayton, as for Grotius,
the sea provided an infinite supply of certain resources, and these resources could not be
exhausted. Poly-Olbion’s riches are natural and organic while The Faerie Queene’s
economic bounty consists of man-made, material objects, such as coins and jewels.
Navigation, appropriately enough, occupies considerable space in both episodes,
but its representation spans the depictional spectrum. Whereas Spenser’s account of
Guyon’s voyage emphasizes his method of transportation, Drayton focuses on the vast
distances over which his mariners travel. For instance, Spenser makes frequent reference
to the Boatman’s rowing: “strongly he them rowes” (II.xii.5), “So forth they rowed”
(II.xii.10), “But his oares did sweepe the watry wildernesse” (II.xii.29), and “he the
boteman bad row easily” (II.xii.33). Spenser even draws attention to the Boatman's
stamina in the face of this corporeal exertion: he “ne sought to bayt / His tyred armes for
toylesome weariness” (II.xii.29). These references remind the reader that Guyon's vessel
is propelled not by the winds and the currents but by the physical displacement of water
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through the act of rowing. Interestingly, the wrecked vessels that Guyon encounters are
all described as ships, not boats; during the period, “ship” clearly denoted a vessel
capable of sail, although sometimes propelled by oar, such as a galley.38 Although the
juxtaposition of “boat” and “ship” can be interpreted at a strict allegorical level—a ship
remains beholden to the winds and currents and signifies a certain abdication of the will
while a boat with oars is acted upon by human agency—this comparison also invites a
legal allegorical interpretation. In Roman law, ownership implies that the property is
owned to an absolute degree; in “relation to the content, the word ‘absolute’ suggests that
the Roman owner was free to do as he pleased.”39 The Boatman, Guyon, and the Palmer
engage in a manipulation of the sea as they navigate it. It submits increasingly to their
will until at the end of the canto, they have, through the act of navigation, exercised total
dominion over it. Like canto 12, Selden’s treatise emphasizes human involvement with
the ocean on nearly every page; it is almost as if the Seldenian sea cannot exist
independent of this interaction. Guyon’s voyage establishes the ocean as malleable. It is
not the conqueror, but the conquered, and it remains subject to possession and dominion.
The navigational spaces envisaged through Drayton’s catalog of voyagers,
conversely, continually expand and underscore breadth. This roughly follows the
historical trajectory of English seaward expansion, beginning with Arthur’s invasion of
Norway and ending at Drake’s circumnavigation. Drayton’s geographic enlargement is
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nowhere more jarring than in the voyage of Martin Frobisher. In an account which leaves
out the more unflattering historical reality of Frobisher’s failures, Drayton writes:
Then Forbosher, whose fame flew all the Ocean o’r,
Who to the Northwest sought, huge China’s wealthy shore,
When nearer to the North, that wandring Sea-man set,
Where hee in our hotst Mon’ths of June and July met
With Snow, Frost, Haile, & Sleet, and found sterne Winter strong,
With mighty Iles of Ice, and Mountains huge and long.
Where as it comes and goes, the great eternall Light,
Makes halfe the yeare still day, and half continuall night.
Then for those Bounds unknown, he bravely set againe,
As he a Sea-god were, familiar with the Maine. (19.287-96)
Frobisher’s unsuccessful quest for the Northwest Passage allows Drayton to illustrate the
ocean’s geographical breadth. These lines emphasize both the physical distance traversed
in the voyages and the corporeal sensations associated with traveling to an arctic region.
In a line that alludes to an earlier moment in the poem, Frobisher’s fame “flew all the
Ocean o’r” (19.287): this image echoes the opening of Song 10, in which the Muse
transforms into a seabird. Like the Muse, but with much greater scope, Frobisher’s fame
flies across the entire ocean. To remind his reader of the Englishness of the voyage,
Drayton first positions us in England, in the “hotst Mon’ths of June and July” (19.290).
Then immediately he bombards the reader with “Snow, Frost, Haile, & Sleet” and “sterne
Winter strong” (19.291). In the infinitesimal space between lines 290 and 291, we have
been transported from the familiar harbor at Ipswich to the remote Labrador Sea. There,
we find “mighty Iles of Ice” and “Mountains huge and long” (19.292). This geography
contains the strange chiaroscuro of summer’s “great eternal Light” and winter’s “half
continuall night” (19.293-94). Frobisher returns to England and then sets out again, as
“he a Sea-god were, familiar with the Maine” (19.296). Frobisher’s lines construct the
ocean as a geographic entity so vast that it remains penetrable only by skilled mariners.
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They also emphasize the remoteness of the Labrador Sea, a landscape alien to Drayton’s
English readership. And paradoxically, this image conjured by Drayton, that of a wooden
sailing vessel pushing through an inhospitable arctic sea, also creates an inherent tension:
even in the most favorable of circumstances, human dominion of the seas remains
precarious, dependent on the whims of a protean landscape. The very essence of the
Labrador Sea, in addition to its geographic remoteness, renders it impervious to English
possession.
The poems’ contrasting depictions of social hierarchy provide one final link to the
free seas debate. Nellish, in an analysis of Guyon’s voyage, observes that the Boatman’s
language is terse and formal; this pattern of speaking is particularly evident when
contrasted with the dialogue between Guyon and the Palmer.40 For example, the Boatman
commands the Palmer to “stere aright” (II.xii.3), and when Guyon wants to visit the
Wandering Islands the Boatman responds, “That may not be” (II.xii.11). Nellish
interprets this rough speech as the Boatman’s representation of will as opposed to the
reason that propels the Palmer as pilot: “As the man at the tiller is associated with
reflective virtues,” he notes, “with reason, prudence, and temperance, so the boatman is
the active principle, the very spirit of perseverance, will, spirit or courage.”41 Both sets of
virtues aid Guyon in his journey, and Nellish’s interpretation coincides with his
allegorical reading of the episode. I would, however, posit an alternative explanation for
this discrepancy in language that transcends a strictly allegorical interpretation.
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In his social history of Elizabethan seamen, naval historian Kenneth Andrews
traced the relative social standing of the crews of late sixteenth-century English sailing
vessels. Using extant records from the period, he observed that those who lacked
sophisticated nautical skills provided the brute labor aboard ship and were frequently
pressed men. In addition, the men who navigated the galleons and galleys of Elizabethan
England were rarely expert pilots, but rather sailors who held the rank of master.42 And
Andrews notes that although the terminology of the period is sometimes confusing and
contradictory, “the important gap [in social standing] was between the master and the rest
[of the crew].”43 Thus, I would argue that Guyon, Palmer, and the Boatman, in addition to
representing an allegorical editorial on the virtue of temperance, represent the historical
reality of sixteenth-century life at sea. In some ways, the legal sea involved a level of
equality with little parallel on land; but this interpretation extends only so far, and this
mitigated social structure still presumed a hierarchy of actors. Taken a step further, this
indicates that the strict social hierarchy on land mirrored that on the sea, which reflected a
more general worldview that the ocean skewed the established terrestrial social order.
Spenser’s emphasis on clearly defined structures of power extends to the sea itself:
belonging to a higher social echelon, Guyon and the Palmer enjoy dominion over the
whole sea; the Boatman only controls the vessel’s movement and the waters in its
immediate vicinity. Drayton’s catalog lacks an analogous social hierarchy. He makes no
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mention of his mariners’ crews, or the more rudimentary minutiae of life on the high
seas. By this omission, one could argue that the Draytonian sea adopts a near-complete
tenor of equality. His ocean is indeed a thing existing for the common use of all men.

V. NEPTUNE AND THE FREEDOM OF THE SEA
In this section, I consider the role of Neptune in the poems as it relates to the
question of free seas. I focus on two moments of significance: Florimell’s imprisonment
by Proteus in Books III and IV of The Faerie Queene and the nymphall in praise of
Neptune in Song 20 of Poly-Olbion. An analysis of Neptune’s function within the poems
further elucidates their attitudes toward the question of free seas. As noted above, PolyOlbion and The Faerie Queene are only loosely related, and Neptune’s corresponding
presence demonstrates at best a cursory relationship. Still, the god of the sea occupied a
unique niche in the Renaissance literary and cultural imagination, and within this context
the early modern reader encountered him in poetry. Certain cultural assumptions about
Neptune, like the corresponding assumptions about the early modern ocean, undergird
my analysis of the poem.
As characters, Spenser’s Neptune proves dynamic and mutable, while Drayton’s
remains static, unyielding. Neptune appears in all but two of The Faerie Queene’s books
(if one includes the Mutabilitie Cantos in the tally): he is conspicuously absent from
Books V and VI. His function in Books I and VII proves strictly perfunctory: for
example, in canto 3 of the first book Archimago alludes to Neptune’s ability to enthrall
women, which parallels Una’s own seduction at the sorcerer’s hand (stanza 32). In the
Mutabilitie Cantos, he is mentioned only in relation to his mythological purview: “Ops of
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the earth; and Iuno of the Ayre; Neptune, of the Seas; and Nymphes, of Riuers all”
(VII.vii.26). In the intervening cantos a dynamic portrait of Neptune emerges, and the
clearly discernable trajectory of The Faerie Queene’s engagement with the sea, discussed
earlier, finds a parallel in the development of the god of the sea himself. He enters as
abstraction and gradually materializes across Books II, III, and VI, a progression that
brings into focus the poem’s endorsement of mare clausum. Here again Drayton veers
sharply from his predecessor: given Poly-Olbion’s desultory nature, it is unsurprising that
no such Neptunian trajectory can be located in the poem, although the nymphall in
Neptune’s honor in Song 20 offers a quasi-apogee of Britain’s nautical landscapes.
Spenser’s investment in Neptune as character reveals his discomfort with Draytonianlevels of prosopopoeia; Drayton, on the other hand, gives the reader no demarcation
between Neptune and the physical ocean. Ultimately, I argue that these divergent
depictional approaches parallel the jurisprudential opening and closing of maritime space.
For early modern readers and viewers, Neptune represented an entity inextricably
tied to both the sea and to a precise historical moment. “The literary portrait of Neptune,”
art historian Luba Freedman reminds us, “is an invention of Renaissance
mythographers.”44 Freedman notes that this Renaissance Neptune, unlike other classical
deities, did not correspond to his depictions from antiquity. Andrea Mantegna’s
engraving The Battle of the Sea Gods, which dates to the 1470s, provided the first
important fifteenth-century representation of Neptune and helped shape all subsequent
portrayals from that century (fig. 4.2). Similarly, Leonardo’s drawing of Neptune for
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Andrea Segni (c.1504), undertaken for a painting now lost, influenced the sea god’s
sixteenth-century depictions (fig. 4.4). Broadly, Freedman notes that unlike classical
portrayals, these Renaissance interpretations move away from the depiction of Neptune
as a classical deity and instead present the viewer with a humanized embodiment of the
sea god.45 Perhaps this shift is nowhere more apparent than in Baccio Bandinelli’s
drawing (after 1528) and Agnolo Bronzino’s portrait (c.1530s) of Charles V’s famed
admiral Andrea Doria as Neptune (figs. 4.5 and 4.6).46 During these decades Neptune
also assumed his familiar visage: nude, flowing beard—one that calls to mind the billowy
aspect of ocean waves, Freedman observes—and expressive countenance.47 The
engravings of Neptune in Poly-Obion (figs. 4.7-4.10) pay clear homage to these earlier
artistic models. Additionally, Freedman notes that unlike most other classical deities,
Neptune’s purview was rather narrow, and his oceanic realm helped solidify the one-toone cultural correspondence between Neptune and the sea.
Relative to its treatment in art history, the role of Neptune in early modern
English culture has been understudied. One Spenserian example: despite his presence in
five of The Faerie Queene’s seven cantos, Neptune does not warrant his own entry in The
Spenser Encyclopedia.48 A recent monograph gives testament to Cupid’s cultural capital
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during the period, but no analogous monograph exists for Neptune.49 I would argue,
however, that his status as early modern cultural icon extends far beyond that of Cupid,
and touches the legal, the literary, the scientific, the cartographic, the nationalistic, and
the naval. In Chapter 5 of this dissertation, I begin to remedy Neptune’s scholarly
neglect. For my present purposes, it will be sufficient to note that in his treatise, Selden
references Neptune’s role in Roman culture, while Grotius does not.50 This divergence
may only reflect the men’s differing scholarly approaches to the topic at hand, and the
rather exhaustive nature of Selden’s Mare clausum.51 However, Selden’s inclusion and
Grotius’ exclusion also serve the authors’ respective arguments: by drawing attention to
the ancient impulse to appoint a god of the sea, Selden signals to his readers that the
ocean is a space capable of being ruled over. It is impossible to draw any larger
inferences from the authors’ engagement with Neptune without a more robust
understanding of Neptune’s cultural standing in the period, which I will not provide until
the next chapter. Consequently, my analysis of Neptune and the question of free seas
does not draw a straight line from the legal treatises to the literary texts. Instead, I ponder
what Neptune’s depiction in the poems reveals about the nature of the sea.
After his passing mention in The Faerie’s Queene’s Book I, Neptune reemerges
in Book II to play a relatively negligible role. In fact, he is mentioned only twice: first, in
a stanza describing Guyon’s passage across the Idle Lake (“Both slow and swift a like do
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serue my tourne, / Ne swelling Neptune, ne lowd thundring Ioue / Can chaunge my
cheare, or make me euer mourne; / My little boat can safely passe this perilous bourne”
(II.vi.10) and his aforementioned presence when Acrasia conjures a tempest (“The waves
come rolling, and the billows rore / Outragiously, as they enraged were, / Or wrathfull
Neptune did them drive before / His whirling charet, for exceeding fear” (II.xii.22)). In
this second book, Neptune’s function can be reduced to the primal: he is not so much a
character in the manner of Acrasia, Guyon, or the Palmer, but rather a force of nature.
The successive mention of Neptune and Jove at the Idle Lake signals to the reader that we
occupy a world of classical mythology, and that Neptune has not yet forfeited his Roman
roots in order to submit to his Renaissance humanizing. In part because of this classicized
conception, and in part because he makes no plot interventions in the book, Neptune’s
presence in Book II resists a more allegorical reading: this may possibly account for his
larger neglect in Spenserian scholarship.
Books III and IV reposition Neptune’s role in the Faery Land cosmos. In Book
III, when Britomart delivers her blazon on Marinell’s strand, she invokes the god of the
sea:
Thou God of windes, that raignest in the seas,
That raignest also in the Continent,
At last blow vp some gentle gale of ease,
The which may bring my ship, ere it be rent,
Vnto the gladsome port of her intent:
Then when I shall my selfe in safety see,
A table for eternall moniment
Of thy great grace, and my great ieopardee
Great Neptune, I avow to hallow vnto thee. (III.iv.10)
Britomart’s invocation further establishes Neptune’s deific position in Faery Land. As we
learned in Book II, he controls the waves, the currents, the storm, and the calm. While
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this is unsurprising given Neptune’s function in the classical world, as well as the
Renaissance attention to his ability to control the sea, the episode on Marinell’s strand
demonstrates the ambit of his powers. One stanza after Britomart ends her supplication, a
metaphorical gale emerges on the horizon: Marinell (whose identity she learns later)
gallops toward her, which results in a sudden shift of her mental state from sorrow to
wrath. Neptune is not directly named as the cause of Marinell’s sudden entrance, and we
later learn that Proteus has foretold of this seemingly chance encounter on the strand.
And yet Spenser constructs the episode in a way that invites an inference of causation:
Britomart supplicates Neptune for a deliverance from her suffering, and then Marinell
appears. This sequence expands Neptune’s purview because not only does he rule the
waves, but apparently he commands the shore as well, an expansion that carries
implications for the poem’s engagement with the international law of the sea.
Once Neptune’s general powers have been delineated, the poem offers additional
details about his nature. When Britomart inadvertently injures Marinell on his own
strand, Marinell’s mother, Cymoent, springs into action. Gathering her “watry sisters”—
the Nereides—she climbs on a dolphin-pulled chariot and hastens to her son’s jewelencrusted shore. En route “Great Neptune stoode amazed at their sight, / Whiles on his
broad rownd backe they softly slid / And eke him selfe mournd at their mournfull plight’
(III.iv.32). He facilitates their journey as they draw attention from other aquatic creatures:
“His mighty waters to them buxome bee: Eftsoones the roaring billowes still abid, / And
all the griesly Monsters of the See / Stood gaping at their gate, and wondred them to see”
(III.iv.32). In a passage that draws attention to Neptune’s corporeality for the first time in
the poem, the chariot of Cymoent and the Nereides slides down Neptune’s back; his
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waters they find buxom. These lines offer a clear conflation of character with landscape;
that is, Neptune functions as both ruler of the seas and ocean water itself. Buxom is not
typically an adjective used to describe the sea.52 Later in the canto, in an episode modeled
on a scene from Ovid’s Heroides, the Nereides’ chariots swim gently “Vpon great
Neptunes necke” (III.iv.42), lines again implying a paradoxically disembodied
corporality. Assuming a high degree of prosopopoeia, Spenser’s description in canto 4
shares almost nothing with the sea god’s humanistic depiction in Renaissance maps and
portraits, which leaves Neptune’s body to inhabit an indeterminate space of quasimateriality. The Neptune of the Nereides’ voyage defies Seldenian enclosure.
But in The Faerie Queene’s cosmos, the sea cannot withstand containment indefinitely,
and Spenser reveals a true physical description of Neptune late in Book III, during
Cupid’s masque. This passage adopts the more conventional Renaissance portrait of the
sea god:
Next vnto him was Neptune pictured,
In his diuine resemblance wondrous lyke:
His face was rugged, and his hoarie hed
Dropped with brackish deaw; his threeforkt Pyke
He stearnly shooke, and therewith fierce did stryke
The raging billowes, that on euery syde
They trembling stood, and made a long broad dyke. (III.xi.40)
What interests me in these lines is not the image conjured: it is conventional enough.
Rather, this passage offers a crucial clue regarding the poem’s attitude toward the
freedom of the seas. A main point on which Grotius and Selden disagreed was the
capacity of the sea to be contained within static borders. Indeed, if such borders were

Spenser uses “buxom” elsewhere in The Faerie Queene in the sense of flexible, pliant; yielding
to pressure (OED). This definition best fits its usage to describe Neptune in Book III.
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impossible, then the question of ownership would be rendered moot. Up until this stanza,
The Faerie Queene has offered no clear embodiment of Neptune. He is introduced
initially as indistinguishable from the sea: he possesses the ability to control the ocean
currents not only because he reigns over the waters, but because he is the sea itself, and
enjoys ostensible agency over the movements of his own watery assemblage, an
extracorporeal framing that becomes reinforced in the episode with Cymoent’s chariot.
But here, at Cupid’s masque, we encounter the Neptune of Bronzino’s portrait:
determined visage, hoary hair, identifying trident. Spenser himself draws attention to this
act of embodiment: “was Neptune pictured” (III.xi.40). As a consequence of this image,
Spenser has contained the unruly sea into the figure of the maritime god easily
identifiable on the period’s maps and sea atlases. In this presentment of Neptune as both
the sea itself and the embodied ruler of the sea, The Faerie Queene advances a twofold
argument for mare clausum: first, it shows how the ocean itself, represented in the figure
of Neptune, can move from boundlessness to containment; and second, it demonstrates
that this containment enjoys its own inherent authority.
While Neptune’s most pivotal role in Spenser’s poem occurs in Book IV, canto
12, discussed in the last chapter, he also appears in canto 11 during the marriage of the
Medway and the Thames. This episode has drawn considerable attention from critics, and
the fluvial union also heavily influenced Poly-Olbion and is even glossed in the
poem.53Now a few comments as this episode relates to Neptune are in order. First,
Spenser interjects the marriage of the Medway and Thames into the Florimell and

“And but that Medway then of Tames obtain’d such grace, / Except her country Nymphs, that
none should be in place, / More Rivers from each part, had instantly been there, / Then at their
marriage, first, by Spenser numbred were.” Poly-Olbion, 18.105-8.
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Marinell plot. Indeed, canto 11 opens with a description of Proteus’ maritime dungeon,
which has confined Florimell for seven months “in the bottom of the maine” (III.viii.37).
Spenser emphasizes Florimell’s dire imprisonment in a few descriptive lines: “Deepe at
the bottome of an huge great rock / The dungeon was, in which her bound he left, / That
neither yron barres, nor brazen locke / Did neede to gard from force, or secret theft”
(IV.xi.3). Spenser reveals that Proteus’ indifferent attitude toward domestic security
results from the inundation of the ocean itself: “For wall’d it was with waues, which
rag’d and ror’d / As they the cliffe in peeces would have cleft; / Besides ten thousand
monsters foule abhor’d / Did waite about it, gaping griesly all begor’d” (IV.xi.3).
Proteus’ dungeon and Cymoent’s bower represent the deepest engagements with the sea
to be found in The Faerie Queene—all others occur on its surface, or at the shore. Here
the true nature of the ocean becomes manifest to those brave enough to peer into the
abyss; and here they find “horror” and “darknesse dredd, that neuer viewed the day, /
Like to the balefull house of lowest hell” (IV.xi.4). These visions of the ocean mirror the
period’s larger epistemological conceptions of inaccessible maritime space, but they also
unveil that the sea itself could be used for purposes of confinement. This revelation has a
profound impact on the question of free seas: not only does Spenser’s ocean allow for
maritime boundaries, but the ocean water itself can be used as a material for these
borders.
The second significant aspect of the placement of the rivers’ marriage is that it
definitively divorces the figure of Neptune from the physical ocean. The description of
Proteus’ lair and its surrounding sea sits in sharp opposition to Neptune’s appearance at
the wedding ceremony, described thus: “First came great Neptune with his threeforkt
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mace, / That rules the Seas, and makes them rise or fall; / His dewy lockes did drop with
brine apace, / Vnder his Diademe imperiall” (IV.xi.11). The proximity of these two
passages highlights the ontological distance between Neptune and the sea—the latter
unknowable and foreboding, the former solid and regal—and this juxtaposition allows
Neptune, as a fully independent entity, to execute his most important task of liberating
Florimell: because he is now disengaged from the sea, he can, like an impartial admiralty
judge, rule over it. After hearing his lady’s laments inside Proteus’ den, Marinell finds
himself moved to pity. Cymoent recognizes both the necessity of rescuing Florimell and
the futility in appealing to Proteus for her son’s release, and thus turns to “great king
Neptune” and “on her knee before him falling lowe, / Made humble suit vnto his
Maiestie, / To graunt to her, her sonnes life, which his foe / A cruell Tyrant had
presumpteouslie / By wicked doome condemn’d, a wretched death to die” (IV.xii.29).
Neptune’s response employs both the royal we (“one that hath both wronged you, and vs”
(IV.xii.30) and refers to Neptune as “the seas sole Soueraine” (IV.xii.30). When he
delivers his judgment, Neptune adopts a markedly legal tenor, the significance of which
has been overlooked by critics: “He graunted it: and streight his warrant made, / Under
the Sea-gods seale autenticall / Commaunding Proteus straight t’enlarge the mayd, /
Which wandring on his seas imperiall, / He lately tooke” (IV.xii.32). The language in
canto 12 constructs Neptune as both royal and legal entity. His position is not only deific,
but political; and this grants him a kind of royal prerogative to police his seas. Nowhere
else in The Faerie Queene does Spenser offer such an unequivocal endorsement of mare
clausum. Within Faery Land, Neptune has come to allegorize the arm of royal authority
which stretched out into England’s waters. In his evolution through the poem, he has
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moved from primordial matter, to godly statesman, to the symbolic representation of
maritime dominion itself. Especially significant is the extent of Neptune’s jurisdiction: it
spreads not only from the shore to the coastal waters, but rather from land to those
unbounded stretches of ocean which most vexed the legal philosophers. Spenser’s
emphasis on the remoteness of Proteus’ lair serves not only to highlight Florimell’s
plight, but also to define the vast reaches of national maritime dominance.
The triangulation of Marinell, Neptune, and Proteus also contains an additional
key to unlocking The Faerie Queene’s attitude toward freedom of the seas. While I
discuss the allegorical meaning of these figures in the last chapter, here I offer some
observations on what this three-way relationship means for the principle of mare
clausum.54 If allegorical designations can be applied to these three characters, Proteus
signifies the sea itself: shapeshifting, mutable, continually in flux. Conventional enough,
this interpretation of the sea god as primal matter should not invite controversy and lays
the foundation for my analysis. Marinell and Neptune, however, incite more interpretive
woes. In the eighteenth century, John Upton argued that the character of Marinell
represents the Lord High Admiral, and specifically, Charles Howard, Earl of
Nottingham.55 Ostensibly, Upton based this reading on the riches accumulated on
Marinell’s strand, which represent the Lord Admiral’s right to prize. While I recognize
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Admittedly, my interpretation shifts between these chapters. In the former, I read Proteus as
pirate, Marinell as the Lord Admiral, and Neptune as the international law of the sea. In the
current, I read Proteus as the ocean itself, Neptune as the Lord Admiral, and Marinell as
interpretively ambiguous: perhaps a vice-admiral. These shifts, however, do not undermine my
larger interpretive schema. The former chapter investigated the English admiralty; the current,
conversely, considers the nature of ocean space in the poem as it relates to freedom of the seas.
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Edmund Spenser, The Faerie Queene, Book Four, ed. Ray Heffner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1935), 277n4.
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this interpretation’s historical rigor and concede it is not without merit, the figure of
Neptune complicates matters. Spenser has demonstrated that the reach of Neptune’s
authority extends both outward, to the “main sea”, and inward, to the coasts. The ambit of
his jurisdiction more closely aligns him with the Lord High Admiral than with the
international law of the sea. Even Grotius did not argue that nations did not enjoy
dominion over their coasts, and so Neptune’s apparent authority to patrol Marinell’s
strand associates him with the authority of Faery Land itself, and not with international
maritime law.56 Were Neptune to represent only the international law of the sea, then his
jurisdiction would cease at the shore. But it does not, and as Andrew Zurcher has recently
observed, Marinell’s right to wreck comes from Neptune himself.57 Neptune’s dominance
over Faery Land’s shore (represented by his dominance over Marinell), in addition to its
sea (represented by his dominance over Proteus), shifts his role in The Faerie Queene
from the mythic to the legal-political. As disembodied policer of the ocean, he might
serve Grotius’ argument for open seas; but as allegorical representation of the Lord High
Admiral, he becomes solidified, his jurisdiction extends to land, and he proves that
nations contain the capacity to effectively police both their coasts as well as the high seas.
A parallel journey through Poly-Olbion expatiating on the nature of Drayton’s
Neptune would prove extraneous. As noted earlier, Neptune-as-character remains rather
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Neptune may appear to serve a similar function as the international law of the sea; that is, he
may attempt to bring a universal order to The Faerie Queene’s oceans. But the geography of the
poem does not support this position. In my larger argument, Faery Land contains not a singular
ocean, but rather a series of oceans; Neptune’s presence at the Idle Lake substantiates this claim.
That said, all of The Faerie Queene’s seas appear to lie adjacent to the continent of Faery Land.
Consequently, Neptune symbolizes an arm of Faery Land’s royal authority, rather than a
universalizing international maritime law.
See Andrew Zurcher, Spenser’s Legal Language: Law and Poetry in Early Modern England
(Cambridge: DS Brewer, 2007), 107.
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static throughout the poem. Paradoxically, however, it is in this stasis that Poly-Olbion
rounds out its implicit argument for mare liberum: the predictability of Neptune’s pliancy
provides proof that the sea cannot be possessed. Song 20 presents the clearest lyric
portrait of the Draytonian sea. Although the geographic spaces of Song 19 have already
described the sea’s gestalt, Song 20 focuses solely on the ocean rather than human-ocean
interaction, and this unadulterated maritime vision mimics the ocean envisaged by
Grotius in Mare liberum. The nymphall is short, only about forty lines (Song 20 itself is
290 lines, one of the shortest of Poly-Olbion), and opens with a twelve-line pedigree of
the sea god. An analysis of this section of the poem demands a near-unquestioning
acquiescence to Drayton’s prosopopoeia, as well as the resignation that the line
separating Neptune from ocean, and ocean from Neptune, cannot exist: this strange
materialism itself supports mare liberum, as it produces maritime space that is impossible
to contain. For the purpose of understanding Poly-Olbion’s attitude toward the sea,
Neptune is the ocean.
Song 20 opens with Neptune’s dramatic ascent from the sea: he calls upon the sea
nymphs and commands them to perform a nymphall in his honor. Although by Song 20
Drayton has thoroughly established Neptune’s fearsome character, this passage reminds
the reader of the sea god’s oppressive presence. It associates Neptune primarily with
sonorous sound, one so powerful that it reaches from Suffolk to Norfolk’s shore.
Responding to his summons, the seamaids, who command the whales and fish, gather.
After the assembled parties adumbrate Neptune’s pedigree, they shift their focus to the
nature of Neptune himself. This opens with musings on the ocean’s geographic scope:
A world of mightie Kings and Princes I could name,
From our god Neptune sprung; let this suffice, his fame
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Incompasseth the world; those starres which never rise,
Above the lower South, are never from his eyes:
As those againe to him doe every day appeare,
Continually that keepe the Northerne Hemisphere;
Who like a mightie King, doth cast his Watched robe,
Farre wider then the land, quite round about the Globe. (20.177-85)
In his description of the ocean, Drayton faces a spatial conundrum: how can one
represent the spherical dimensions of the globe? To wit, how can Neptune, who, in the
poem, both rules the sea and is the sea, be present throughout the surface of the Earth?
The question seems metaphysical, almost theological, in its scope. But Drayton does not
shirk from a spatial challenge. In lines that echo Frobisher in the preceding song, Drayton
offers a visual as well as linguistic solution: “let this suffice, his fame / Incompasseth the
world” (178-79). The enjambment suggests that even the expansive alexandrines cannot
contain Neptune’s fame. The passage continues: “those Starres which never rise, / Above
the lower South, are never from his eyes.” Neptune remains ever present, and Drayton, as
he did in Song 19, again emphasizes the spherical quality of the globe. He creates a
spatially impossible scenario, one that even his English navigators cannot achieve:
concurrent presence both above and below the equator. And Drayton’s solution to the
spatial problem of representing Neptune’s omnipresence, while also expressing the
sphericity of the globe, is to reference the hemisphere-specific constellations. The sheer
immensity of the planet, which had been coming into clearer focus for early modern
Europeans since the circumnavigation of Magellan in the early sixteenth century, was
much more frequently encountered via book board than starboard, and Drayton offers an
exquisite linguistic palette. His ability to produce an almost infinite global ocean rivals
Grotius: Song 20 constructs aquatic space that remains impervious to national possession
or dominion.
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The relationship between Neptune and the freedom of the seas presents the
literary critic a problem difficult to overcome. It rests on a conception of the sea god that
was, like the domain he governed, protean and susceptible to unaccountable shifts. And
yet the different approaches to his depiction—Spenser’s dynamic, Drayton’s static—
reveal embedded attitudes toward the freedom of the seas. In Spenser’s case, Neptune
begins nearly synonymous with the sea itself; his subsequent evolution across the poem
may represent legal, technological, and navigational advancements in the human sphere,
which rendered international maritime boundaries possible. In addition, the sea god’s
transition from indeterminate matter to identifiable figurehead of royal and legal
authority symbolizes England’s increasing consciousness of its sovereignty over British
waters. During the early modern period, mare clausum required a national admiralty with
the capacity to adequately patrol its waters and coasts, and The Faerie Queene’s Neptune
proves an effective admiral. Poly-Olbion’s Neptune, conversely, assumes a Grotian
vision of ocean space. He never escapes the fetters of Draytonian prosopopoeia; his fate
renders him perpetually, relentlessly, indistinguishable from the sea. In its resistance to
progression, Drayton’s conception of Neptune inadvertently supports Grotius’ argument
for free seas. This analysis had begun to open some of the interpretive complexity
inherent in the figure of the Renaissance Neptune.

VI. CONCLUSION
Questions of mare clausum and mare liberum, as noted at the beginning of the
chapter, have their roots in the classical world, but the contributions of Selden and, in
particular, Grotius represent a turn in the nature of the debate. Their general methods for
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conceptualizing the sea endured until the introduction of more sophisticated technology
in the twentieth century. But the broader debate persists into the twenty-first century, in
which the possession of and jurisdiction over maritime space still figures prominently in
international law and politics. Consequently, literary and cultural historians working in
the maritime humanities—in the early modern period but also in subsequent periods—
can benefit from a more nuanced understanding of the international law of the sea. This
chapter has forged one path forward in this potentially robust scholarly conversation, one
that engages literary, legal, cultural, economic, and transnational contextualizations, and
provides a methodological example of how to engage these issue
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CONCLUSION

This dissertation began with a survey of early modern English maritime legal
texts because these writings and the subject they address are so unfamiliar, even to
specialists in the field of Renaissance studies. But the subject was not unfamiliar to early
moderns themselves, and the dissertation proceeded to demonstrate the productive link
between maritime law and English Renaissance literature. Reading these literary and
other texts in dialogue with the writings of maritime law opens a variety of new
questions, methods, and approaches, and brings a variety of new texts into the emerging
scholarly conversation on early modern maritime humanities. This conclusion offers
some thoughts on extended projects that could develop out of each chapter. While they
ask a broad range of questions and consider a host of texts, they, in most cases, find
affinity through their linking of text and image, and content and form.
On October 8-9, 2020, the Université catholique de Louvain hosted a conference,
“Engaging Margins: Framing Imagery as Embodiment of Cognitive Processes,” at which
I presented. The conference aimed to “assess to what extent images placed in the margins
of a main literary or visual work could reflect, encourage or interact with cognitive
processes. To date, the influence of early modern developments of knowledge in
marginal visual devices has been under-addressed in art historical studies.”1 My paper
focused on the physical manifestation of the 1633 edition of Hugo Grotius’s Mare
liberum, and John Selden’s response, Mare clausum (1635; English translation 1652). I

Call for papers, Gwendoline de Mûelenaere and Sophie Suykens, “Engaging Margins: Framing
Imagery as Embodiment of Cognitive Processes,” Université catholique de Louvain, October 8-9,
2020.
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argued that the material presentation of these treatises had a significant effect on the way
that readers conceived of the contested legal principle of freedom of the seas. Although
the first edition of Mare liberum did not contain illustrations and relied solely on its text
to construct a sound legal argument, the 1633 edition integrated a sailing ship on its title
page, a visual cue to remind the reader of the benefit of open seas (fig. C.1). Selden’s
Mare clausum (1635) incorporated several illustrations, including two maps of the British
Isles. In addition to these cartographic appendages, Mare clausum’s English translation
(1652) employed an elaborate frontispiece and corresponding poem that further
promulgated Selden’s argument for English sovereignty over its territorial waters (fig.
C.2). Ultimately, my paper argued that these paratextual frames augmented readers’
conceptions of maritime space. They complemented the adjacent text by providing a
visual reinforcement of the legal arguments contained within.
During the summer of 2020, along with historian Valérie Hayaert, I organized a
panel for the Renaissance Society of America’s annual meeting. The theme, broadly, was
“Early Modern Law and Visual Culture.” Our panel will interrogate the visual
dimensions of early modern law and legal phenomena. During the period, images acted
as surrogates for judges and, consequently, enjoyed an inherent relationship to legal
authority. In addition, these artworks often hung above judge’s benches, representing a
visual reinforcement of their juridical role. Thinking through these larger themes, Carolin
Behrmann’s paper will consider the role of balance in shaping both aesthetic and judicial
principles in early modern Europe; Vanessa Paumen will analyze two large panel
paintings depicting the judgment of Cambyses which hung in the city hall chamber of
Bruges; and my own paper will consider the figure of Neptune as the visual exemplar of
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early modern maritime law. Our interdisciplinary panel centers Continental (rather than
English) law and visual culture.
In conjunction, this conference and panel have pushed me to consider the
visuality of printed English law. In my first chapter, I considered legal texts as texts. I did
not, however, attend to their physical manifestation: the way the text appeared on the
page; their historiated initials; their borders; their woodcuts and engravings. A project
that considers the texts of early modern English law alongside their paratextual elements
would provide a fruitful site of scholarly enquiry and investigation. Previously, this work
has been undertaken by Continental, and in particular, German scholars.2 German printed
books of early modern law, such as Michael Beuther’s German translation of Joost de
Damhouder’s Praxis rervm criminalium (Frankfurt, 1565), contain sophisticated
woodcuts (figs. C.3 and C.4). Locating this visuality in English law books of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries proves more difficult, and perhaps requires a
reorientation of the concept of “image,” but it does not preclude sustained research and
analysis. My preliminary explorations have uncovered some printed books that would
serve as the foundation of my inquiries. In addition to John Selden’s Mare clausum,
Edward Coke’s The first part of the Institutes of the lawes of England. Or, A
commentarie upon Littleton (1628) teems with visual elements that supplement the text.
The title page, for example, offers the reader a rich viewing experience (fig. C.5) before
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See, eg, Franziska Prinz, Der Bildgebrauch in gedruckten Rechtsbüchern des 15. bis zum
Ausgang des 18. Jahrhunderts (Hamburg: LIT, 2006); Klaus F. Röhl, “Bilder in gedruckten
Rechtsbüchern,” in Recht Vermitteln: Strukturen, Formen und Medien der Kommunikation im
Recht, ed. Kent Lerch (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2005), 267-348; Hanna Sofia Hayduk, Rechtsidee und
Bild: Zur Funktion und Ikonografie der Bilder in Rechtsbüchern vom 9. bis zum 16. Jahrhundert
(Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2013). See also Fabiana Tuccillo, “Typographic Art and Roman Law: A
Renaissance Image of the Lex XII Tabularum,” in History of Law and Other Humanities, ed.
Virginia Amorosi and Valerio Massimo Minale (Madrid: Dykinson, 2019), 69-80.
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the reader engages with the book’s content. The 1629 edition also contains an engraving
by Robert Vaughan of fifteenth-century judge and legal writer Thomas de Littleton (fig.
C.6). What fascinates me the most about this edition, however, is the complicated layout
of its text (figs. C.7-C.9). An admixture of roman, italic, and two types of gothic, it
presents readers with a sophisticated visual interface that fluctuates between Littleton’s
original text, the English translation, and Coke’s explication of the text. This interface
and oscillation of font mediates their consumption of Coke’s commentary on Littleton.
Printers maintained this elaborate textual presentation when producing the second, third,
and fourth parts of Coke’s Institutes (although the layout of text reverts into a more
conventional configuration: fig. C.10). In another seventeenth-century legal example,
John Selden’s Mare clausum (1635) incorporates the oscillation of font (fig. C.11), which
included letters from Old English—a detail that presented problems for the Dutch printers
who pirated the work the following year (fig. C.12).3 Font represents a necessary paratext
in printed books, one that acts as an intermediary between text and reader, and a closer
inspection of the relationship between content and form may lead to discoveries about
authority and printed English law. The 1671 edition of William Dugdale’s Origines
juridiciales, or, Historical memorials of the English laws also incorporates an illustration
of judges and administrators who played an important role in English legal history (fig.
C.13). The interplay of text, font, and image in these examples invites such questions as,
to what extent did legal authority rest in a particular font for the early modern English

Peter J. Lucas, “Printing Anglo-Saxon in Holland and John Selden’s Mare Clausum seu de
Dominio Maris,” Quaerendo 31.2 (2001), 120-38.
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lawyer, and how did paratexts such as images and even layout of text serve to reinforce
the attendant legal texts? I would like to pursue this line of questioning in the future.4
A possible avenue of inquiry embedded in my second chapter involves the early
modern construction of piratical identity. I began to address this question within the
chapter, especially in my discussion of the early Stuart pirate plays. A project of this
nature would expand the texts with which it engages: in addition to further plays of the
period, it would include legal texts that address piracy, including the maritime codes
discussed in my first chapter, as well as more theoretical works, such as Grotius’s De jure
belli ac pacis (1625); commentary from the period’s naval officers, such as William
Monson’s Naval Tracts; additional popular accounts (including ballads), such as A true
relation of the life and death of Sir Andrew Barton, a pirate and rover on the seas (1630)
and non-drama literary depictions of pirates, such as in Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie
Queene (1590, 1596) and William Warner’s depiction of Aegaeon in Albions England
(1612). Furthermore, it would attend much more closely to the text of the royal
proclamations considered in my second chapter, in addition to their form. Texts from the
pirate’s own hand, such as Cusack’s (alleged) journal in The Grand Pyrate: Or, the Life
and Death of Capt. George Cusack (1675) and Henry Mainwaring’s account of his own
piratical exploits in Discourse on Pirates (c.1618) would also be considered. The protean
sea robber, like the sea itself, remained always in flux, shifting and mutating as he moved

Work of this type has been tackled in, for example, Mark Bland, “The Appearance of the Text
in Early Modern England,” Text 11 (1998), 91-154 and Kasia Solon Cristobal, “From Law in
Blackletter to ‘Blackletter Law’,” Law Library Journal 108.2 (2016), 181-216.
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between texts. and my research would theorize how language, in turn, informed this
refashioning in relation to different purposes, forms, and audiences.
My third chapter offers three possible sustained sites of study, one of which I will
discuss here. It would consider the role of tempest and shipwreck in early modern
English literature and culture.5 The Faerie Queene involves several shipwrecks: in
addition to the wreck sustained by Philtera’s ship and the moored ships that dot Acrasia’s
islands, Talus’s defeat of the Giant is described thus:
Like as a ship, whom cruell temptest driues
Vpon a rocke with horrible dismay,
Her shattered ribs in thousand peeces riues,
And spoyling all her geares and goodly ray,
Does make her selfe misfortunes piteous pray.
So downe the cliffe the wretched Gyant tumbled;
His battered ballances in peeces lay;
His timbered bones all broken rudely rumbled,
So was the high aspyring with huge ruine humbled. (V.ii.50)
In The Faerie Queene, the ocean often represents a site of metamorphosis.6 However,
existing criticism does not adequately address why the Giant evolves into a metaphoric
ship, nor why his ascent resembles a shipwreck. I did not address this episode in my
chapter; however, the broader motif of shipwreck in early modern English literature and
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The germ of this idea lies The Tragic History of the Sea, ed. and trans. C.R. Boxer
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001) and art historian Lawrence Otto Goedde,
Tempest and Shipwreck in Dutch and Flemish Art (State College: Pennsylvania State University
Press, 1989).
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For example, when Lucy leaps into the sea in V.iv in her thwarted suicide attempt, her intent
reorients itself: “The wretched mayd that earst desir’d to die / When as the paine of death she
tasted had/And but halfe seen his vgly visomie / Gan to repent, that she had been so mad”
(V.iv.11). Perhaps the most evocative example, however, is that of Malbecco. Filled with disgust
at the perfidy of Hellenore, he runs to a precipice over the sea and in a moment of suicidal despair
throws himself off. However, because he has so long neglected himself “through long anguish,
and selfe-murdering thought” (III.x.57), the leap is not enough to kill him. His waif-like frame
receives “no hurt at all” and he crawls into a small cave. Eventually, after becoming inured to the
existence he is “woxen so deform’d that he was quight / Forgot he was a man, and Gelosy is
hight” (III.x.60).
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culture offers such a rich site of analysis, especially in an analysis informed by legal
conceptions of wreck. Legally, a ship represents much more than a vehicle by which to
transport people and goods from one point to another: it is also an instrument fraught
with multifarious legal significance. Legal historian D.P. O’Connell notes:
A ship is a unique subject-matter of law. It is for some purposes, such as being a
negotiable asset of value, a chattel, but it is not only a chattel, because it has the
capacity to carry with it the law and jurisdiction of sovereigns. In that sense a
ship is said to have personality, but that is an unusual usage of the expression
because, unlike persons in international law, a ship is not a legal actor
independent of those who operate it, and if it is the bearer of legal rights and
obligations this is only for procedural reasons. Unlike inanimate objects, a ship is
the creature simultaneously of more than one system of law.7
This legal aspect of ships, and shipwrecks, would provide an additional linking of the
maritime, the legal, and the cultural. The second point of my investigation would
incorporate shipwreck narratives. Although England failed to generate a literature of this
genre to rival the Portuguese, it did produce seventeenth-century pamphlets such as
Lamentable newes, shewing the wonderfull deliuerance of Maister Edmond Pet sayler,
and maister of a ship (1613), The raging tempest stilled (1623), and Sad News from the
Seas. Being a true relation of the losse of that good Ship called the Merchant Royal
(1641). These short accounts provide the reader with the inherent drama of wreck: “[the
ship] began to sinke deeper and deeper into the Sea, whereupon every one began to shift
for himselfe in laying hold some upon one thing, and some upon another … then with
great shrikes and loud cries they were al drowned: Nay more, not one living thing in the
ship saved.”8 Broadside ballads that depict wreck also circulated, such as Martin Parker’s

7

O’Connell. The International Law of the Sea, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 747.

8

Lamentable newes, shewing the wonderfull deliverance of Maister Edmond Pet sayler and
maister of a ship, A2v.
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Neptune’s raging fury, or, The gallant sea-mens sufferings (c.1650) and The Benjamin’s
lamentation for their sad loss at sea, by storms and tempests (c.1674). These accounts are
imbued with theological or moral meaning; as Lawrence Goedde observes, “The
tempestuous sea has always occupied a vital place in man’s consciousness of the world
and of himself. Apprehended as tragic circumstance and as deeply resonant symbol, it has
been an unfailing source of metaphors for the vicissitudes of existence.”9 What intrigues
me the most about these accounts, however, is their marriage of text with image (figs.
C.14-C.21). Not only do these images present a third point at which to theorize about
early modern shipwreck, they also imply that English conceptions of shipwreck were as
much visual as they were textual. Thus, this project would stage a dialogue between text
and image in these narratives, in addition to depictions of tempest and shipwreck in the
period’s poetry, prose romance, and drama. These considerations would be informed,
more generally, by the legal meanings inherent in shipwreck.
My final research project, rooted in my fourth chapter, considers the role of
Neptune in early modern English culture. It argues that the sea god’s portrayal in the
frontispiece of Marchamont Nedham’s 1652 translation of John Selden’s Mare clausum
(1635) represents a kind of apogee, one in which Neptune had come to symbolize a visual
exemplar of early modern maritime law. The project traces Neptune’s evolution across
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and engages with the different meanings the
English ascribed to him. Taking cues from the work of art historian Luba Freedman, who
researches the artistic evolution of Neptune in Renaissance Italy, Richard Unger, who
studies illustrations on sixteenth- and seventeenth-century maritime maps, and Reuben

9

Goedde, 1.
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Brower, who considers how the mythic Neptune was translated from classical to early
modern literary and visual depictions, my research links Neptune with the poetic, the
cartographic, the visual, and the legal. In one interesting example, Neptune appears in
two different pictographic roles (military and mythological) in John Speed’s Theatre of
the Empire of Great Britaine (figs. C.22-C.25). This project is essentially
interdisciplinary in its approach and applies the tools of literary and visual analysis,
cultural history, and history of the book. Such a project on a particular mythical figure
finds precedent in Jane Kingsley-Smith’s 2010 monograph Cupid in Early Modern
Literature and Culture, which considers the cultural significance of Cupid in early
modern England.10
Despite his proliferation in texts of the English Renaissance, Neptune has
received no comparable treatment in English literary or cultural scholarship. My project
would remedy this deficiency. It takes on a two-pronged approach: it considers the visual
and the textual and examines how these media worked in tandem to produce the uniquely
English Neptune. This section focuses mainly on The Faerie Queene and Poly-Olbion,
although I will include other works that feature Neptune, such as John Lyly’s Gallathea
and Ben Jonson’s Neptune’s Triumph for the Return of Albion. Poly-Olbion presents a
particularly useful site of investigation: Neptune appears not only in Drayton’s verse, but

10

Most work on Renaissance Neptune has been undertaken by art historians working on
Renaissance Italy. See, eg, Cecil Gould, “Leonardo’s ‘Neptune’ Drawing,” The Burlington
Magazine 94.595 (1952), 289-95; Bianca Candida, “Un bronzo di Alessandro Vittoria,”
Prospettiva 28 (1982), 79-82; Anna Maria Massinelli, “Osservazioni sul rilievo del Carro di
Nettuno al Museo del Bargello,” Mitteilungen des Kunsthistorischen Institutes in Florenz 36.1/2
(1992), 227-35; Richard J. Tuttle, The Neptune Fountain in Bologna: Bronze, Marble, and Water
in the Making of a Papal City (London: Harvey Miller, 2015).
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also in the attendant cartographic engravings that accompany the poem (figs. 4.6-4.9).
Poly-Olbion, thus, entails an interplay of text and image. The English nature of Neptune
is solidified further in the poem’s dedication, where Drayton writes on Prince Henry’s
maritime aspirations: “He like great Neptune on three Seas shall rove, / And rule three
Realms, with triple power like Jove.” The Faerie Queene, although it lacks contemporary
illustrations, also constructs Neptune as the allegorical manifestation of English maritime
law, as I argue in Chapter 3.
The second prong of my project engages the visual. Locating this visual English
Neptune proves a bit more challenging than his Italian counterpart: England enjoyed no
fountains of Neptune as in Florence (fig. C.26), Bologna (fig. C.27), or Messina (fig.
C.28), civic monuments that afforded the public imposing views of the god of the sea.
My research has revealed, however, that Neptune did occupy a public-facing role in
England: he appeared in the historiated initials of several printed royal proclamations,
particularly during the reigns of Mary and Elizabeth (fig. C.29).11 This discovery reveals
that Neptune already enjoyed a relationship to English maritime law long before
Marchamont Nedham’s translation of Mare clausum: the proclamations that his image
accompanies include 563 (Elizabeth, 1569), which enforced penalties against piracy and
784 (Elizabeth, 1596), which ordered defenses maintained and commanded naval officers
remain on the coast (numbers from Hughes and Larkin). To date, no scholar has
considered the relationship between the historiated initials and the text of the
proclamation itself. In Chapter 2, I did not consider how a piece of the proclamation—the

This particular image comes from a 1570 English edition of Sebastian Brant’s Stultifera nauis;
however, it is identical to the initial used in the proclamations.
11
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historiated initial—sat in direct dialogue with its content. Indeed, the extensive
circulation and public display of royal proclamations makes their images of Neptune the
most widely viewed in early modern England, and consequently, developing a portrait of
the English Neptune would be futile without considering his presence on this ubiquitous
royal document. Additionally, my nascent investigations have revealed that European
books also contain historiated initials featuring images of Neptune, mostly in Italy.12
Books containing Neptune were printed in Bologna, Rome, and Venice, and I have
identified six unique Neptune initials (figs. C.30—C.35). I have located one non-Italian
Neptune in a book printed by Sebastian Gryphius in Lyon in 1552 (fig. C.36). These
initials may represent an overlooked, but important, site of scholarship on images of the
Renaissance Neptune.

12

I thank Rachel Young for drawing my attention to the existence of Italian Neptune initials.
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Fig. 2.1 Royal Proclamation, Elizabeth I, issued January 3, 1567
Image and Source: Folger Shakespeare Library
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Fig 2.2 Royal Proclamation, James I, issued December 9, 1619
Image and Source: Folger Shakespeare Library
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Fig. 2.3 Royal Proclamation, Charles II, issued May 12, 1680
Image and Source: Folger Shakespeare Library
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Fig. 2.4 Ward and Danseker, Two notorious Pyrates (London, 1609), title page, woodcut
Image and Source: Folger Shakespeare Library
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Fig. 2.5 Ward and Danseker, Two notorious Pyrates, A1v, woodcut
Image and Source: Folger Shakespeare Library
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Fig. 2.6 Ward and Danseker, Two notorious Pyrates, D4v, woodcut
Image and Source: Folger Shakespeare Library
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Fig. 2.7 A True Relation, of the Lives and Deaths of the two most Famous English Pyrats,
Purser, and Clinton (London, 1639), title page, woodcut
Image: Bodleian Library
Source: Early English Books Online
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Fig. 2.8 A True Relation, of the Lives and Deaths of the two most Famous
English Pyrats, Purser, and Clinton, C1v
Image: Bodleian Library
Source: Early English Books Online
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Fig. 2.9 A True Relation, of the Lives and Deaths of the two most Famous English Pyrats,
Purser, and Clinton, C2r, woodcut
Image: Bodleian Library
Source: Early English Books Online

Fig. 2.10 A True Relation, of the Lives and Deaths of the two most Famous English
Pyrats, Purser, and Clinton, C1v and C2r
Image: Bodleian Library
Source: Early English Books Online
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Fig. 2.11 A True Relation, of the Lives and Deaths of the two most Famous English
Pyrats, Purser, and Clinton, title page, woodcut. Repeats B2r, B6v, C3v, and C4v
Image: Bodleian Library
Source: Early English Books Online

Fig. 2.12 A True Relation, of the Lives and Deaths of the two most Famous English
Pyrats, Purser, and Clinton, C5r, woodcut
Image: Bodleian Library
Source: Early English Books Online
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Fig. 2.13 Willem van de Velde, An English Ship in Action with Barbary Vessels (1678)
Oil on canvas, 109.2 cm x 198.1 cm
Image and Source: National Maritime Museum, Greenwich

Fig. 2.14 Fortune by Land and Sea, Scene 3.4, 33
Image: Boston Public Library
Source: Internet Archive
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Fig. 4.1 Mare clausum (London, 1635), 122-3
Image and Source: Lillian Goldman Law Library
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Fig. 4.2 Andrea Mantegna, Battle of the Sea Gods (c.1485–88)
Engraving, 28.6 cm x 37.5 cm
Image and Source: The Metropolitan Museum of Art

Fig. 4.3 (detail of 4.2)
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Fig. 4.4 Leonardo, Drawing of Neptune c.1504-5
Charcoal on paper, 25.1 cm x 39.2 cm
Image and Source: Royal Collection Trust
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Fig. 4.5 Baccio Bandinelli, Drawing of Andrea Doria as Neptune (after 1528)
Pen and brown ink on paper, 42.7 cm x 27.5 cm
Image and Source: British Library
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Fig. 4.6 Agnolo Bronzino, Portrait of Andrea Doria as Neptune (c.1530s)
Oil on canvas, 115 cm x 53 cm
Image: Pinacoteca di Brera
Source: Wikipedia Commons
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Fig. 4.7 William Hole, Cornwall, Devonshire, and The Channel Islands (1612)
Engraving
Image and Source: Folger Shakespeare Library

Fig. 4.8 (detail of 4.7)
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Fig. 4.9 William Hole, The Island of Lundy, Glamorgan, Monmouthshire, part of
Brecknockshire (1612)
Engraving
Image and Source: Folger Shakespeare Library

Fig. 4.10 (detail of 4.9)
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Fig. C.1 De mari libero (Leiden, 1633), title page, engraving
Image and Source: University of Minnesota Law School
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Fig. C.2 Franz Cleyn and Pierre Lombart, Of the dominion, or,
ownership of the sea (London, 1652), frontispiece, engraving
Image: University of California Berkeley
Source: Wikipedia Commons
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Figure C.3 Praxis rervm criminalium (Frankfurt, 1565), 171r, woodcut
Image and Source: Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg
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Figure C.4 Praxis rervm criminalium (Frankfurt, 1565), 152v, woodcut
Image and Source: Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg
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Fig. C.5 The first part of the Institutes of the lawes of England.
Or, A commentarie vpon Littleton (London, 1628), title page, engraving
Image: Hathi Trust
Source: The Ohio State University
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Fig. C.6 Robert Vaughan, Thomas de Littleton (1629), engraving
Image: Hathi Trust
Source: University of Michigan
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Fig. C.7 First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (London, 1628), 14
Image: Hathi Trust
Source: The Ohio State University
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Fig. C.8 First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (London, 1628), 18
Image: Hathi Trust
Source: The Ohio State University

Fig. C.9 (detail of C.8)
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Fig. C.10 The fourth part of the Institutes of the laws of England: concerning the
jurisdiction of courts (London, 1644), 12
Image: Hathi Trust
Source: The Ohio State University
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Fig. C.11 Mare clausum (London [Leiden?], 1636), 148
Image: Hathi Trust
Source: Universidad Complutense de Madrid
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Fig. C.12 Mare clausum (London [Leiden?],1636), detail of page 164
Image: Hathi Trust
Source: Universidad Complutense de Madrid

Fig. C.13 Origines juridiciales, or, Historical memorials of the
English laws (London, 1671), 100, engraving
Image: Hathi Trust
Source: The Ohio State University
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Fig. C.14 Lamentable newes, shewing the wonderfull deliuerance of Maister Edmond Pet
sayler, and maister of a ship (London, 1613), title page, woodcut
Image: British Library
Source: Early English Books Online
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Fig. C.15 Sad news from the seas. Being a true relation of the losse of that good ship
called the Merchant Royall (London, 1641), title page, woodcut
Image: British Library
Source: Early English Books Online
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Fig. C.16 The wonders of this windie winter. By terrible stormes and tempests (London,
1613), title page, woodcut
Image: British Library
Source: Early English Books Online
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Fig. C.17 The raging tempest stilled (London, 1623), title page, woodcut
Image: British Library
Source: Early English Books Online
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Fig. C.18 Neptune’s raging fury, or, The Gallant Sea-mens Sufferings
(London, c.1650), woodcut
Image and Source: English Broadside Ballad Archive

Fig. C.19 (detail of C.18)
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Fig. C.20 The Benjamin’s lamentation for their sad loss at sea,
by storms and tempests (London, c.1674), woodcut
Image and Source: English Broadside Ballad Archive

Fig. C.21 (detail of C.20)
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Fig. C.22 Map of Caernarvon, John Speed (1603-1611)
Engraved with hand coloring, 37.5 cm by 51 cm
Image and Source: Cambridge University Library

Fig. C.23 (detail of C.22)
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Fig. C.24 Map of Denbighshire, John Speed (1603-1611)
Engraved with hand coloring, 37.5 cm by 51 cm
Image and Source: Cambridge University Library

Fig. C.25 (detail of C.24)
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Fig. C.26 Bartolomeo Ammannati. Neptune Fountain (begun 1565), Florence
Marble
Image: Artstor
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Fig. C.27 Giambologna, Neptune Fountain (1563-67), Bologna
Bronze and marble
Image: Artstor

Fig. C.28 Giovanni A Montorsoli, Fountain of Neptune (1551-1557), Messina
Marble
Image: Artstor
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Fig. C.29 Historiated T, Stultifera nauis, qua omnium mortalium
narratur stultitia (London, 1570)
Image: Hathi Trust
Source: Getty Research Institute
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Fig. C.30 Historiated N, La montagna Circea torneamento
(Bologna, 1600)
Image: Hathi Trust
Source: Getty Research Institute

Fig. C.31 Historiated N, Orlando Furioso (Venice, 1556)
Image: Hathi Trust
Source: Duke University
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Fig. C.32 Historiated N, Libro di M. Giovambattista Palatino cittadino romano
(Rome, 1550)
Image: Hathi Trust
Source: Getty Research Institute

Fig. C.33 Historiated N, La Republica e i magistrati di Vinegia (Venice, 1564)
Image: Hathi Trust
Source: Universidad Complutense de Madrid
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Fig. C.34 Historiated N, Descrittione di tutta Italia (Bologna, 1550)
Image: Hathi Trust
Source: Getty Research Institute

Fig. C.35 Historiated N, Historia continente da l'origine di Milano tutti li gesti
(Venice, 1554)
Image: Google Books
Source: The Bavarian State Library
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Fig. C.36 Historiated A, Lexicon ivris civilis (Lyon, 1552)
Image: Google Books
Source: Ghent University
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